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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
A growing body of literature documents the influence of firm-specific 
determinants on dividend changes.1 In general, cash distributions are 
economically useful for managers and shareholders, if they lead share prices to 
rise.2 This happens when investors prefer dividend-paying companies to 
nonpaying companies.3 The assumed positive value effect is conclusive only if 
payouts are more advantageous than reinvestments and, for example, contribute 
to the assimilation of the information asymmetries between managers and 
investors to overcome free cash flow problems.4 Although common explanatory 
variables for dividend changes are frequently derived from trade-off, pecking 
order and agency theories, pieces of the dividend puzzle are still missing, such as 
how stock market liquidity influences dividend changes.5  
The 2008 financial market crisis has changed companies’ business 
environment towards capital funding as well as significantly changing investors’ 
affinity and shows in particular that liquidity in stock markets is not self-evident.6 
Because selling stocks becomes more expensive with a lack of tradability, it 
becomes disadvantageous to reverse investment decisions, and the insecurity of 
                                            
1 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 403 f.; Charitou, A. et al. (2011), p. 1521 f.; De 
Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 1 f.; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 375 f.; Li, 
W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 293 f. 
2 Cf. Aharony, J., Swary, I. (1980), p. 11. 
3 Cf. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2004), p. 1160. 
4 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 753; Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. 
(1976), p. 342 f.   
5 Cf. Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R. H. (1973), p. 918; Myers, S. C. (1984), p. 575 f.; 
Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 219 f. 
6 Cf. Bogle, J. C. (2016), p. 9 f.; Mancini, L. et al. (2013), p. 1821. 
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investing rises. The illiquidity experience might provide new insights to 
understand the nature of dividend changes. 
The theoretical impact of illiquidity on dividend changes is ambiguous: it 
can be either substitutive or complementary.7 The negative, exchangeable 
relationship is attributed to manager-shareholder conflict and the corporate goal 
of assimilating the corporate information level to reduce financing costs.8 Because 
the decision to pay out a dividend contains information about the firms’ 
perspectives, it can downsize investment risks by reducing agency costs.9 Despite 
the numerous possibilities to demonstrate that they are not running the company 
opportunistically, managers favor cash distributions over stock buybacks to 
create trust.10 In addition to information asymmetries, the risk of equity-holding 
increases if shareholders cannot reverse their investment decision quickly at low 
cost.11 Therefore, the substitutive effect implies that both dividends and stock 
market liquidity can help to reduce investment risk.12  
In contrast to the substitution theory, stock liquidity and dividends are also 
stated to be complementary.13 Companies with more volatile earnings, 
unpredictable net cash flows and various investment opportunities pay lower 
dividends.14 As larger firms tend to have more stable cash flows and lower debt, 
greater firm size significantly promotes dividend payments.15 At the same time, 
access to capital markets improves with company size and larger companies 
                                            
7 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 428; Banerjee, S. et al. (2007), p. 394; Kale, J. R. 
et al. (2012), p. 27 f. 
8 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H.  (1984), p. 650 f.; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988),        
p. 149 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323 f.; Lang, L. H. P., Litzenberger, R. H. (1989),                   
p. 181 f. 
9 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 393. 
10 Cf. Benesh, G. A. et al. (1984), p. 140; Best, R. J., Best, R. W. (2001), p. 361 f.; 
Denis, D. J. et al. (1994), p. 586; Yoon, P. S., Starks, L. T. (1995), p. 1015 f. 
11 Cf. Bernstein, P. L. (1987), p. 55. 
12 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007), p. 371. 
13 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. (2002), p. 8; Jiang, F. et al. (2017), p. 312. 
14 These findings are in line with the trade-off model and the pecking order 
predictions. 
15 Cf. Steck, A. (2010), p. 4. 
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generally have more liquid traded stocks. Accordingly, a manager’s decision to 
distribute dividends is positively connected to company size and simultaneously 
the tradability of shares improves. If this is the case, a positive relationship 
between stock liquidity and dividends can be assumed.  
The contrary views in the literature, which are explained in more detail in 
section 3.3, show that further research is necessary to explore the effect of stock 
market liquidity on dividend changes. This dissertation aims to close that 
research gap and to answer the central question as to whether stock market 
liquidity determines dividend changes.  
1.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH 
The study contributes to the growing body of dividend change research in 
several areas:  
 
First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge the influence of stock market 
liquidity on dividend changes has not been analyzed yet. Therefore, the research 
is unique in controlling the influence of liquidity on dividend changes, while 
research is still currently engaged in seeking the key determinants of dividend 
changes. This investigation fits with that search by promoting the understanding 
of the modern capital allocation process. Besides the liquidity level, annual 
liquidity changes are used to explain managements’ propensity to change 
dividends. Previous studies show that a decrease in transaction costs lead share 
prices to rise.16 Furthermore, increasing stock liquidity influences the firm’s 
growth opportunities positively and also corporate managers and shareholders 
base their investment decisions on the trading environment.17 Despite these 
findings, the influence of liquidity changes on dividend changes is not adequately 
studied. The research question becomes particularly contemporary, since 
illiquidity shocks are more evident after the 2008 financial market crisis. 
 
 
 
                                            
16 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H.  (1986), p. 46. 
17 Cf. Becker-Blease, J. R., Paul, D. L. (2006), p. 50. 
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Second, dividend research commonly uses stochastic data modeling 
techniques such as linear regression or linear discriminate analysis.18 Those 
techniques rely on historical information regarding the data structure and are 
therefore backward looking. To overcome that problem, machine learning 
approaches depend less on historical information, treat the nature of the variable 
as a black box and do not require a clear vision of the model.19 Regarding their 
importance for the outcome variable, the algorithm organizes the input variables 
in descending order of importance.20 As the statistical power of machine learning 
estimation is high and is not only backwards directed, it is a suitable tool to 
expand the stochastic investigation.21 Compared to data models, algorithmic 
models can reach a better predictive accuracy and therefore provide superior 
information about the underlying mechanism.22 To use a wide variety of tools in 
the present study, classical stochastic data modeling like panel logit estimation 
and linear discriminant analysis are used together with algorithmic data 
modeling techniques (data mining) like decision tree, random forest and gradient 
boosting, which are quite innovative in this research field.23 Even if data mining 
does not per se outperform the classic models it can help to strengthen the 
understanding of dividend payout decisions.24 Employing different classification 
techniques aims at delivering additional insights into the decision about whether 
to change dividends. 
 
Third, the investigation of European companies is still underrepresented to 
date, as most investigations are conducted on American and British databases. 
Different corporate governance systems and degrees of shareholder protection 
                                            
18 Cf. Chan, K. F. et al. (2016), p. 935 f.; De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), 
p. 8 f.; Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 731; La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 1 f., 
among others. 
19 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 199. 
20 Cf. Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 5. 
21 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 214. 
22 Cf. Huang, Z. et al. (2004), p. 543 f. 
23 Breiman, L. (2001), p. 214 recommends the use of multiple methods for data 
analysis.  
24 Cf. Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 342 f.   
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can be examined in many countries, which makes a cross-border investigation 
necessary.25 In this context, Europe is of high importance for the global economy, 
with a percentage on the world GDP of 23.70 in 2015; while Germany, Britain and 
France are in the top six of the worldwide nominal GDP.26 The European area, 
furthermore, covers an interesting cross-border heterogeneous environment, 
especially due to the current sovereign debt crisis. Exemplary German companies 
are declared to have rather flexible distribution policies in an international 
comparison.27 In fact, in more than three quarter of the present annual 
observations German companies’ change their dividends. With reference to its 
great flexibility and versatility, Europe should be examined separately. For this 
reason the study might lead to results that differ from US and British studies and 
contributes to the current state of research.  
 
Fourth, the time span of this study covers the eventful years from 2006 to 
2014. It includes the outbreak of the financial market crisis in 2008 as well as the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis. Contemporary liquidity issues, especially the 
financial market crisis in 2008, might provide new insights to explain how 
companies’ payout behavior changes with illiquidity.28 As companies aiming at 
keeping dividends on a constant level e.g. to avoid negative feedback from stock 
prices and to ensure steady financing costs, the turbulent conditions within the 
nine years covered by the research may force companies to reduce their payouts 
to ensure companies’ solvency. Thus, the time span enlarges the possibility of 
investigating the nature of rarely appearing dividend decreases.29 These special 
                                            
25 Cf. Amihud, Y., Murgia, M. (1997), p. 397 f.; La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 1 f.; 
Short, H. et al. (2002), p. 105 f., among others. 
26 Cf. World Bank, 22 July 2016. 
27 Goergen, M. et al (2005) investigates the flexibility of dividend changes 
within different corporate governance systems.   
28 Cf. Caballero, R., Simsek, A. (2012), p. 2549 f.; Nagel, S. (2012), p. 2 f., among 
others.  
29 That dividend decreases are unpopular with corporate managers is 
documented among others in the early survey of Lintner, J. (1956) and in 
Javakhadze, D. et al. (2014) afterwards.  
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surroundings make Europe particularly interesting for investigation during the 
period presented.  
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
After sketching the importance of the investigation in an economic context, 
chapter two investigates the driving determinants of dividend changes. Since the 
influencing factors of the propensity to pay out a dividend and of dividend yields 
are more thoroughly studied than the determinants of dividend changes, the 
overview starts with a literature analysis of the well studied propensity to pay out 
dividends. Such an analysis permits examination of implications regarding the 
general firm-specific drivers of distribution policies and dividend changes. 
Managers commonly pursue the goal of keeping cash distributions at a constant 
level to ensure steady financing costs and a calculable equity base. Furthermore, 
dividends are sticky to avoid negative feedback from stock prices.30 The special 
nature of dividend change and its influencing determinants is investigated in the 
course of further inquiry. As the dissertation examines the influence of liquidity 
on dividend changes it is indispensable to get an understanding of both the 
dividend-change decision and the liquidity phenomenon. Therefore, chapter three 
introduces the importance, the nature and the different stages of liquidity to 
enhance understanding of the complexity and particularity of this phenomenon. 
Because liquidity has different dimensions, it is difficult to quantify by a single 
measure. Accordingly, several liquidity measures are introduced. They are 
subsequently specifically assessed as to their quality and usefulness under 
different assessment criteria. After selecting suitable measures for the present 
study the potential liquidity proxies are compared to each other.  
The chapter ends with an overview of the current state of research on 
liquidity and dividend changes and the definition of hypotheses that are derived 
from research findings.  
The fourth chapter introduces the research strategy and different modeling 
techniques. Next, the variables selected for scientific research are introduced and 
the empirical analysis of stock liquidity and dividend changes is executed. To get 
                                            
30 Cf. Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; Subrahmanyam, A., Titman, S. (2001), p. 
2389 f. 
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results for the cause-and-effect relationship between stock liquidity and dividend 
changes in Europe, stochastic models are used first and are expanded by three 
machine learning techniques, namely decision tree, random forest and gradient 
boosting. After those techniques are implemented and the analysis is performed, 
the dissertation continues with the interpretation of the statistical results and an 
outlook for further possible research fields that is given in chapter five. 
Summarized, by way of illustration, the structure of the work is given in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the work 
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2 DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND CHANGES 
2.1 VALUE RELEVANCE OF DIVIDEND CHANGES 
2.1.1 Market reactions to dividend changes 
Although dividend payments appear to be easy to understand in the field of 
corporate management, they are difficult to appreciate from an economic point of 
view.31 As a result, corporate finance literature is largely engaged in assessing the 
impact of dividend changes on the market value of listed securities.32  
The dividend discount model illustrates the tension field between 
dividends and company growth. Basically it is assumed that the firm’s value is 
the sum of its future cash flows (including dividend payments) and its constant 
growth rate discounted at an appropriate discount rate:33 
 
(1) Dividend discount model 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Although the dividend payout ratio has a positive effect on the share price, 
the dividend growth rate sinks with higher dividend yields, because it is 
                                            
31 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 650. 
32 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 20; De 
Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 8 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; 
Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 387 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. 
(2006), p. 303 f.; Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f., among others. 
33 Cf. Gordon, M. J., Shapiro, E. (1956), p. 104.  
    
  
     
 
P0 = value of stock in t0 
D1 = estimated dividend per share in t1 
rEK = companies‘ cost of equity capital 
g = constant dividend growth rate in perpetuity 
 
28 SEBASTIAN KUHLMANN 
calculated as the return on equity multiplied by the reinvestment rate                         
(1 – dividend payout ratio). In other words, the growth of dividends is mainly 
influenced by the part of income that is ploughed back into the company and by 
the subsequent profitability of those reinvestments. This in turn can lower the 
theoretical value of the company.34 Despite there being a trade-off between 
dividend payments and company growth following the specific model, several 
investigations indicate that dividend paying firms in particular grow fast.35 Thus, 
there is a need to analyze the influence of dividend changes on share valuations 
in greater detail in the further course of research. 
In a perfect capital market environment, financial decisions do not influence 
the share price.36 Since in reality capital markets are far from being perfect, 
managers face, for example, agency costs, tax burdens and information 
asymmetries.37 Due to those restrictions, dividend distributions are frequently 
stated to affect the company’s market valuation in different ways:   
 
First, the influence of dividend increases on corporate market valuations 
can be negative if capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than cash dividends.38 If, 
for instance, institutional shareholders are taxed beneficially in comparison to 
retail investors, dividend-paying stocks attract more institutions than retail 
investors.39 Institutional owners can be particularly valuable for the future firms’ 
performance since they frequently hold larger stakes than private investors and 
have a monitoring function in the company.40 That illustrates that capital markets 
respond to dividend changes depending on dividend clienteles that are discussed 
in more detail in the further course of the dissertation.  
 
                                            
34 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al. (1997), p. 1031. 
35 Cf. Aivazian, V. et al. (2003), p. 386 f. 
36 Cf. Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F. (1961), p. 411 f.  
37 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H.  (1984), p. 650 f.; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988),       
p 149 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323 f.; Lang, L. H. P., Litzenberger, R. H. (1989),     
p. 181 f.; Leary, M. T., Roberts, M. R. (2010), p. 332 f., among others.  
38 Cf. Jain, R. (2007), p. 406 f. 
39 Cf. Allen, F. et al. (2000), p. 2500. 
40 Cf. Barclay, M. J. et al. (2009), p. 2428 f. 
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Second, contrary to the “tax preference theory”, the “bird in hand 
hypothesis” sees a positive effect in dividend changes and the shareholder value 
in view of the fact that future cash flows have a lower value than present cash 
flows.41 This is due to two reasons: Inflation leads to a depreciation of money over 
time and entrepreneurial risk lowers the value of future cash flows and makes it 
favorable to obtain cash immediately.42 Based on these assumptions, future cash 
flows are discounted by a reference interest rate.43 If the company pays out 
dividends, that amount of money is no longer affected by the risk of suboptimal 
investment decisions by the responsible management.44 However, dividend 
changes can influence shareholder value when investors prefer cash to 
repayments.45 In other words, the theory assumes that equity claimants value 
dividends more than capital gains, because it is uncertain if reinvestments into the 
company lead to higher future returns.46 
With regard to those agency costs, dividends have a positive influence on 
the share price.47 If managers can abuse the firm’s cash reserves for their own 
benefit (e.g. consumptions on the job) dividends can help to control managers by 
reducing available funds.48 If private benefits are taken from cash, the future 
performance of the company will not change after the shift in dividends and the 
resulting signaling effect of dividend changes is misleading. Therefore, the 
disciplinary effect of dividends can create value.49 
 
 
                                            
41 Cf. Bhattacharya, S. (1979), p. 260. 
42 Cf. Myers, S. C. (1984), p. 127.  
43 Cf. Bonduelle, Y. et al. (2003), p. 8.  
44 Cf. Nöll, B., Wiedemann, A. (2011), p. 57. 
45 Cf. Bajaj, M., Vijh, A. M. (1990), p. 217. 
46 Cf. Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F. (1961), p. 411 f. 
47 Cf. Aharony, J., Swary, I. (1980); Asquith, P., Mullins, D. W. (1983); Brickley, 
J. A. (1983); Charest, G (1978); Eades, K. M. (1982); Lipson, M. L. et al. (1998), 
among others. 
48 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), among others.  
49 Cf. Faccio, M. et al. (2001), p. 71; Maury, C. B., Pajuste, A. (2002), p. 17; Jiang, 
Y., Peng, M. W. (2010), p. 685; Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 255 f. 
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Third, the impact of dividend changes on the share price can be positive, 
negative or irrelevant, depending on the signaling value.50 In that sense the 
novelty of the dividend signal plays an important role, because some dividend 
distributions reflect the foretime (show the current and past earnings) whereas 
other dividends permit an outlook on what is coming.  
To keep up the signaling hypothesis, two requirements have to be fulfilled: 
investors have to believe in the signaling value of dividends and dividend 
changes have to be reliable in respect of the future operating performance of the 
company. Whether these conditions are met is discussed in the further course.    
2.1.2 Signaling value of dividends 
If investors believe in the signaling value of dividend changes then they 
assume that dividend changes convey new information, which will lead to stock 
price reactions in an informational efficiency environment.51 For instance, 
increased cash distributions show that the circumstances for investing in the 
company are solid and that the company can afford to distribute cash. In 
particular, dividends provide investors with valuable insights if information 
asymmetries are at a high level.52 This is the case if managers have inside 
information that shareholders do not have. The opportunity for managers to use 
their superior information to enrich themselves at the shareholders’ expense make 
equity claimants demand a higher risk premium for their investments.53 Agency 
costs of unequal distribution are high, especially in the absence of high corporate 
governance principles like voluntary disclosure of inside information, financial 
reporting regulations, reliable auditing procedures and information 
                                            
50 Cf. DeAngelo, H. et al. (2000), p. 310; Dhillon, U. S., Johnson, H. (1994), p. 281 
f.; Bajaj, M., Vijh, A. M. (1990), p. 193 f., among others. 
51 Supported by Aharony, J., Swary, I. (1980); Asquith, P., Mullins, D. W. (1983); 
Brickley, J. A. (1983); Charest, G (1978); Eades, K. M. (1982); Lipson, M. L. et al. 
(1998). 
52 Cf. Allen, D. E. (1993), p. 101; D’Souza, J., Saxena, A. (1999), p. 36; Leary, M. 
T., Roberts, M. R. (2010), p. 332, Myers, S. C., Majluf, N., p. (1984), p. 189, among 
others.  
53 Cf. Brockman, P., Unlu, E. (2009), p. 291. 
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intermediaries.54 On this basis, managers use the distribution policy to reduce 
information asymmetries between management and shareholders and help to 
lower the companies’ costs of equity.55 This implies that dividend changes lead to 
positive share price reactions when the dividend statement reduces the likelihood 
that managers are acting for their personal benefit.56  
The literature finds considerable support for the view that, in particular, 
negative dividend events like omissions and decreases make shareholders adjust 
expectations, as those distributions are followed by significant declines in stock 
price.57 Accordingly, it appears that investors care more about bad than about 
good news. 
In this context, the surprise effect of dividend changes is a further important 
driver; when companies change their dividends unpredictably in one direction, 
investors will adjust their expectations in the same direction.58 In particular, 
dividend decreases that are unexpectedly lower than the forecast make investors 
sell their shares.59 Once dividends become expected, they do not tend to produce 
any reactions.60  
How surprising dividend signals are depends largely on their deviation 
from the earning forecast and the shareholders’ information level.61 Generally, 
regular dividend increases do not lead to abnormal returns, but unexpected 
changes in dividends do.62 That shows that investors rely more on the expected 
favorableness (good, bad or ambiguous) of the dividend signal than on the 
direction of the dividend shift.63 Abnormal returns to dividend change 
                                            
54 Cf. Be‘dard, J. et al. (2004), p. 31 f.; Leuz, C. Verrecchia, R. E. (2000), p. 121. 
55 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 650 f.; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988),        
p 149 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323 f.; Lang, L. H. P., Litzenberger, R. H. (1989),    
p. 181 f., among others. 
56 Cf. Bhattacharya, S. (1979), p. 270. 
57 Cf. Ghosh, C., Woolridge, J. R. (1991), p. 328, among others.  
58 Cf. Manos, R. (2001), p. 55. 
59 Cf. Best, R. J., Best, R. W. (2001), p. 373; Woolridge, J. R. (1982), p. 245.  
60 Cf. Woolridge, J. R. (1982), p. 245. 
61 Cf. ibid.  
62 Cf. Chen, S-S., Fu, K.-C. (2011), p. 598. 
63 Cf. Elfakhani, S. (1998), p. 229. 
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announcements are larger when the firms outperform the earnings forecast that 
has been made before the dividend change.64 In other words, the stock return 
resulting from dividend shifts is positively related to the level of the inaccuracy of 
the prior year’s forecast.65  
Based on the surprise effect, dividend changes can be separated into labeled 
and unlabeled dividend-events. Unlabeled dividend changes let volatility 
increase, whereas labeled dividend changes do not change the level of volatility.  
The instability of the share price of unlabeled distribution changes can be 
explained by two opposite effects: dividends help to reduce information 
asymmetries and therefore are followed by decreasing volatility, but the 
uncertainty of future financing increases, due to the reduced equity base of cash 
payouts.66 Consequently investors reconsider their portfolios’ risk-return-profile 
after dividend announcements which, in turn leads to increasing volatility and 
market reactions.67 Thus, dividends are stated to be either comforting signals as 
soon as the interpretation of the signal is obvious or noisy signals when the 
interpretation of the signal is less apparent.68   
Accounting conservatism might be a relevant factor for the asymmetrical 
information effect of dividend increases and decreases. Lessening the dividend 
yield can be a long-term conservative precautionary intervention in order to 
insure the solvency of the company.69 As dividends are costly, extended cash 
distributions imply that the company can afford the increase in dividends and 
signals that the current earning situation is on a constant level.70 Actually, firms 
that increase their dividends are less likely to have earnings reductions in the 
following years than firms that do not change their dividend.71 Besides the 
                                            
64 Cf. Best, R. J., Best, R. W. (2001), p. 373. 
65 Cf. Woolridge, J. R. (1983), p. 1615. 
66 Cf. Jayaraman, N., Shastri, K. (1993), p. 684. 
67 Cf. ibid. 
68 Cf. Jayaraman, N., Shastri, K. (1993), p. 683. 
69 Cf. Nissim, D., Ziv, A. (2001), p. 2131. 
70 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al.  (1997), p. 1032. 
71 Cf. ibid. 
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general dividend shift, the size of the change matters; the larger the dividend 
changes are, the larger are the resulting price changes.72 
2.1.3 Reliability of dividend change signals  
As a second prerequisite that makes dividends appropriate signals, 
dividend changes have to be reliable in respect of the future operating 
performance of the company.73 For instance, it is expected that increasing 
dividends display current stable earnings and improved future profitability, 
while dividend decreases anticipate the opposite.74 In the current state of the 
literature, it is shown that dividend increases actually lead to better operating 
results in the future after the dividend change, while dividend decreases do not 
influence the company’s future earning level with statistical significance.75  
Those findings are also valid for the low-information environment of ADR 
firms.76 The small influence of lowered cash distributions on the future firm-
performance might be due to the companies’ operational adjustments as a 
consequence of the reduced payout that keep the companies’ operating income on 
a stable level. Deliberate management strategies can lead to higher future 
earnings and can be superior to a resigned “no action strategy”.77 If dividend 
reductions lead to changes in companies’ strategies that make the company more 
profitable in the future, the price decrease is less than the reaction to dividend 
reductions that are not followed by operational action.78 That shows that reduced 
payouts may not be a signal for poor future performance under all 
circumstances.79 
                                            
72 Cf. Benesh, G. A. et al. (1984), p. 140; Denis, D. J. et al. (1994), p. 585; Dhillon, 
U. S., Johnson, H. (1994), p. 288 f.  
73 Cf. Liu, C., Chen, A.-S. (2015), p. 205.  
74 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al. (1997), p. 1032. 
75 Cf. Chen, T.-Y., Kao, L.-J. (2014),  p. 508; Iqbal, Z., Rahmann, M. H. (2002),           
p. 23; Nissim, D., Ziv, A. (2001), p. 2131. 
76 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 428. 
77 Cf. Iqbal, Z., Rahmann, M. H. (2002), p. 24.  
78 Cf. Iqbal, Z., Rahmann, M. H. (2002), p. 23. 
79 Cf. Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 552; Christie, W. G. (1994), p. 473. 
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It can be concluded that the influence of dividend changes on future profit 
finds wide support in the literature.80 Despite numerous investigations finding 
support for the information content of dividend changes, different investigations 
conclude that the information content of dividend changes does not exist.81 While 
the effect of dividend increases is more obvious, dividend decreases influence the 
future companies’ profitability considerably less. 
The results furthermore show that dividends are generally useful for 
transferring information. In order to evaluate the effect of illiquidity on dividend 
changes, the investor’s willingness to buy or sell shares as a result of dividend 
changes appears to be the more important requirement. Investors determine the 
supply and demand of shares and thus influence the sales volume on the stock 
market. Even if traders know that these announcements do not contain any 
information, they expect them to affect share prices, and their beliefs are self-
fulfilled.82  
 
Since dividend omissions and initiations are special in nature, they are 
investigated separately in the following section. While the signaling value of 
dividend omissions is controversial, dividend initiations are described as the 
most informative dividend decision of all.83  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
80 Cf. Benesh, G. A. et al. (1984), p. 140; Denis, D. J. et al. (1994), p. 585; Dhillon, 
U. S., Johnson, H. (1994), p. 288 f. 
81 Cf. Grullon, G. et al. (2005), p. 1618. 
82 Cf. Carmerer, C. (1989), p. 11. 
83 Cf. Ross, S. A. et al. (2005), among others.  
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2.1.4 Special consideration of dividend initiations and omissions 
2.1.4.1 Information content of dividend initiations 
Assuming that managers aim to keep dividends at a constant level (strategy 
of dividend continuity), first-time dividend payments are an important milestone 
in the firm’s life cycle, since it is not intended they will soon be omitted.84 
Initiation, furthermore, implies that the cash distribution will be followed by 
several further dividend payments in the following years. Consequently, paying 
out dividends demonstrates that companies’ earnings are at a constant level and 
that the firms’ prospects are good, because both factors are required to distribute 
cash regularly.85 Generally, dividend policies differ between companies as a sum 
of the expected costs and benefits and can be divided into two categories, 
depending on the following stock price reaction.86  
Dividend initiations increase the firm’s value if equity investors desire 
them.87 If investors aim for cash distributions they react positively to the 
announcement of such distributions.88  
Given that in conditions of semi-strong market efficiency the collection of 
information is costly for shareholders, it is advantageous if information is widely 
publicly available. Data are especially readily available for firms that are highly 
monitored and/or actively traded on stock exchanges. If the companies’ stock 
tradability is low and companies are not monitored, first-time dividend payments 
lessen the costs of gathering self-directed information.89 When managers stick to 
their dividend policies, the first time dividend payment is particularly 
informative for investors and shows that managers anticipate that the future 
earning situation is good enough for successive cash distributions. Moreover, 
those dividends provide shareholders with liquid funds and a steady income 
                                            
84 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 393. 
85 Cf. Goergen, M., et al. (2002), p. 375. 
86 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 393. 
87 Cf. Ferris, S. P. (2009), p. 1730 f.  
88 Cf. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2004), p. 1160; Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 307.  
89 Cf. Mitra, D., Owers, J. E. (1995), p. 551.  
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component that is no longer exposed to operational risk.90 This income becomes 
more meaningful in illiquid capital markets since creating home-made dividends 
by selling shares is costly. Distributing liquidity out of the company furthermore 
limits the investment possibilities of managers and serves as a monitoring 
mechanism. Likewise, dividend announcements lead to increasing volatility in 
equity returns for firms in a low-information environment.91 That also shows that 
the investor’s uncertainty is higher if information is not publicly available. 
Accordingly, the contribution of dividend initiations increases with the lack of 
information in a company’s surroundings.92  
Moreover, cross-firm valuation consequences of dividend initiations 
underline their high information value and show that investors not only expect 
the dividend-initiating company to perform better than it was forecasted to do, 
but also have the same expectation for the whole industry. The reaction to first-
time dividend payments increases with the surprise effect of the dividend 
announcement.93 In the literature, the positive reaction to dividend initiations far 
outweighs negative observations and supports the positive signaling value of 
such initiations.94 
However, there are also findings that dividend initiations do not necessarily 
reflect positive developments.95 It is stated that dividend initiations are not 
automatically a sign of high profitability but of shareholders’ liquidity needs.96 
When companies with constant liquidity levels, increasing capital expenditures 
and improved profitability pay dividends, the distribution can also show that 
investment opportunities have declined.97  
 
 
 
                                            
90 Cf. Brown, J. R. et al. (2007), p. 1935 f.  
91 Cf. Kalay, A., Loewenstein, U. (1985), p. 447.  
92 Cf. Lipson, M. L et al. (1998), p. 36. 
93 Cf. Firth, M. (1996), p. 210. 
94 Cf. Born, J. A. (1988), p. 44; McCaffrey, K., Hamill, P. (2000), p. 541. 
95 Cf. Jin, Z. (2000), p. 274.  
96 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 2.  
97 Cf. Wansley, J. W., Lane, W. R. (1987), p. 434. 
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2.1.4.2 Information content of dividend omissions 
Normally, dividend omissions are stated to be unfavorable signals because 
they show a low historical income and a poor present and/or future earning 
situation.98 Then again, they can also demonstrate increasing investments and 
growth opportunities.99 When cash reserves are needed for firms’ growth, the 
resulting allocation of capital leads to dividend suspensions, because the cash 
flows are being used alternatively. Hence, the information content of each 
individual payout omission is influenced by further variables like cash flows, 
leverage and investment opportunities.100 As some of the influencing factors are 
positive and some are negative, the two opposing effects are compared in the 
following discussion.  
That dividend omissions can be positive is especially true for companies 
with high investment opportunities.101 If funds are required for promising 
projects, dividend omissions reflect great expectations rather than hard times.102 
All else being equal, stockholders will not sell their shares when the signaling 
message is credibly positive and based on investment opportunities.103  
Besides the positive effect of dividend omissions, such events are often 
stated to be negative, since low profits and poor performance are the most 
common drivers for dividend omissions.104 In this case, they are interpreted as 
management’s signal that the short-term financial conditions are not expected to 
improve.105 That is underlined by the market reaction to dividend omissions, 
which is larger when firms suffer a loss in the relevant year.106 As the negative 
effect on share prices of omitted distributions is frequently smaller than 
                                            
98 Cf. Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988), p. 173; Liu et al. (2008), p. 1015.  
99 Cf. Christie, W. G. (1994), p. 473.  
100 Cf. Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 552 f. 
101 Cf. Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 552. 
102 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al. (1997), p. 1031 f.; Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 552. 
103 Cf. Robin, A. J. (1998), p. 7. 
104 Cf. Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 552. 
105 Cf. Ghosh, C., Woolridge, J. R. (1991), p. 328. 
106 Cf. Charitou, A. et al. (2011), p. 1540. 
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anticipated, the link between risk-adjusted excess returns and dividend omissions 
is more complex than expected:107  
First, dividend omissions might be the turning point of the unsatisfactory 
situation and might promise a quick recovery.108 Second, firms that leave out 
dividends entirely recover to the preannouncement level more quickly than do 
firms that only reduce their payouts.109 Third, new equity investors who favor 
reinvestments over cash distributions can demand dividend omissions. In this 
case, investors will not review their fundamental valuation of the company and 
are uninfluenced by dividend omissions.110  
Consequently, the market impact and the information content of dividend 
omissions vary individually. Firms that use cash flows for alternative growth 
opportunities are less likely to react negatively to dividend omissions than 
companies that omit payments as a result of missed earnings forecasts. That 
shows that the management’s investment opportunities are important for the 
future development of the company. The opportunity to expand, change or 
shorten projects is a component of the total value of the firm that is referred to as 
a “real option” in the field of corporate evaluation.111 Because an option is equal to 
the freedom of choice it is likely to influence future firm performance positively. 
From a rational perspective managers will not participate in projects when they 
expect them to lower shareholder value. Consequently, the right to choose is 
always a value driver that can potentially compensate the negative effect of 
dividend omissions.  
                                            
107 Cf. Christie, W. G. (1994), p. 473. 
108 Cf. Gunasekarage, A., Power, D. M. (2002), p. 133.  
109 Cf. Christie, W. G. (1994), p. 473. 
110 Cf. Benito, A., Young, G. (2003), p. 532 f. 
111 Cf. McGrath, R. et al. (2004), p. 87. 
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2.2 FIRM SPECIFIC DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND CHANGES DERIVED 
FROM DIVIDEND THEORIES 
2.2.1 Systematization  
It is often claimed in the literature that corporate financing is one of the 
most important fields of value-driven corporate management.112 Except for some 
limitations like legal requirements, debt covenants and the availability of cash, the 
companies’ dividend assumptions are generally free.113 Therefore, empirical 
research finds strong local, temporal and firm-specific variation in dividend 
policies.114 Despite the large differences, one precondition is equal for all firms; 
the dividend decision competes with an alternative use of liquid funds such as 
reinvesting it into the company.115 The capital allocation conflict—whether to 
retain or distribute free cash flows—enhances the field of tension between 
shareholders and managers.116 With regard to the various assumptions that 
dividends could be advantageous, disadvantageous or irrelevant, the 
phenomenon described is well known as the "dividend puzzle", and illustrates 
the difficult nature of payout policies.117 As the conflict described does not exist in 
complete capital markets, the systematization of dividend theories starts with the 
assumption that dividends are irrelevant under those circumstances.118  
However, assuming complete capital markets, financing has no impact on 
the costs of capital and consequently stockholders do not have a preference 
between dividends being paid or not paid.119 In the absence of restrictions, 
dividend payments are also insignificant for shareholder value. Investors who 
prefer cash payments to capital gains can generate liquidity for themselves by 
selling shares—so-called home-made dividends. When earnings are retained, 
                                            
112 Cf. Graham, J. R.  Harvey, C. R. (2001), p. 187 f., among others.   
113 Cf. Chava, S. et al. (2010), p. 1121 f.  
114 Cf. La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 27. 
115 Cf. Grullon, G., Michaely, R. (2002), p. 1676. 
116 Cf. La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 27. 
117 Cf. Black, F. (1976), p. 8; Lam, K.-C. (2014), p. 36. 
118 Cf. Mann, S. V. (1989), p. 3. 
119 Cf. Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F. (1961), p. 414. 
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investors can immediately convert shares into cash by selling the share at the 
increased price.120 That means that, ceteris paribus, in contrast to distributions the 
accumulation of profits leads to higher share prices. Contrarily, the distribution of 
major parts of cash reserves without reinvesting money into the stability of the 
company can make future dividend payments more unlikely.121 
 
Since frictionless trading is not possible in reality, the irrelevance theory 
does not seem to be appropriate to derive recommendations on dividend 
decisions in real life.122 As investors aim to increase their own wealth at the lowest 
possible cost, shareholders are interested in discovering the value-driving 
determinants of the company.123 That particularly includes cash distributions that 
are possible adjustment screws to reduce agency cost and to consequently 
increase the firm’s value.124  
 
The limitations of the irrelevance theory encourage further research in this 
thesis to expand the way in which shifting payouts are viewed. Hence, the firm-
specific determinants of dividend changes in the presence of market 
imperfections are classified and discussed.  
For the systematization of dividend theories, the overview categorizes those 
theories regarding their market imperfections. Not assuming complete capital 
markets can lead either to an optimum dividend strategy that maximizes the 
shareholder value or to a hierarchy that recommends an order in which dividends 
should be distributed. Additionally, some theories imply that managers choose 
their dividend policies depending on both an optimum and a pecking order. 
 
                                            
120 Cf. Copeland, T. E. et al. (2010), p. 698; Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F. (1961),  
p. 414 f. 
121 Cf. Uddin, M. H., Osman, D. (2008), p. 99. 
122 This is underlined by an investigation of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2005) 
that concludes that the irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961) is 
irrelevant due to their inappropriate premises. 
123 Cf. Kelleners, A. (2004), p. 131; Wenzel, J. (2005), p. 67. 
124 Cf. Pott, O., Pott, A. (2012), p. 232; Rappaport, A. (1986), p. 1 f.; Rappaport, 
A. (1999), p. 68. 
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Since basic dividend theories are more numerous than dividend change 
surveys, the determinants of dividend variations are derived from investigations 
that analyze dividend probabilities and dividend yields in a first step.125 In 
summary, five theories are reviewed with the systematization process that is 
visualized in Figure 2. In a second step, the current state of the literature on 
dividend changes is analyzed to find the major drivers for dividend changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
125 Theories of dividend changes are analyzed in more detail in subchapter 
2.2.3.  
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Figure 2: Systematization of dividend theories 
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 2.2.2 Dividend policies 
2.2.2.1 Trade-off theory  
The static trade-off theory describes financing as an optimum of debt 
capitals’ tax advantage and the cost of insolvency.126 In this discussion, the capital 
structure choice becomes relevant as it can increase shareholder value.127 The 
following determinants of dividend changes can be derived from the trade-off 
theory:  
 
Table 1: Determinants of dividend increases based on trade-off theories 
Determinants Expected influence 
 Effective tax rate 
 Leverage 
 Profitability 
 Operational risk 
 Investment alternatives 
 Cash reserves 
 Asset tangibility 
 Company size 
 Company age 
 Target leverage 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
 
Everything else being equal, the tax deductibility of interest-expenses, 
combined with the profit from substituting cheaper debt capital for expensive 
equity capital, makes debt financing more attractive and minimizes the weighted 
                                            
126 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 1 f.; Hackbarth, D. et al. (2007), p. 
1390; Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R. H. (1973), p. 911 f.; Modigliani, F., Miller, M. H. 
(1958), p. 261 f.; Myers, S. C. (1984), p. 575 f.; Shyam-Sunder, L., Myers, S. C. 
(1999), p. 220. 
127 Cf. Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R. H. (1973), p. 918; Modigliani, F., Miller, M. H. 
(1958), p. 296;  Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 219 f. 
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average cost of capital.128 In a few words, financing can be optimized by 
substituting cheaper debt capital for rather costly equity capital. However, 
decreasing the capital costs with higher leverage is only possible up to the point 
where the higher risk premium (that is due to the higher leverage) equals the 
substitution profit.129 Because the dividend policy influences the ratio of equity 
and debt, it can influence the capital costs under these assumptions.130 If 
dividends are distributed, the equity level decreases and the weighted average 
cost of capital sinks until the demanded risk premium of the investors exceeds the 
substitution profit.131 Therefore it is expected the effective tax rates will have a 
positive influence on dividend increases.132 
 
Generally, in line with the trade-off theory, to minimize their financing costs 
highly leveraged firms reduce their liabilities rather than distribute cash out of the 
company.133 In greater detail, the profitability level—as also the size of the 
company—plays a major role for the effect of the leverage ratio on dividend 
changes. This is underlined by one of the pioneering investigations in dividend 
research; the early survey of Lintner (1956) shows that companies follow 
deliberate payout strategies based on the company’s profit.134 As more profitable 
firms have a more comfortable liquidity and equity base, a positive impact on 
                                            
128 Cf. Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R. H. (1973), p. 918; Modigliani, F., Miller, M. H. 
(1958), p. 261 f.; Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 188; Shyam-Sunder, L., 
Myers, S. C. (1999), p. 220.  
129 Cf. Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 219 f. 
130 Modigliani, F., Miller, M. H. (1958), p. 261 f. 
131 Cf. Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 219 f. 
132 The positive influence of the tax rate is also analyzed in Allen, F. et al. 
(2000), p. 2499 f.; Barclay, M. J., et al. (2008), p. 2453; John, K., Williams, J. (1985), 
p. 1053 f.  
133 Cf. Al-Najjar, B. (2011), p. 209 f.; Charitou, A. et al. (2011), p. 1533; Grulllon, 
G. et al. (2002), p. 411. 
134 Cf. Lintner, J. (1956), p. 101. 
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dividends is assumed.135 The profitability situation is one of the most investigated 
and well established drivers for distribution policy throughout other research.136  
Hence, declining profitability increases the costs of insolvency; companies 
with highly fluctuating income tend to face higher costs.137 Smaller companies 
have higher operational risk and more volatile earnings than do larger ones and 
therefore basically have higher costs of insolvency that make them keep their debt 
at a low level.138 As larger firms usually have more stable incomes, their 
insolvency costs remain low despite their higher leverage ratio.139  
In addition to external financing, the firm experiences expenses if the 
company prefers cash distributions to attractive investment opportunities.140 The 
inhibition of promising investments is a further cost driver that might occur if 
investment opportunities exceed the firm’s self-financing capabilities and the 
company refuses to raise external funds.141 Thus, the opportunity cost of dividend 
payments is the value of the best alternative foregone and the missed opportunity 
to generate future profits.142 
 
Although the influence of cash reserves on dividend policies is frequently 
documented in the literature143, the direction of influence remains unclear: Even 
though high cash reserves might designate stable profits, they can also illustrate 
                                            
135 Cf. Al-Najjar (2011), p. 213; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379; Grullon et al. 
(2002), p. 387; Jensen, G. R. et al. (1992), p. 257; Mizraei (2012), p. 327 f.; Lintner, J. 
(1953), p. 252. 
136  The influence of the profitability situation on dividends is also analyzed in 
Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 28; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379; Gugler, K. 
(2003), p. 1310; Jensen, G. R. et al. (1992), p. 257; Lintner, J. (1956), p. 101; Mizraei 
(2012), p. 327 f, among others. 
137 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 14. 
138 Cf. Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. (2015), p. 367. 
139 Cf. Mueller, F. (2010), p. 49; Steck, A. (2010), p. 4. 
140 Cf. Miller, M. H., Rock, K. (1985), p. 1048. 
141 Cf. Miller, M. H., Rock, K. (1985), p. 1034 f. 
142 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 753. 
143 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 33 f.; Chahayadi, C. S.; Salas, J. M. (2012), p. 461;  
Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f, among others.    
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that the firm expects access to fresh money to be challenging in the future.144 
Accordingly, poor access to capital markets makes companies keep cash in 
reserve.145 If a solid liquidity base results from high income, the influence on 
dividends is positive and dividend increases become more likely.146 The impact of 
cash reserves on dividends becomes negative if poor financing prospects are 
discovered. In this case, dividend increases become more unlikely and the 
probability of dividend decreases grows.  
Asset tangibility can play a major role in protecting creditors’ interests, as it 
can easily be converted into cash.147 Consequently, firms with a large number of 
tangible assets might have easier access to external funds and higher debt ratios 
than might firms without such assets.148
 
Firms rich in tangible assets are more 
likely to pay out cash if they can refund themselves without difficulty; a positive 
relationship with dividend increases is assumed.  
 
Large company size can be accompanied with greater diversification of 
operational activities, which in turn reduces the risk of bankruptcy.149 
Additionally, larger firms tend to have less volatile earnings compared to smaller 
firms and therefore derive greater benefit from the leverage effect and the tax 
benefits of debt financing.150 Since those companies are used to having higher debt 
ratios and large reinvestment opportunities via capital markets, the distribution 
of equity capital becomes more likely and the probability of dividend increases 
rises.151 
 
 
                                            
144 Cf. DeAngelo, H. et al. (2006), p. 227 f. 
145 Cf. Chittenden, F. et al. (1996), p. 59 f.; Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 8. 
146 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 28; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379; 
Gugler, K. (2003), p. 1310. 
147 Cf. Aivazian, V. A. et al. (2006), p. 442; Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2006), p.1645 
f.; Bates, T. W. et al. (2009), p. 1987.  
148 Cf. Michaelas, N. et al (1999), p. 115. 
149 Cf. Titman, S., Wessels, R. (1988), p. 17. 
150 Cf. Smith, C. W., Stulz, R. M. (1985), p. 403. 
151 Cf. Fama, E. French, K. (2002), p. 1 f. 
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Depending on the stage of their life-cycle, older firms have more ways of 
refinancing than younger firms have, based on a company’s ability to generate 
cash over time.152 It is evident that it is more challenging for companies that are 
still growing to generate constant cash flows than is the case for more stable 
firms.153 A company undergoes a process in which it changes from being a fast-
growing firm with many profitable investment projects to a more mature firm 
over the course of years.154 Due to their high growth and investment 
opportunities, quickly expanding companies are confronted with completely 
different conditions than are established companies that grow more slowly.155 In a 
later stage of the company life-cycle, the cash flows generated are more likely to 
exceed the ability to find profitable investment opportunities.156 Therefore, 
dividends become more probable in a later stage, as they do not compete with 
other potential uses.157 As soon as the growth rate and profitability are expected to 
decline, companies will start to initiate dividends.158  
 
The static trade-off theory is commonly criticized because the costs of 
constant capital adjustments are high, since it takes only one certain point of time 
into account and does not observe the financing process over time. Furthermore, 
profit accumulations play an important role for funding in reality and are not 
taken into consideration within the static trade-off theory. To overcome that 
problem and increase the flexibility of the static assumption, the dynamic trade-
off theory is a multiple-period hypothesis that states that firms will only change 
their capital structure if benefits exceed costs. In more detail, the transaction costs 
of adjusting the present capital structure have to be compared to the aspired 
                                            
152 The life cycle theory goes back to Modigliani, F. (1966) and is reviewed by 
Fama, F. E., French, K. R. (2001), Grullon, G. et al. (2002), DeAngelo, H. et al. 
(2006). 
153 Cf. Dickinson, V. (2011), p. 1990. 
154 Cf. Grullon, G. et al. (2002), p. 422; Kadapakkam, P. R. et al. (1998), p. 293 f. 
155 Cf. Thanatawee, Y. (2011), p. 52. 
156 Cf. Baker, H. K., Powell, G. E. (2000), p. 29. 
157 Cf. Pan, Y. et al. (2016), p. 2983 f.  
158 Cf. Bulan, L. T., Subramanian, N. (2009), p. 3. 
48 SEBASTIAN KUHLMANN 
future financing configuration.159 Consequently the dynamic model focuses on the 
future optimum capital structure and not exclusively on the current optimum 
leverage.160 Depending on the difference between current and target leverage, 
companies can regulate their capital structure continuously, so that between such 
adjustments the ratio of debt and equity is not optimal and is frequently reached 
with delay.161 The dynamic theory makes the evidence of the validity more 
complex but increases the flexibility.162 It supplies an additional determinant of 
dividend changes, the target leverage, which has a negative influence on 
dividend changes.163  
2.2.2.2 Pecking order theory 
Differently from the previously described static trade-off hypothesis, the 
pecking order theory provides an investment hierarchy in the presence of 
information asymmetries.164 Information is particularly lacking between managers 
and shareholders165, where managers know more about the current and future 
situation of the firm than equity claimants do.166 With regard to the information 
advantage, investors will always face the uncertainty that managers might act for 
their own benefit.  
 
Despite the pecking order theory stating that there is no optimum in 
financing structure, the influence of profitability, investment alternatives, 
company age and cash reserves on dividend changes mainly agrees with the 
                                            
159 Cf. Fischer, E. et al. (1989), p. 19 f. 
160 Cf. Lev, B., Pekelman, D. (1975), p. 75. 
161 Cf. Jalilvand, A., Harris, R. S. (1984), p. 127 f.; Marsh, P. (1982), p. 121 f.; 
Ozkan, A. (2001), p. 176. 
162 Cf. Leary, M., Roberts, M. (2005), p. 2575 f. 
163 Cf. ibid.  
164 Cf. Chirinko, R. S., Singha, A. R. (2000), p. 417 f.; Leary, M., Roberts, M. 
(2005), p. 2575 f.; Shyam-Sundera, L., Myersb, S. C. (1999), p. 219 f. 
165 Also see subchapter 2.2.2.3.1. 
166 Cf. Allen, D. E. (1993), p. 101; Leary, M. T., Roberts, M. R. (2010), p. 332, 
Myers, S. C., Majluf, N., p. (1984), p. 189.  
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assumptions of trade-off theory.167 Additionally, if large company size is a proxy 
for high profitability it can influence dividend changes positively. On the other 
hand, if company size is associated with operational risk, it can also influence 
dividend changes negatively.168 
 
Because companies prefer the source of financing that is accompanied with 
the lowest uncertainty and minimum resistance, managers act mainly for the 
benefit of the current equity claimants.169 As a side effect of external financing, 
shareholders suffer dilution of control if equity capital is issued.170 To prevent 
such an effect, shareholders have to participate in capital increases that include 
transaction costs that are disadvantageous for investors. Therefore, to avoid the 
danger of adverse selection, shareholders prefer internal funding to external 
funding and debt financing to equity financing.171 That means that more 
profitable companies have more refinancing possibilities than do less profitable 
companies.172 As current shareholders avoid the issuance of equity capital, 
companies with low earnings will not reduce their equity capital by paying it out 
to the shareholder. 173 If company size is associated with higher profitability and 
lower operational risk, company size also influences dividend changes 
positively.174 
                                            
167 Cf. Chirinko, R. S., Singha, A. R. (2000), p. 417 f.; Leary, M., Roberts, M. 
(2005), p. 2575 f.; Shyam-Sundera, L., Myersb, S. C. (1999), p. 219 f. 
168 Cf. Hall, M.; Weiss, L. (1967), p. 319 f.; Uyar, A. (2009), p. 191. 
169 Cf. Myers, S. C. (1984), p. 99; Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 219 f. 
170 Cf. Asquith, P., Mullins, D. W. (1986), p. 61 f. 
171 Cf. Allen, D. E. (1993), p. 101 f.; Baskin, J. (1989), p. 26 f.; Chirinko, R. S., 
Singha, A. R. (2000), p. 417 f.; Leary, M., Roberts, M. (2005), p. 2575 f.; Shyam-
Sundera, L., Myersb, S. C. (1999), p. 219 f. 
172 Cf. Mukherjee, S., Mahakud, J. (2012), p. 42; Myers, S. C. (1984), p. 589. 
173 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 4. 
174 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Fama, E. F., Bulan, L. et al. (2007),      
p. 20; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f. ; French, K. R. (2002), p. 4; Kale, J. R. et al. 
(2012), p. 365 f.   
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Dividend payouts become more unlikely when the company needs the cash 
for other purposes, such as investments.175 In view of that, managers should pay 
dividends only if the distributed amount of money does not exceed the internal 
financing that is needed for other purposes. Accordingly, companies with a high 
dependency on external financing should pursue a more restrictive dividend 
policy.176  
The pecking order theory shows that the agency constitution (e.g. 
shareholders, stakeholders) can influence distribution policy. Accordingly, 
agency oriented theories are analyzed in greater detail in the following 
subsections. 
2.2.2.3 Agency theory 
2.2.2.3.1 Manager-shareholder conflicts 
An isolated examination of the previously discussed financing theories 
would fail to explain the complexity of dividend changes.177  
Although the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory can help to 
increase understanding of financing decisions, the underlying assumptions are 
contradicted by investigations that show companies of similar size and structure 
have large diverging debt ratios.178 Since the static trade-off theory is very much 
restricted to capital structure, the pecking order theory expands the view of the 
pecking order by taking information asymmetries into account.179 In the 
following, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, majority and 
minority shareholders, different shareholder groups and equity and debt 
investors are investigated. 
 
 
                                            
175 Cf. Ince, U., Owers, J. E. (2009), p. 54. 
176 Cf. Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 257. 
177 Cf. Myers, S. C. (2001), p. 99. 
178 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2005), p. 26; Haugen, R. A., Senbet, L. W. 
(1986), p. 12.   
179 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308 f.    
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Summarized, the following determinants of dividend changes can be 
attributed to those agency conflicts:  
 
Table 2: Additional determinants of dividend increases resulting from conflicts of 
interest  
Determinants Expected influence 
 Ownership concentration  
 Second-largest shareholder 
 Institutional ownership 
 Managerial ownership 
 Foreign ownership 
 Changes in ownership 
 Shareholder activism 
 Corporate governance level 
 Bank equity investors 
 Issued debt capital 
 Debt covenants 
 Bank loans  
 Secured loans 
 Access to capital markets  
 Seasoned equity offering 
 R&D investments 
 M&A 
 Number of business segments 
- 
+/- 
+ 
- 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
 
Controlling for manager-shareholder conflict, Rozeff (1982) develops the 
equity distribution model. It states that an optimal dividend policy exists, if a 
minimum of two opposing cost-components can be reached.180  
On the one hand, managers pay dividends if equity investors demand 
them.181 Since rational equity investors want the company to decrease its 
financing costs, they will avoid additional financing costs for dividend payments. 
                                            
180 Cf. Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 249 f. 
181 Cf. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2004), p. 1160. 
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That means that capital gains are favored over cash distributions, since 
distributions make the need for future financing more likely.182  
On the other hand, dividends can help to reduce the agency costs of capital 
that arise from the separation of ownership and control.183 If a company is owned 
by a single owner-manager, agency costs equal zero.184 Smaller firms are closest to 
the definition of a sole owner-manager firm and therefore agency costs can 
increase, among other things, with the size of the company, which makes external 
shareholding more likely.185  
Contrary to the assumption that agency costs rise with the size of the 
company, larger companies are more likely to have legal reporting obligations, an 
investor relation division and better corporate governance, which helps to lower 
information asymmetries.186 Furthermore, monitoring becomes more difficult and 
ineffective for multi-segment companies.187 Together with the complexity of 
monitoring, analysts make more imprecise forecasts for diversified than for 
focused companies.188 If large companies have more segments than small firms, 
the agency costs rise with the size of the company and dividend increases become 
more likely.189  
Company age influences information asymmetries negatively, since the 
amount of accessible information rises over time.190 Assuming that older 
companies are becoming larger over time, the previously discussed positive 
influence of company size on the information flow is also influenced by the age of 
the company.191  
                                            
182 Cf. DeAngelo, H., Masulis, R. W. (1980), p. 453 f. 
183 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al. (1997), p. 1032. 
184 Cf. Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 305 f. 
185 Cf. Ang, J. S. et al. (2000), p. 83.  
186 Cf. Chari, V. V. et al. (1988), p. 110 f.; Wenzel, A. (2006), p. 182. 
187 Cf. Berger, P. G., Ofek, E. (1995), p. 40. 
188 Cf. Brennan, M. J., Hughes, P. J. (1991), p. 1665 f.; Merton, R. C. (1987),          
p. 483 f. 
189 Cf. Doukas, J. A. et al. (2000), p. 56.  
190 Cf. Wenzel, A. (2006), p. 180.  
191 Cf. Fama, F. E., French, K. R. (2001), p. 3 f.;  DeAngelo, H. et al. (2006),               
p. 227 f. ; Grullon, G. et al. (2002), p 387 f. 
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While all business investments are accompanied by information 
asymmetries, the agency costs appear to be particularly high in the case of 
research and development (R&D).192 The value of company-specific R&D 
investments is complex to measure. For instance, it is complicated to assess the 
monetary value of the development of computer programs, patents and 
medication. Since those investments are non-standardized they cannot be traded 
on markets and no market prices exist for those specific investments. 
Furthermore, the accounting rules are different for R&D investments than for 
other investments and do frequently not provide investors with value or 
productivity information.193 The rising uncertainty makes investors claim higher 
dividends in order to reduce the amount of money that can potentially be 
invested into those projects. Accordingly, the expected influence of R&D on 
dividend changes is positive.  
In particular, the availability of free cash flows can lead to diverging 
interests between managers and shareholders.194 Managers have the incentive to 
enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders by extracting private benefit195 
from cash.196 Furthermore, the management might decide to retain earnings rather 
than pay dividends due to private motives.197 Reinvesting cash makes it more 
possible to build an empire by growing firm size, which leads to increasing 
salaries, status, power and the recognition of one’s work.198  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can either be the way out or the proof of 
the conflicts of interest between managers and equity investors; the influence on 
dividend payments is therefore ambiguous. M&A illustrate agency problems, in 
                                            
192 Cf. Abody, A., Lev. B. (2000), p. 2747. 
193 Cf. Abody, A., Lev. B. (2000), p. 2748. 
194 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 731 f.; Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. 
(1976), p. 305 f.  
195 Private benefits are monetary gains that are arranged at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  
196 Cf. Benos, B., Weisbach, M. (2004), p. 217 f.; Brockman, P., Unlu, E. (2009),        
p. 291; Filatotchev, I., Mickiewicz, T. (2001), p. 1 f.  
197 Cf. He, W. et al. (2017), p. 281. 
198  Cf. Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323; He, W. et al. (2017), p. 281. 
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particular when managers invest their cash for low-benefit external growth rather 
than paying it out to shareholders.199  
To overcome the free-cash-flow problem200, dividend distributions are the 
most prominent solution. When cash is paid out to shareholders, the 
misallocation of funds becomes more unlikely and information asymmetries 
shrink.201 Supporters of the signaling hypothesis state that dividend payments are 
a credible way to deliver information to markets and their participants.202 
Accordingly, dividends are initiated to show the high quality of the firm and its 
good prospects.203 Even if dividend payments require the firm to seek financing in 
the future, that might be desirable, because investors expect conditions at that 
future time to be acceptable.  
2.2.2.3.2 Conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
Besides the manager-shareholder conflicts described above, majority-
minority shareholder conflicts can also contribute to explain why companies 
change their dividends.204 In this context, ownership concentration commonly 
leads to dividend reductions. The negative impact of ownership concentration on 
dividend policies can be due either to the high information level of well-informed 
block holders or to rent extraction of minority investors by anchor equity 
investors.205 
                                            
199 Cf. Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 328. 
200 The free cash flow problem arises from the separation of ownership and 
control and is based upon the idea that managers can take private benefits of 
liquid funds to the detriment of shareholders.    
201 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 650 f.; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988),      
p. 149 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323 f.; Lang, L. H. P., Litzenberger, R. H. (1989),    
p. 181 f., among others.  
202 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 393. 
203 Cf. ibid. 
204 Cf. Faccio, M. et al. (2001), p. 54 f.; Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 249 f.; Young, M. 
N. et al. (2008), p. 196 f.  
205 Cf. Miller, M. H., Rock, K. (1985), p. 1031 f. 
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The incentives to monitor the issuer’s management rise with ownership 
concentration.206 That means that the disciplinary function of dividend payments 
is less needed in the presence of a controlling shareholder.207 Since those large 
investors are frequently institutional investors, their information advantage and 
the professional nature of their management control generally creates value and 
makes cash payments redundant.208  
Moral hazard becomes more probable if the anchor investor reaches an 
absolute majority and the residual ownership is highly granular. Major 
shareholders have an incentive to expropriate minority shareholders, especially in 
phases of economic downturns, when major shareholders suffer from significant 
losses in their stock holdings.209 The risk of moral hazard by extracting private 
rents form cash increases with dividend omissions.210  
Consequently, the second-largest equity investor might call for dividends as 
an internal control mechanism that potentially limits disposable cash flows.211 
When several anchor-investors form a coalition, they can either increase their 
controlling power by urging payment of higher dividends or reduce cash 
distributions in order to enhance their private benefits.212 Regardless of what 
effect dominates, conflicts between large and small shareholders can influence 
dividend changes. 
2.2.2.3.3 Examination of shareholder identity 
An ideal dividend policy minimizes the sum of external financing on the 
one hand, and agency costs on the other hand, so that a firm-specific optimum 
                                            
206 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 731 f.  
207 Cf. Al-Najjar, B. (2011), p. 213; Lee, W.-J. (2011), p. 313; Short, H. et al. (2002), 
p. 105.   
208 Cf. Al‐Najjar, B. (2009), p. 182 f.; Lee, W. J. (2011), p. 297 f.; Shleifer, A., 
Vishny, R. (1986), p. 461; Short, H. et al. (2002), p. 105 f.  
209 Cf. Young, M. et al. (2008), p. 214.  
210 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 753. 
211 Cf. Faccio, M. et al. (2001), p. 65 f.  
212 Cf. Faccio, M. et al. (2001), p. 71; Maury, C. B., Pajuste, A. (2002), p. 17; Jiang, 
Y., Peng, M. W. (2010), p. 685; Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 255 f. 
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dividend policy is reached.213 When agency costs increase, a more stringent 
dividend policy is carried out and distributions become more cautious if the 
transaction costs of financing rise. The better investors are informed, the more 
easily they can waive dividends. External shareholders are more likely to face 
information asymmetries and therefore desire current income.214 
The impact of institutional investors on dividend changes is particularly 
discussed in the scientific literature since different kinds of institutional investors 
exist who have different motivations for their investments.215 
With the objective of realizing short-term profits, investors, especially 
institutional investors like hedge funds, regularly purchase considerable stakes in 
publicly-traded companies, while strategic investors aim to hold their 
investments over a longer period.216  
Larger companies are more likely to have institutional investors that desire 
current income via dividends.217 Then again, large institutional investors are 
generally well informed and can waive dividends if institutional ownership is 
accompanied by superior information.218 The literature makes it clear that the 
influence of institutional shareholders on dividends changes, depending on their 
participation rate.219 While dividend payouts and increases commonly become 
more likely if institutional investors hold considerable investments, their 
influence can be heterogeneous.220 For that reason, it is necessary to separate them 
further into operating and financing as well as active and passive investors. 
                                            
213 Cf. Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 258. 
214 Cf. Maury, C. B., Pajuste, A. (2002), p. 17. 
215 Cf. Gaspar, J. M. et al. (2013), p. 261 f.; Truong, T., Heaney, R. (2007), p. 683.  
216 Cf. Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M. (2010), p. 2212. 
217 Cf. Reeding, L. (1997), p. 246. 
218 Cf. Bhattacharya, D. et al. (2015), p. 1 f.; Kaserer, C. et al. (2012), p. 85 f.; 
Reeneboog, L., Szilagyi, P. G. (2015), p. 18. 
219 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 403 f.; Mirzaei, H. (2012), p. 327 f.; 
Thanatawee, Y. (2013), p. 121 f. 
220 Cf. Kuhlmann, S., Rojahn, J. (2017), p. 30.  
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To exercise control, operating investors221 hold larger stakes than financial 
investors hold, aiming to minimize information asymmetries.222 In order to 
increase the companies’ value, they primarily focus on improving operational 
activities by achieving synergies and strategic guidance.223 Thus, the presence of 
operational investors can lead to lower dividend payouts as a result of stronger 
future growth and expiring capital expenditures. 
When institutional financial investors224 hold considerable stakes in a 
publicly traded company, the influence on dividend changes is expected to be 
diametrical to the operational investors’ influence.225 The importance of dividend 
signaling rises in significance when institutional financial investors are 
outsiders.226 Additionally, financial institutions commonly manage several 
different funds that have different investment strategies and differing track 
records.227 To attract more investors, the funds will keep the capital allocation 
constant when track records are good.228 High dividend payments can help 
financial institutions to reduce the danger of misallocation of funds and to present 
solid results. 
To get deeper insights, a country-specific subdivision of institutional 
financial investors is promising, since it is shown for the German capital market 
that foreign financial institutions in particular influence dividend payouts.229 
Diverse conditions in corporate governance might influence this: Low 
shareholder protection increases agency costs and firms from countries with high 
                                            
221 For instance companies that primary focus on synergies and strategic 
interactions with their target firms. 
222 Cf. Barclay, M. J. et al. (2009), p. 2423 f. 
223 Cf. Arping, S., Falconieri, S. (2010), p. 691. 
224 For instance hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds and mutual 
funds that make investment decisions primarily based on the prospect for 
financial gain. 
225 Cf. Arping, S.,, Falconieri, S. (2010), p. 691 f.  
226 Cf. Truong, T., Heaney, R. (2007), p. 683. 
227 Cf. Bushee, B. J. et al. (2014), p. 123 f.  
228 The information content and survivorship bias of performance track records 
is explained in more detail in Fung, W., Hsieh, D. A. (1997).  
229 Cf. Kuhlmann, S., Rojahn, J. (2017), p. 30. 
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shareholder protection pay higher dividends.230 Firms that are less protected due 
to their lower country-specific corporate governance distribute dividends more 
reservedly.231 That shows that corporate governance can help shareholders to 
extract dividend payments to inhibit manager’s cash flow abuse.232  
From a different point of view, it can be assumed that in high-risk 
environments corporate governance alters the firm’s dividend policy and 
complements it for low-risk firms.233 Risk increases with increased levels of excess 
cash; and, to prevent overinvestment, good corporate governance encourages 
managers to reduce their cash reserves by dividend payouts.234 Contrarily, if the 
idiosyncratic risk is low, underinvestment would be particularly costly for 
managers and corporate governance will not motivate managers to pay out cash. 
It more probably encourages firms to retain liquid funds for investment purposes.  
Although it is stated that the probability of cash distributions has declined 
with the evolution of corporate governance technologies, the literature still 
disagrees as to how corporate governance affects corporate dividend policies.235 In 
comparison to domestic institutions, foreign companies might have different 
investment goals because they face different country-specific conditions and, 
additionally, are exposed to higher information asymmetries than domestic 
institutional investors.236  
Besides the local aspect, the separation of short-term and long-term 
institutional financial investors is necessary to control for the incentives to 
monitor the firm’s management.237 In expectation of positive market reactions, 
                                            
230 Cf. La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 27. 
231 Cf. ibid. 
232 The influence of corporate governance on dividend policies is also analyzed 
in Amihud, Y., Murgia, M. (1997); Bhattacharya, D. et al. (2015); Gugler, K. (2003); 
Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003). 
233 Cf. Bhattacharya, D. et al. (2015), p. 38. 
234 Cf. La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 27 f. 
235 Cf. Farre-Mensa, J. et al. (2014), p. 75 f.; Gugler, K. (2003), p. 1319. 
236 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 406; Baik, B. et al. (2010), p. 89.  
237 Cf. Khan, T. (2006), p. 183. 
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short-term investors prefer stock repurchases to cash dividends, while long-term 
investors prefer payouts for monitoring purposes.238  
The investment philosophy also varies between active and passive funds.239 
While operating investors use their controlling power to elevate the firms’ 
performance by exercising control, passive investors only replicate indices and 
are focused on the least possible tracking error.240 Since those passive investors 
focus on replicating an index’s composition they might not be interested in 
influencing dividend policies at all. To the contrary, in order to protect their 
clients from moral hazard, their vote can become a relevant factor to control the 
management. Especially because they lack flexibility in the capital allocation 
process, the “exit threat”241 is not an option for passive investors to monitor 
managers.242 Consequently, the execution of voting rights becomes more 
important when shares cannot be traded on a free basis. 
Apart from institutional investors, the Government can also influence 
dividend changes.243 Their claim for dividends might be due to a desire to 
monitor managers to guarantee successful economic policy or to close a budget 
deficit.  
Due to clientele effect, a change in ownership concentration can also lead to 
dividend increases or decreases, depending on the new shareholders’ 
preference.244  
 
 
 
 
                                            
238 Cf. Gaspar, J. M. et al. (2013), p. 261.  
239 Cf. Bogle, J. C. (2016), p. 9 f. 
240 Cf. Rompotis, G. G. (2011), p. 14 f.  
241 It describes the decision-making power of investors to sell their shares. 
Depending on the importance of the investor, the management accommodates 
their requests. 
242 Cf. Edmans, A. (2009), p. 2484.  
243 Cf. Gugler, K. (2003), p. 1297 f. 
244 Cf. Stinson, S. R., Ricketts, R. C. (2016), p. 122. 
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2.2.2.3.4 Conflicts between equity and debt claimants 
Taking a closer look at the different kind of costs that can arise from 
payouts, cash distributions are particularly costly for the issuer and the investor if 
external financing is required at a later date.245 Among other things, the costs of 
raising additional finance include exchange expenses, administration costs, 
license fees, and costs of compliance, own labor and time.246 Those costs differ 
with the size of the company, where larger firms have better access to capital 
markets and benefit from fixed cost digressions if they issue high funding 
volume. Lower capital funding is more expensive, which generally penalizes 
smaller companies. Stock market liquidity can influence the costs of raising 
external capital. In this context it is found that seasoned equity offerings can 
determine the direct costs (investment banking fees) as well as the indirect costs 
(liquidity level) of raising capital. While investment banking fees decline, the 
tradability of the issuer’s share improves when seasoned equity is offered and the 
effect becomes stronger with the size of the issued volume.247 Consequently, better 
access to capital markets is associated with lower expenses, and the anticipated 
influence on dividend increases is positive.248 
From an agency costs point of view, the diverging interests between 
managers, majority shareholders, minority shareholders and debt claimants make 
it more difficult for managers to raise capital. The resulting agency costs make a 
good access to capital markets more valuable. Firms that raise debt capital via 
capital markets rather than companies that source finance via bank loans pay 
dividends.249 There are a variety of reasons for this.  
First, companies that issue public debt normally have a higher credit quality 
than firms that waive public funding.250 Second, bond market participants are 
most frequently institutional investors that can forego dividend signaling due to 
                                            
245 Cf. Ofer, A. R., Thakor, A. V. (1987), p. 385. 
246 Cf. Asquith, P., Mullins, D. W. (1983), p. 94; Easterbrook, F. H. (1984),          
p. 650 f.  
247 Cf. Butler, A. W. et al. (2005), p. 980.  
248 Cf. Fama, E., Franch, K. (2002), p. 29. 
249 Cf. Aivazian, V. A. et al. (2006), p. 452. 
250 Cf. Arena, M. P. (2011), p. 143.  
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their good information basis.251 Third, commercial banks have special capabilities 
to monitor the issuer of debt capital by their superior access to inside 
information.252 Consequently, debt-financing can support dividend reductions 
and omissions due to the bonding character of secured loans and financial 
covenants.253 
Put the other way around, firms financed entirely through equity have more 
problems controlling agency costs.254 While debt investors make dividend 
reductions that are more likely to keep the company solvent, equity claimants 
frequently argue for payouts following the “bird in hand” argument.255  
Regardless of insolvency costs and taxes, higher leverage can also influence 
dividend policies due to financial covenants.256 In order to minimize their 
investment risk, debt claimants primarily aim to receive interest and repayments. 
To do so, they influence distribution decisions and make highly leveraged 
companies follow reserved dividend policies to insure the firms’ solvency. Hence, 
financial covenants and dividends are expected to be substitutes.  
2.2.2.4 Theories based on investor’s preference 
If the demand for dividends is a basic driver of distribution policy, 
dividend changes largely depend on investors’ preference. Controlling for 
investors preference, four further determinants of dividend changes are 
complemented: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
251 Cf. Aivazian, V. et al. (2006), p. 452. 
252 Cf. Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 396; Leland, H. E., Pyle, D. H. (1977), p. 372 f.  
253 Cf. Brockman, P., Unlu, E. (2009), p. 298; Stulz, R. M. (1990), p. 23.  
254 Cf. Florackis, C. et al. (2009), p. 783 f.  
255 Cf. Brockman, P., Unlu, E. (2009), p. 298; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 327. 
256 Cf. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. (1990), p. 1415 f.   
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Table 3: Additional variables of dividend increases based on investors’ preference 
Determinants Expected influence 
 Previous years dividend 
 Individual tax rates 
 Dividend premium 
 Firm valuation 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
+/- 
 
When managers cater to their investors with minimum distributions, the 
previous year’s dividend policy has a positive influence on the current year’s 
dividend changes.257 Companies that increased their dividends in the previous 
year are more likely to continue to enhance their payouts. To do so, the long-term 
available operating cash flow is particularly essential.258 Only if companies can 
rely on the stability of free cash flows259 they can increase their payouts at a 
constant level.  
In addition, individual tax rates influence the attitude of investors towards 
dividends and determine the willingness to buy or not to buy shares.260 When 
investors are taxed at different rates, firms with high dividend-payout ratios are 
able to attract investors with low marginal tax rates.261 If equity investors are 
taxed at a high rate, dividends produce a tax penalty.262 Therefore, the model is 
also known as the “tax-preference-model”.263 In contrast to dividend payouts, the 
accumulation of the annual net profit does not lead to an immediate tax liability 
and supports higher share prices. It is still possible for the company to invest the 
money to gain a higher return on the capital invested. As there are no tax 
payments for accumulations, the compound interest effect can be a major 
                                            
257 Cf. Gugler, K. (2003), p. 1299; Pettit, R. R. (1972), p. 1006. 
258 Cf. Baker, H. K., Powell, G. E. (2000), p. 36. 
259 It describes the companies’ generated liquid funds after spending the money 
required to maintain or expand the asset base. It is calculated as operating cash 
flow reduced by capital expenditures.  
260 Cf. Dhaliwal, D. et al. (2005), p. 675 f.; Litzenberger, R., Ramaswamy, K. 
(1979), p. 163 f.; Nguyen, K. H. (2014), p. 584. 
261 Cf. Allen, F. et al. (2000), p. 2499 f. 
262 Cf. Li, O. Z. (2007), p. 21. 
263 Cf. Graham, J. R., Kumar, A. (2006), 1305 f. 
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argument against dividends.264 Thus, the influence of dividend payouts on share 
valuations is negative due to the disadvantageous tax effect.265  
The current literature also includes opposite findings: For instance, the 
previous assumptions could not be supported for the country of Saudi Arabia.266 
Regardless of whether individual tax rates influence dividend policies, the tax 
penalty does not seem to be a major influencing factor for dividend policies. Cash 
distributions are commonly demanded by shareholders despite their being 
disadvantageously taxed in comparison to tax on retained earnings.267 That 
shareholders demand dividends regardless of the uneconomical character of such 
a policy is sensible only if payouts lead to other positive market reactions that are 
larger than the negative tax effects.  
In order to explain the positive market reaction that firms cater to, this 
demand suggests that clienteles substantially influence dividend policies.268 
Basically, it is assumed that firms’ management supplies the investors with 
dividends on demand.269 That means that dividends are distributed when 
investors pay higher prices for dividend-paying companies than for non-
dividend-paying companies.270  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
264 Cf. Seida, J. A. (2001), p. 19. 
265 Cf. Dhaliwal, D. et al. (2005), p. 675 f.; Litzenberger, R., Ramaswamy, K. 
(1979), p. 163 f.  
266 Saudi Arabia is predestined for tax influence surveys, as investors do not 
have to pay income taxes in this country. 
267 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2001), p. 3 f.  
268 The catering theory of dividends was developed at the beginning of the 21st 
century and is based on the simple idea that the demand determines the price of 
the share. 
269 Cf. Hoberg, G., Prabhala, N. (2009), p. 112 f.  
270 Cf. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2004), p. 1160.  
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To approximate catering incentives the comparison of the market-to-book 
ratio of dividend payers and non-dividend payers (dividend premium) leads to a 
significant positive influence of the dividend premium on dividend increases.271 
The empirical investigation shows that managers might use dividend changes to 
affect the own firm-valuation. For the same reason, managers tend to retain 
earnings rather than to distribute them if shareholders prefer a regressive 
dividend policy.272 Therefore, the companies’ valuation level is an important 
determinant of dividend changes under catering assumptions. This illustrates the 
investor’s expectations of the company’s future situation.273 A high valuation level 
shows that investors expect management to create more value from the current 
situation.274  
On the one hand, a high valuation can be interpreted to be a positive signal; 
market participants are willing to invest in the company. On the other hand, a 
high ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity might imply an 
overvaluation that motivates investors to sell shares. Due to the contrary 
assumptions, the valuation-levels’ direction of influence on dividends remains 
unclear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
271 Cf. Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 307.  
272 Cf. Baker, M., Wurgler, J. (2004), p. 1160. 
273 Cf. Huang, R. D., Shiu, C-Y. (2009), p. 567 f.   
274 Cf. Yoon, P. S., Starks, L. T. (1995), p. 1016. 
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2.2.3 Summary of firm-specific determinants of dividend changes  
The main drivers of dividend increases that are derived from the theories 
are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Determinants of dividend increases based on dividend theories 
Theory Determinant Expected 
Influence 
Trade-off theory   Effective tax rate 
 Leverage 
 Profitability 
 Operational risk 
 Investment alternatives 
 Cash reserves 
 Asset tangibility 
 Company size 
 Company age 
 Target leverage 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
Agency theory  Ownership concentration  
 Second-largest shareholder 
 Institutional ownership 
 Managerial ownership 
 Foreign ownership 
 Changes in ownership 
 Shareholder activism 
 Corporate governance level 
 Bank equity investors 
 Issued debt capital 
 Debt covenants 
 Bank loans  
 Secured loans 
 Access to capital markets  
 Seasoned equity offering 
 R&D investments 
 M&A 
 Number of segments 
- 
+/- 
+ 
- 
+ 
+/- 
+/- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
Catering theory 
Tax preference theory 
 
 Previous years dividend 
 Individual tax rates 
 Dividend premium  
 Valuation level 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
+/- 
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It is conventional wisdom that managers are unwilling to change (especially 
reduce or omit) dividends and aim to keep distributions on a constant level.275 If 
managers act differently, dividend changes tend to be informative concerning the 
firms’ situation and generally produce share price reactions.276 Because dividend 
changes are special events with special information content, they are examined 
separately. 
2.3 DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND CHANGES DERIVED FROM RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
The selection of firm-specific determinants of dividend changes is expanded 
by the current state of dividend-change research. Since investigations of 
dividend-change drivers are not very numerous, the firm-specific determinants of 
dividend initiations are also included. Table 5 classifies the investigations 
regarding their arrangement of the endogenous dividend variable. Starting with 
dividend initiations, also multinomial measured dividend changes and binary 
coded dividend increases and decreases are observed. All determinants that 
impact the specific dividend variable with an error rate below 0.10 are listed; if 
variables do not reach the 90 % confidence interval, they are excluded from the 
overview. In addition to the statistical significance, the summary controls for the 
direction of influence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
275 Cf. Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; Lintner, J. (1956), p. 104; Subrahmanyam, 
A., Titman, S. (2001), p. 2389 f.   
276 Cf. Best, R. J., Best, R. W. (2001), p. 361 f.; Denis, D. J. et al. (1994), p. 567; 
Yoon, P. S., Starks, L. T. (1995), p. 1016. 
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Table 5: Summary of the current state of determinants of dividend change 
research  
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The literature review selects many determinants of dividend changes that 
have already been discussed in the previous section:  
As a key driver, firms change their dividends based on their profitability 
level.277 With higher income increases become more likely278 and the probability of 
dividend decreases lowers.279 It is also found that companies initiate dividends if 
they have solid incomes and their retained earnings are high.280  
Together with the earnings situation, firm size also influences dividend 
changes positively.281  
In line with the catering theory, the “dividend premium” has a positive 
effect on dividend increases and a negative influence on dividend decreases.282 
Since initiations are also positively affected,283 managers change their dividends at 
the shareholders’ demand.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
277 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 20; De 
Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 8 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; 
Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 387 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. 
(2006), p. 303 f.; Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f. 
278 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. 
(2015), p. 8 f.; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 387 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f.; 
Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f. 
279 Cf. De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 16 f.; Goergen, M. et al. (2005), 
p. 387 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f. 
280 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 20 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; Kale, J. R. et 
al. (2012), p. 381 f.  
281 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 33 f.; De 
Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 8 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; Kale, J. 
R. et al. (2012), p. 381 f.; Li, W., Lie, E., (2006), p. 303 f.  
282 Cf. Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 307. 
283 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 33 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 381 f. 
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Since the evaluated literature shows that dividend increases become more 
unlikely with the greater debt level284 and the firm’s growth opportunities285, the 
effect of cash reserves on dividend changes remains unclear286. 
Additionally, it becomes more likely that distributions change if they have 
changed in the previous year.287 The impact of the firm’s risk level could be 
outlined thus: While the direction of influence is sometimes stated to be unclear288, 
different findings report that dividend initiations become more unlikely with the 
firm’s increased risk-level.289 
Also the positive effect of institutional ownership on dividend increases is 
shown with statistical significance290 while a deficit in institutional ownership291 
leads to dividend initiations.292 Since stock exchange listing is frequently seen as 
giving good access to additional funds, listings on the NYSE make initiations 
more likely.293  
Expanding previous findings, five further firm-specific determinants of 
dividend changes could be derived from the dividend-change literature 
overview:   
 
 
                                            
284 Cf. Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f.; Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f. 
285 Bulan, L. et al. (2007); Deshmukh, S. (2003), Kale, J. R. et al. (2012) show the 
negative influence of growth opportunities on dividend initiations. Li, W., Lie, E. 
(2006) and Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016) show the negative influence on dividend 
increases and decreases. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012) show the negative influence on 
increases. 
286 Cf. Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f. 
287 Cf. Simons, K. (1994), p. 586. 
288 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 33 f. 
289 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 381 f. 
290 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 417 f. 
291 The difference between the predicted institutional ownership and the actual 
institutional ownership; institutional ownership is measured as the fraction of the 
firm’s equity owned by all institutions. 
292 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 377. 
293 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 381. 
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First, financial analysts evaluate and analyze different companies, stocks 
and their derivatives, as well as economies and industries.294 Their work serves as 
a basis for the investment decisions of national and international, private and 
institutional investors, financial advisors and portfolio managers.295 Analysts can 
be subdivided into buy-side- and sell-side analysts, who are either information 
providers or information intermediaries.296 Sell-side analysts examine businesses 
that are listed on different stock exchanges and provide primary external clients 
with the accumulated data by selling their research reports.297  
Different from that, buy-side analysts are employees of institutional 
investors like banks, investment funds or insurance companies.298 Therefore buy-
side analysts are strongly linked with institutional investors, as they work in the 
business.299 When analysts provide new information (information provider) they 
contribute more to reduce agency costs than do information intermediaries, who 
only follow already existing information.300 Their results are for internal use only 
and consequently unsuitable for empirical investigations. 
In general, there are two possible ways financial sell side analysts can 
influence dividend changes: They can monitor the management in order to 
reduce agency costs and provide additional information.301 While investors 
observe several stocks to diversify their portfolio, financial analysts specialize on 
a few stocks they know particularly well.302 After the purchase and analysis of 
                                            
294 Cf. Bassen, A. (2002), p. 16 f., Cooper, R. A. et al. (2001), p. 383 f.; Eberts, M. 
(1986), p. 46 f.; Groysberg, B. et al. (2008), p. 25; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (2001), 
p. 406, among others.  
295 Cf. Cooper, R. A. et al. (2001), p. 384; Eberts, M. (1986), p. 46; Groysberg, B. 
et al. (2008), p. 25. 
296 Cf. Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (2001), p. 406.  
297 Cf. Fieseler, C. (2008), p. 52 f.; Mueller, C. (2005), p. 18.  
298 Cf. Groysberg, B. et al. (2008), p. 25.  
299 Cf. Bassen, A. (2002), p. 16; Reimann, M. (2005), p. 21; Weber, J. et al. (2004), 
p. 302 f. 
300 Cf. Wilke, H. (2016), p. 170. 
301 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 654 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323; Wilke, H. 
(2016), p. 21. 
302 Cf. Hax, (1998), p. 494 f.  
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data, sell-side and buy-side analysts can provide information to many different 
investors (cross-sectional-reusability). The benefits of specialization and the 
reusability of the data enables analysts to have lower stock-monitoring costs than 
private investors have and that can help to reduce the chance that managers run 
the business for their own benefit.303 Since, in the presence of financial analysts, 
dividends are less required as a means of keeping investors informed, free cash is 
less likely to be distributed. When analysts base their recommendations on 
information gathered from outside sources, it is easier for them to evaluate 
companies in an improved information environment.304 To avoid heavy 
workloads, analysts cover stocks with easily accessible information. As a result, 
analyst coverage can also be used to approximate the information environment 
level, while superior analyst coverage indicates better access to information. 
Therefore a substitutive effect of analyst-coverage and dividend distributions is 
assumed.305 
Contrarily, it is also assumed that buy-side analysts influence the 
propensity of dividend changes to occur due to their influence on institutional 
investors.306 When analysts provide institutional investors with information, their 
superior level of information enables such investors to waive dividends for 
signaling purposes.307 From a different perspective, the institutional investor’s 
desire for current income can also outweigh the information advantage argument 
and dividend payments are more likely to increase the greater the number of 
analysts that cover the stock.308 If this is the case, analyst coverage is more likely to 
have a positive impact on dividend increases.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
303 Cf. Henze (2004), p. 13. 
304 Cf. Baker, H. K. et al. (2002), p. 498; Huddart, S. J., Ke, B. (2007), p. 204 f. 
305 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 411. 
306 Cf. Mikhail, M. B et al. (2004), p. 68; Stanzel, M. (2007), p. 14 f.; Steiger, M. 
(2000), p. 195. 
307 Cf. Mizraei, H. (2012), p. 331. 
308 Cf. Reeding, L. (1997), p. 246. 
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Second, in addition to financial analysts, abnormal returns are also a 
determinant of dividend changes that is derived from the literature review. 
Assuming that some traders can be better informed concerning a firm’s situation 
than anybody else, they can influence the firm’s valuation. The resulting 
abnormal returns can even provide novel information to managers, such that it 
makes them revisit their dividend decisions.309 In other words, anomalous stock 
returns can be considered by managers in view of their dividend change decision, 
hence unexpected share price movements can be informative about cash flows 
and/or discount rates.310 When cash flows are larger than expected or discount 
rates are surprisingly low, positive market reactions will follow that make 
managers increase their dividends. Accordingly, the influence of the previous 
year’s abnormal returns on dividend changes tends to be positive.311  
 
Third, the previous year’s dividend yield can also influence dividend 
changes. If the last year’s payout rate in comparison to the reference value was 
high, dividends are less likely to increase still further.312 It is plausible that 
companies that have already distributed large parts of their profits are limited to 
distributing less in the following year. Starting from a high dividend level, the 
probability of dividend decreases rises with high dividend yields.313 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
309 Cf. Bond, P. et al. (2012), p. 342 f.  
310 Cf. Chen, L. Zhao, X. (2009), p. 5213 f.; De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. 
(2015), p. 16. 
311 Cf. Chemmanur, T. J.  et al. (2010), p. 430. 
312 Cf. De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 11; Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 304. 
313 Cf. De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 9 f. 
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Fourth, index membership is an additional determinant of the propensity to 
initiate dividends.314 It can be associated with permanent future returns that 
cannot be traced back in terms of different firm-specific reasons but result from an 
increased demand after the firm was included in the index.315 In order to avoid 
tracking errors, index tracking funds replicate the compilation of an index as 
precisely as possible and hold their positions until the composition of the index 
changes. The rise of index tracking Exchange-traded funds could therefore be a 
possible explanation for a long-lasting positive effect.  
In contrast to the assumption that the positive consequence of index 
membership is longstanding, different surveys see only a temporary peak in 
demand, because potential sellers have a delayed reaction to the stock price 
increase.316 The influence of index membership remains ambiguous and the 
estimated direction of influence on dividend changes can vary between different 
indices.  
 
Index membership indicates a fifth influencing factor of dividend changes; 
companies’ industry. The composition of indices is not randomly selected and 
combines businesses that meet specific requirements. The criteria selected to be 
included in the relevant index might be the relevant factor for the influence of the 
composition of the index on dividends. For example NASDAQ index members 
are high-tech companies; it can therefore be assumed that dividend payouts of 
those enterprises vary with technological progress that enables substantial and 
fast growth opportunities.317 As long as the investment opportunities are good, 
managers prefer to keep liquid funds for investments rather than paying it out.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
314 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 14. 
315 The effect is investigated by Shleifer, A. (1986); Shleifer, A. (2000) for the 
S&P 500 index. 
316 Investigated by Harris, L., Gurel, E. (1986) for the S&P 500 index. 
317 Cf. Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 13.  
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The additional determinants of dividend changes and initiations that are 
obtained from research findings are highlighted in the subsequent Table 6: 
 
Table 6: Determinants of dividend increases derived from research findings 
Investigation Determinant  Expected influence 
Dividend 
increases 
 Analyst coverage 
 Abnormal return 
 Historical dividend yield 
+/- 
+ 
- 
Dividend 
initiations 
 Index membership 
 Companies’ industry 
+/- 
+/- 
 
Besides analyst coverage, abnormal returns, historical dividend policies, 
index membership and industry affiliation, dividend change literature also 
expands previous findings by controlling for the influence of stock liquidity on 
dividend initiations.318 The propensity to initiate dividends is negatively affected 
by the stock market liquidity level, which is attributed mainly to the information 
value of stock market liquidity that can replace dividend signaling.319 When 
investors aim at disinvesting, they can either claim cash dividends or sell their 
shares. Stock liquidity can therefore serve as a surrogate for dividend 
distributions.  
The listed investigations approximate stock liquidity with trading volume, 
which does not respect the multidimensional complexity of stock market 
liquidity.320 Implementing additional liquidity proxies is necessary to make more 
valid statements.  
Moreover, the listed analyses estimate only dividend initiations that are 
special in nature and cannot be compared to dividend changes.  
 
                                            
318 The influence of stock market liquidity on dividend initiations is 
investigated by Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012); Kale, J. R. et al. (2012).  
319 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 428; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 382. 
320 That liquidity is a complex multidimensional phenomenon is investigated in 
Chai, D. et al. (2010); Grullon, G. et al. (2004); Makower, H., Marschak, J. (1986), 
among others.  
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Consequently, the measurement problems of stock market liquidity and, 
furthermore, the arrangement of the endogenous dividend variable makes further 
research necessary to understand how stock liquidity influences dividend 
changes.  
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3 STOCK LIQUIDITY VALUE AND ESTIMATION 
3.1 STOCK LIQUIDITY AND FINANCING COSTS 
3.1.1 Value of stock market liquidity 
Above and beyond the influence of dividend changes on financing costs, a 
company’s stock liquidity also plays a significant role within the refinancing 
process.321 Due to the internationalization of capital markets and the growing 
importance of institutional investors, the necessity of value-based management 
increases in the competition for capital.322 To date it is common knowledge that 
high-value firms have better and easier access to new capital sources than do 
companies with low firm values, since high stock liquidity enhances the valuation 
of the company.323  
Rappaport’s (1986) shareholder value approach illustrates how stock 
liquidity influences the valuation of stocks.324 The widely used foundation for 
value-oriented management places equity investors in the focus of corporate 
activities.325 That means that management has the primary incentive to increase 
shareholders' wealth (the market value of equity) as a long-term goal.326 To 
                                            
321 Cf. Fernández-Amador, O. et al. (2013), p. 55; Gopalan, R. et al. (2012), p. 333 
f.; Hoshi, T. et al. (1991), p. 57. 
322 Cf. Fischer, T. M. (2006), p. 1; Günther, T., Gonschorek, T. (2008), p. 132. 
323 Cf. Cooper, S. K., Groth, J. C. (1985), p. 19 f.; Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; 
Schmeisser, W. et al. (2009), p. 6. 
324 For further information regarding the shareholder value approach also see 
Blyth, M. L. et al. (1986), p. 48 f.; Heilbron, J. et al. (2014), p. 1 f.; Rappaport, A. 
(1983), p. 28 f.; Rappaport, A. (1986), p. 1 f.; Rappaport, A. (1987), p. 58 f.; 
Rappaport, A. (2006), p. 66 f. 
325 Cf. Hahn, D., Hintze, M. (2006), p. 84; Jung, H. (2014), p. 521; Keay, A., 
Adamopoulou, R. (2012), p. 5 f.; Körnert, J., Wolf, C. (2007), p. 133. 
326 Cf. Sundaram, A. K., Inkpen, A. C. (2004), p. 359. 
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concentrate on shareholders in particular tends to be conclusive, given that 
shareholders have only a residual claim after all of the firms’ liabilities have been 
deducted.327 That is different for all other stakeholders within the company that 
can rely on contractual guaranteed claims.  
Despite shareholders being especially worth protecting, the value-oriented 
management approach is also criticized in the literature.328 It is alleged that the 
exclusive concentration on shareholders neglects the interests of stakeholders 
such as employees, customers, debt investors, suppliers etc.329 To create 
shareholder value, the long-term success of the company has to be ensured and 
therefore stakeholders also have to be content.330 Despite the critics, the 
shareholder value approach is very highly respected within firms to date and has 
been adopted by many corporate managers.331  
Generally, liquidity influences the shareholder value in two ways:  
 
First, liquidity can reduce a firm’s weighted average cost of capital and 
facilitates access to additional funds.332 Listing on stock exchanges enables the 
issuer to reach a broader base of investors to meet that issuer’s financing needs.333 
This is also underlined by the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model 
(LACAPM) of Acharya and Pedersen (2004), which emphasizes the influence of 
                                            
327 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 656; Easterbrook, F. H., Fischel, D. R. (1983), 
p. 395 f.; Fama, E. F., Jensen, M. C. (1983), p. 302.  
328 Cf. Banzhaf, J. (2006), p. 121 f.; Krol, F. (2009), p. 61; Metten, M. (2010),           
p. 165 f. 
329 Cf. Keay, A., Adamopoulou, R. (2012), p. 7 f.; Rappaport, A. (1987), p. 59; 
Stier, C. (2017), p. 54. 
330 Cf. Donaldson, T., Preston, L. E. (1995); p. 65 f.; Freeman, R. E. (2010), p. 1 f.; 
Poeschl, H. (2013), pp. 127 f.; Skrzipek, M. (2005), p. 47 f. 
331 Cf. Kraus, K., Strömsten, T. (2012), p. 188. 
332 Cf. Husman, C. (2003), p. 81. 
333 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988), p. 13. 
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illiquidity risk on security performance that is discussed in the subsequent 
section.334  
 
Second, managerial decisions can vary with a firm’s liquidity level through 
feedback from stock prices.335 Liquidity effects equity and debt financing and 
gives companies with liquid traded shares lower issuance costs.336 These 
decreasing financing costs allow corporate managers use additional funds for 
investment purposes and increase the company’s investment in liquid assets, 
which can lead to increased future profitability.337 For that reason, liquidity 
generates positive feedback prices, while illiquidity can lead to negative results.338 
 
However, managers seek to ensure that the firm’s shares can be traded with 
low friction.339 To do so, managers have two general opportunities to increase 
liquidity; they can enlarge the alienability of their shares or reduce information 
asymmetries.340 To increase the alienability of shares companies can go public, 
standardize their claims, issue new public equity, denominate their stocks or list 
on different exchanges. Furthermore, in order to reduce information asymmetries, 
companies can limit their liability, increase their corporate borrowing or disclose 
inside information.341 Despite the shareholder value oriented view on capital 
markets showing that liquidity is an essential condition for the financial markets 
                                            
334 Cf. Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H. (2004), p. 392. The liquidity effect on asst 
pricing is also analyzed by  Jacoby, G. et al. (2000), p. 69 f.; Liu, W. (2006), p. 631 f.; 
Papavassiliou, V. G. (2013), p. 184 f.  
335 Cf. Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; Subrahmanyam, A., Titman, S. (2001),      
p. 2389 f.  
336 Cf. Lipson, M. L., Mortal, S. (2009), p. 611 f.  
337 Cf. Hasbrouck, J., Seppi, D. J. (2001), p. 383. 
338 Cf. Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; Subrahmanyam, A., Titman, S. (2001),      
p. 2389 f.  
339 Cf. Holmström, B., Tirole, J. (2000), p. 317, Loukil, N. (2015), p. 415. 
340 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988), p. 8 f. 
341 For further information regarding the management possibilities of stock 
liquidity see Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988). 
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to function effectively, the financial market crisis exposes that stock market 
liquidity cannot be taken for granted.342 
3.1.2 Liquidity adjusted CAPM 
Extending the imagined frictionless economy of the traditional CAPM by 
liquidity costs, the liquidity adjusted CAPM shows that illiquidity influences 
market returns negatively and investors should not only be concerned about their 
investments in economic downturns but also when disinvesting becomes more 
difficult;343 especially when crisis-driven times make investing more insecure, or 
inversely, the increased risk is displayed by higher illiquidity.344 Under this 
premise, illiquid capital markets lead to a premium that the buyer has to pay and 
a discount that reduces the sellers’ revenue when placing a market order.345 This 
model reviews the one-beta CAPM by supplying three liquidity risk components: 
To start with, the demanded return on investment increases with the 
commonality-in-liquidity effect.346 That means that shareholders demand higher 
stock returns in the covariance between the security liquidity and the market 
liquidity. When the stock market in general becomes illiquid, the tradability of a 
specific share also decreases, which in turn makes investors demand higher risk-
compensating returns.347  
Beyond that, a linear relationship between securities’ expected return and 
market liquidity is assumed, where illiquid stocks produce higher risk-adjusted 
                                            
342 Cf. Boehmer, E. et al. (2009), p. 1398; Váradi, K. (2012), p. 2.  
343 Cf. Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H. (2004), p. 392. 
344 Cf. Campello, M. et al. (2010), p. 470 f.; Jacoby, G. et al. (2000), p. 69 f.; Liu, 
W. (2006), p. 631 f.  
345 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 657 f.; Jensen, M. J. (1986), p. 328; 
Papavassiliou, V. G. (2013), p. 184 f. 
346 The commonality-in-liquidity effect is also analyzed in Brockman, P. et al. 
(2009), p. 851 f.; Chordia, T. et al. (2001), p. 501 f.; Fernando, C. S. (2003), p. 233 f.; 
Karolyi, G. A. et al. (2012), p. 82 f.; Koch, A. et al. (2016), p. 1943 f.  
347 Cf. Chordia, T. et al. (2001), p. 501 f.; Hasbrouck, J., Seppi, D. J. (2001), p. 408. 
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market returns than frequently traded stocks do.348 This makes corporations 
demand liquidity to lower their costs of capital and increase shareholder value.349  
Finally, the demanded risk premium should sink in the covariance between 
securities’ liquidity and market returns.350 In times of financial distress and 
market downturns investors aim to replace high asset returns for the tradability 
of the securities held in their portfolios.351 Stock liquidity becomes more valuable 
in a downward market because disinvesting can preserve investors from 
suffering considerable losses. In other words, disinvesting would generate 
substantial expenses in illiquid capital markets.352 
Under these circumstances, stock liquidity reduces agency costs and 
determines the shareholders’ risk-adjusted return expectations on their invested 
capital.353 Depending on those agency costs, equity investors demand a risk-
adjusted return on their invested capital.354  
As there are several well studied possibilities to overcome the information 
deficit problem, such as dividend payments, controlling shareholders and debt 
financing, the possibility of reversing an investment decision quickly and with 
low consequential losses is also expedient.355 The more frictionless trading 
becomes, the lower is the risk-premium that is required by the firm’s equity 
investors.356 Inversely, illiquidity causes financing costs to rise because 
shareholders are obliged to keep their shares over a long period of time, which 
                                            
348 Cf. Pástor, L. Stambaugh, R. F. (2003), p. 683. 
349 Cf. Holmström, B., Tirole, J. (2000), p. 295 f. 
350 Cf. Chordia, T. et al. (2001), p. 501 f. 
351 Cf. Young, M. et al. (2008), p. 214. 
352 Cf. Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H. (2004), p. 382. 
353 Cf. Diamond, D., Verrecchia R. (1982), p. 275 f. 
354 Cf. Heger, W. (2005), p. 42. 
355 Cf. Benartzi, S. et al. (1997), p. 1032. 
356 Cf. Amihud, Y. Et al. (2015), p. 367. 
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makes investing more insecure.357 In general, the standardization of equity 
financing makes trading of property rights via capital markets possible.358  
3.1.3 Liquidity definition and dimensions 
Lippmann and McCall (1986) see the time that is required until an asset is 
exchanged for money to be the most relevant factor in defining liquidity. Garbade 
and Silber (1979) state that together with the trading time, the distance to the 
contemporaneous equilibrium value of the share is the most important factor.  
Campbell et al. (1997) state that “Financial market liquidity (is) the ability to 
buy or sell significant quantities of a security quickly, anonymously, and with 
relative little price impact.359”, while Wyss (2004) defines stock market liquidity by 
subdividing it into different stages: The first and most rudimentary stage of stock 
market liquidity is defined as the ability to trade at all.360 In contrast to illiquidity, 
at least one bid and one ask offer exists. The next rudimentary step is trading with 
a large impact on the quoted price. With higher liquidity, the price impact 
decreases.361 If trading is possible with only small price effects362, the third level of 
liquidity is reached.  If no price impacts are given and assets can be traded at the 
same price at the same point of time, a point of maximum liquidity is approached. 
This situation can be improved only by immediate trading, which is stated to be 
the highest form of liquidity. In this case stock trading causes no charges, price 
impacts or delays in time.363 
 
 
                                            
357 Cf. Amihud, Y. et al. (2015), p. 350 f.; Brennan, M., Huh, S. W. (2013), p. 133 
f.; Chan, H. W., Faff, R. W. (2005), p. 429 f.; Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 657 f.; 
Jensen, M. J. (1986), p. 328. 
358 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988), p. 9. 
359 Campbell, J. Y. et al (1997), p. 99 f. 
360 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 8 f. 
361 Cf. Phan, H. et al. (2007), p. 52. 
362 The price impact is based on transitory price movements that are described 
in more detail in subchapter 3.1.4. 
363 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 8. 
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Figure 3: Liquidity levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Wyss, R. (2004), p. 8. 
 
The different definitions imply that liquidity is a multidimensional 
phenomenon (a package of properties) that is complex in nature.364 To consider 
the multidimensional character of liquidity, the depth of the market, the breadth 
of the market and the resilience of the market have to be observed.365 Moreover, 
several investigations determine an additional fourth dimension; time 
(immediacy).366 This makes the major problem concerning liquidity-measurement 
visible; liquidity cannot be measured in one dimension. The four liquidity 
dimensions are highlighted below:367 
 
1. Tightness (breadth)  
The tightness dimension primarily takes the cost aspect into account and 
reflects the costs that arise from buying and immediately selling shares. The less 
dense the market is, the higher are the costs that result from a different bid-ask 
quotation.368 If the cumulative volume neither exceeds the highest bid nor the 
                                            
364 Cf. Chai, D. et al. (2010), p. 181 f.; Grullon, G. et al. (2004), p. 457; Makower, 
H., Marschak, J. (1986), p. 284. 
365 Cf. Schmidt, H., Iversen, P. (1991), p. 210.   
366 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 15 f.; Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
367 Cf. Brunner, A. (1996), p. 3; Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
368 Cf. Hasbrouck, J. (2003), p. 2375 f. 
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lowest asked price, tightness remains unaffected.369 Most commonly, the different 
spread measures are used to evaluate the breadth of the market. 
 
2. Depth 
Depth explores the quantity of a limited order book.370 The market becomes 
deeper with the quantity of shares that can be traded to a given bid-asked-
quotation.371 More precisely, the depth dimension explores the number of shares 
that can be traded at the given bid-asked-indication without influencing it. It is 
commonly measured by the order ratio, the trading volume, the flow ratio or the 
depth itself.  
 
3. Resilience 
A large unlimited order that far exceeds the given supply and demand can 
lead to an order imbalance that makes the new share-price differ from the fair 
market value.372 Due to a strongly diverging market evaluation of the companies’ 
value, informed investors will bring the price into balance, due to their following 
orders. For that reason, resilience is also described as the speed and the costs that 
are needed to return the share price to the fair market value.373 It covers the 
influence of the traded volume on the quoted price and can be measured by 
intraday returns, the variance ratio or the different liquidity ratios. 
 
4. Time (immediacy) 
The literature implies a fourth dimension; time (immediacy). It is defined as 
the duration required to find an appropriate counterparty to trade a given 
volume to given costs. It is also termed the quantity of transactions that is 
necessary to sell or buy a given amount of shares to a given price.  
 
The dimensions of a limited order book that have been described above are 
visualized in Figure 4. 
                                            
369 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 15. 
370 Cf. Bar-Yosef, S., Prencipe, A. (2013), p. 300 f.; Wyss, R. (2004), p. 5.  
371 Cf. Garbade, K. D. (1982), p. 420 f. 
372 Cf. Fung, J. K. W. (2007), p. 701. 
373 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 16. 
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Figure 4: Liquidity aspects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
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In order to find measures that evaluate the nature of liquidity appropriately 
and make different stocks’ liquidity comparable to each other, the investigation 
takes the four liquidity dimensions into consideration.374 The interdependency 
between the different dimensions makes the selection of appropriate liquidity 
proxies more difficult.375  
Because a growing order volume also increases the bid-ask span376, the 
breadth and the depth dimension are linked to each other and are frequently 
measured together.377 The execution of a given volume can be accomplished by 
aggregating orders over several periods (aggregate exchange behavior) within a 
limited order book.378 Therefore, the breadth and the time for a given volume and 
the depth and the time for a given span are correlated to each other.379  
Furthermore immediacy is connected to resilience. If a price can quickly 
return to the fair market price (high resilience) only a few orders are necessary to 
adjust the imbalance. Low resilience indicates that many orders are required to 
return to the fair market value.  
Finally, the tightness and the depth dimensions depend on the resilience. If 
there are unlimited orders that lead to an execution of many limited buying 
orders, the spreads will increase (tightness) and analogously the depth will 
decrease.380  
 
                                            
374 The multidimensional investigation of liquidity measures is based on             
Wyss, R. (2004), p. 8. 
375 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 16. 
376 The difference between the prices quoted for an immediate sale (offer) and 
an immediate purchase (bid). 
377 Cf. Lee, C. M. S. et al. (1993), p. 349 f. 
378 Cf. Campbell, J. Y., Cochrane, J. H. (1999), p. 205 f.; Evans, M. D. D., Lyons, 
R. K. (2002), p. 170 f.  
379 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 18. 
380 Cf. ibid. 
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Since liquidity cannot be measured directly, it is commonly approximated 
by transaction costs.381 The lower the costs of trading are, the higher is the 
liquidity level.382 An overview of the different transaction costs, separated into 
explicit and implicit cost components, is given in the following discussion.383  
 
Figure 5: Single components of transaction costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Gomber, P., Schweickert, U. (2002), p. 487. 
 
The rather obvious explicit trading costs (also termed direct transaction 
costs) arise from processing.384 Among other things, broker’s commissions, 
handling fees and taxes are the most common examples of explicit trading costs 
and reduce the expected return on the invested capital.385  
                                            
381 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1991), p. 1411 f.; Domowitz, I. (2002), p. 142 
f.; Jang, B.-G. et al. (2007), p. 2329 f.; Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 9 f.; Lesmond, D. A. 
et al. (1999), p. 1132;  
382 Cf. Aitken, M., Comerton-Forde, C. (2003), p. 46. 
383 Cf. Keim, D. B., Madhavan, A. (1998), p. 50.  
384 Cf. Domowitz, I. et al. (2001), p. 224; Keim, D. B., Madhavan, A. (1998), p. 50; 
Korajczyk, R. A., Sadka, R. (2004), p. 1040. 
385 Cf. Demetz, H. (1968), p. 33 f.; Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S. (1993), p. 77; Stoll, 
H. R. (2001), p. 16 f.  
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In contrast to explicit trading costs, implicit costs of trading are a product of 
imperfect capital markets and are applicable to every trader.386 Because implicit 
trading costs are negatively linked with liquidity, financing becomes cheaper with 
increasing liquidity.387 For purposes of subdivision, the implicit costs of trading 
can be classified into three groups: The bid-ask spread, price impact and 
opportunity costs.388 Bid-ask spreads are most frequently used to measure trading 
ability; thus they are explained in the following remarks. 389  
In the first step of the trading process, various orders are collected in an 
open order book.390 On the bid side, the lowest price is most likely to be executed 
and, correspondingly, the highest price on the ask side.391 If there is a difference 
between the bid and the ask price, it is not possible to trade shares free of 
charges.392 In other words, the bid-ask spread makes selling shares and 
immediately repurchasing them impossible at the same price.393  
The size of the spread is, furthermore, attributed to the market makers’394 
order processing, inventory holding and adverse information costs.395 These are 
explained in more detail in the following paragraphs.  
Order processing costs are the fixed costs that are required to fulfill the 
customer’s order. For instance, they include connection costs to the dealing 
system and costs for the demand of electronic information.396 The market maker 
                                            
386 Cf. Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (2001), p. 422. 
387 Cf. Datar, V. T. et al. (1998), p. 203 f.; Gomber, P., Schweickert, U. (2002),     
p. 487. 
388 Cf. Gomber, P., Schweickert, U. (2002), p. 487. 
389 The bid-ask spread is also used in Banerjee, S. et al. (2007); Griffin, C. H. 
(2010); Huang, G.-C. et al. (2012); Jayaraman, S., Milbourn, T. T. (2012), among 
others.  
390 Cf. Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
391 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 7. 
392 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 13.  
393 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 28. 
394 Market makers display buy and sell quotations for a given number of shares 
and assume the risk of holding shares to facilitate trading in that security.  
395 Cf. Madhavan, A. (2000), p. 208 f.  
396 Cf. Krinsky, I., Lee, J. (1996), p. 1523. 
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enhances the bid-ask spread to account for the reduced profit margins that go 
along with these kinds of costs.397    
Inventory holding costs occur when the market maker holds a less 
diversified portfolio to supply the market with liquidity.398 Therefore, inventory-
holding models assume that the market maker actively manages the spread to 
achieve the desired inventory.399 While an expanding inventory increases the 
price-change risk, a rather low inventory increases the danger of uncovered sales 
and market illiquidity.400 However, the deviation of the optimal inventory holding 
can leave the market maker with substantial costs.401 Because the inventory-
holding costs component is driven by the price risk as well as the opportunity 
costs of holding securities, the influence on dividend initiations is positive.402 In 
general, dividends reduce the price change risk because the cash distribution 
lowers the money that is left in equity risk. Accordingly, inventory-holding costs 
should increase the probability of dividend increases. However, the opportunity 
costs of holding an inventory also support dividend increases. Funds that are 
distributed in the form of cash dividends can be used for different purposes so 
that the opportunity costs decline.   
Besides inventory holding, information costs can also be a driving 
determinant of the bid-ask spread.403 As long as information is unequally 
distributed in reality, the uninformed market maker changes the bid-ask spread 
to compensate for the risk that is associated with dealing with a better-informed 
counterparty.404 An informed investor demands shares if the valuation level is too 
low, and sells shares if the firm’s market valuation exceeds fair value. That simply 
means that informed traders increase their own profit at the market maker’s 
                                            
397 Cf. Huang, R. D. (2002), p. 1285 f.  
398 Cf. Bollen, N. P. B. et al. (2002), p. 97.  
399 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1980), p. 31 f.; Garman, M. B. (1976), p. 257 
f.; Ho, T., Stall, H. R. (1981), p. 47 f.  
400 Cf. Damodaran, A. (2005), p. 4 f. 
401 Cf. Garman, M. B. (1976), p. 257 f. 
402 Cf. Howe, J. S., Lin, J.-C. (1992), p. 1.  
403 Cf. Stoll, H. R. (2000), p. 1482. 
404 Cf. Glosten, L. R., Milgrom, P. R. (1985), p. 71 f.; Grossman, S. J., Miller, M. 
H. (1988), p. 617. 
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expense and market makers respond by raising spreads for protection.405 It is 
expected that the information costs component of the spread influences dividend 
increases positively, because the information content of dividend increases can 
help to reduce information asymmetries.406  
The three cost components suggest that the market maker’s risk increases 
with volatility and information asymmetries.407 Further, it is found that 
institutional trading activity can increase insecurity and with it the bid-ask 
spread, due to the institutional investors’ presumed information advantage.408 
Conversely, several determinants—among others the price level, the trading 
volume and the number of market makers—influence the bid-ask spread 
negatively.409 The determinants lead to higher trading frequency. In the presence 
of various market makers or high trading volume, liquidity rises and the span 
between the bid and ask quotation decreases.410 Because the span between the two 
offers is larger for illiquid assets than for liquid assets, illiquidity makes trading 
more costly for the investor.411 Thus, the quoted bid-ask difference indicates a 
liquidation discount that reflects the price of immediacy, the timing costs.412 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
405 Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1980), p. 31 f. 
406 Cf. Aharony, J., Swary, I. (1980); Asquith, P., Mullins, D. W. (1983); Brickley, 
J. A. (1983); Charest, G (1978); Eades, K. M. (1982); Lipson, M. L. et al. (1998). 
407 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1980), p. 31 f.; Guéant, O. et al. (2013),         
p. 477 f.  
408 Cf. Kothare, M., Laux, P. A. (1995), p. 52. 
409 Cf. Jagadeesh, N., Subrahmanyam A. (1993), p. 171; Stoll, H. R. (1978),         
p. 1133 f. 
410 Cf. Lee et al. (1993), p. 345 f.  
411 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1991), p. 57. 
412 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988), p. 5. 
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In terms of liquidity measurement, the relevant literature distinguishes 
between quoted and realized bid-ask spreads.413 Whereas the quoted spread is 
calculated as the gap between the quoted ask and the dealers' quoted bid price at 
a certain point of time, the realized spread has a different time component.414 It 
shows the difference between the market makers’ purchasing prices and the 
market makers’ selling price.415 Since the quoted spread reflects the conditions 
that investors face in reality more appropriately, it appears to be more suitable 
than the realized spread for liquidity investigations.  
 
In addition to different spreads the price impact is a trading cost component 
for an asset that is driven by the trading-volume. If the volume of the best bid or 
ask quotation has been exceeded, the order goes to the second-best quotation. 
Consequently, trading becomes more expensive if immediate execution is 
desired.416 It can be predicted that the order quantity of the limited order book 
promotes stock liquidity and leads to more frictionless trading. Hence, the order-
volume of liquid capital markets is higher than the order-volume of illiquid 
capital markets and the market-impact costs increase with increasing illiquidity.417 
As many market participants intend to avoid price-impact costs to make 
investments more profitable, they delay the execution and watch for more 
attractive trading partners that offer them better conditions. Nevertheless, the 
delayed transaction in order to avoid timing-costs and market-impact costs is also 
costly for the investor. Waiting causes them to lose the value of the best 
alternative use of the liquid funds—so-called opportunity costs.418  
 
 
                                            
413 Cf. Elyasiani, E. et al. (2000), p. 2. 
414 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 13 f. 
415 Cf. Stoll, H. R. (1989), p. 115. 
416 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 28. 
417 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1991), p. 57. 
418 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1991), p. 57; Griffiths, M. D. et al. (2000),      
p. 66; Lesmond, D. A. et al. (1999), p. 1132.  
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The described costs of trading are repetitive, which means that they have to 
be paid whenever an asset is traded.419  
3.1.4 Volatility components of price movements 
Given that the volatility of the share determines the execution likelihood of 
a limited order, it influences the tradability of the share.420 If all information were 
freely available for everyone, trading would be done at the company's fair market 
value.421 Since information is lacking in reality, new fundamental information 
makes investors review the evaluation of the company and lets the share’s price 
move. To evaluate how new fundamental information influences the bidding 
behavior of investors, price movements can be divided into persistent and 
transitory components. A persistent price impact is based on fundamental 
information. It allows the share price move to its fair market value. A transitory 
price impact leads share prices in the opposite direction, away from fair value.422  
 
Figure 6: Reasons for share price movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 31 f. 
 
                                            
419 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1988), p. 6. 
420 Cf. Kinderman, S. (2005), p. 31. 
421 Cf. Boyer, R. (2007), p. 780.  
422 Cf. Hasbrouck, J. (1991), p. 179. 
 
93  3 STOCK LIQUIDITY VALUE AND ESTIMATION 
While “transitory price movement” signals illiquidity, “persistent price 
movement” results from information flow.423 The price impact varies with the 
novelty of the information for the different kinds of traders, which is based on 
their individual information level.424 Given that liquidity is an equilibrium 
between liquidity demand and liquidity supply, different kinds of investors are 
distinguished, depending on whether they supply or demand liquidity.425  
 
First, informed traders need liquidity to benefit from their information 
advantage (liquidity demand).426 They evaluate the fair value of a business and 
sell shares if the share price exceeds the fair value and buy shares if the company 
is under-valued.427 This is possible only if the execution can be done with the 
lowest possible friction.  
 
Second, uninformed traders supply the market with liquidity.428 As these 
market participants are unaware of the fair market value and unable to assess the 
share properly, they primarily aim to trade at the lowest possible costs. To obtain 
a completion advantage they place limited orders that supply the market with 
liquidity.  
 
Third, noise traders do not base their investment decision on fundamental 
information but on “noise” that is due to overreactions, inaccurate ideas and 
incorrect data.429 Generally, noise traders add liquidity to a market while not 
distorting valuations.430 
 
 
                                            
423 Cf. Elyasiani, E. et al. (2000), p. 5. 
424 Cf. Glosten, L. R., Milgrom, P. R. (1985), p. 76;  Hasbrouck, J. (1990), p. 234 f.; 
Wyss, R. (2004), p. 20. 
425 Cf. Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
426 Cf. Kinderman, S. (2005), p. 31 f. 
427 Cf. Kim, M. J. et al. (1991), p. 12.  
428 Cf. Kinderman, S. (2005), p. 33. 
429 Cf. Black, F. (1986), p. 531. 
430 Cf. Brown, G. W. (1999), p. 82 f.  
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Fourth, arbitrageurs influence liquidity depending on the underlying 
reason for the arbitrage. When arbitrageurs increase the market-making capacity 
as a result of non-fundamental demand shocks, market liquidity improves.431 
While demand shocks appear rather seldom in reality, a different connection 
seems to explain the relationship more appropriately.  
If the arbitrage arises from fundamental trading, arbitrageurs can exploit 
less informed investors due to their information advantage and therefore demand 
liquidity.432  
 
Fifth, market makers supply liquidity to enable market participants to trade 
immediately. They decrease market volatility and support the volume of 
transactions. 
 
Despite the great significance of liquidity on share prices for modern stock 
markets and the existence of numerous studies, various inconsistent definitions of 
liquidity have made liquidity measurement challenging for a long time.433  
3.2 CLASSIFICATION AND COMPARISON OF LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
3.2.1 Liquidity measure classification 
Given that liquidity is not directly measurable, one possible way to measure 
it is to concentrate on its quantifiable properties.434 Thus, liquidity measures could 
be categorized by their dimensional and multidimensional character.435 Due to 
interdependency between the different liquidity dimensions, it is commonly not 
possible to point out which dimension is influenced the most. Hence, one further 
                                            
431 Cf. Gromb, D., Vayanos, D. (2010), p. 251 f.; Holden, C. W. (1995), p. 423 f. 
432 Cf. Domowitz, I. et al. (1998), p. 2001 f.; Kumar, P. Seppi, D. J. (1994), p 293 f. 
433 Cf. Boulding (1955), p. 310; Váradi, K. (2012), p. 35; Wyss, R. (2004), p. 5 f.  
434 Cf. Makower, H., Marschak, J. (1986), p. 284; Mancini, L. et al. (2011),           
p. 1806; Wyss, R. (2004), p. 5 f.  
435 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 9. 
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way to divide liquidity measures into categories is used; the separation into “pre-
trade” and “post-trade” categories.436  
Both pre-trade and post-trade estimation can provide valuable information 
about the level of stock market liquidity.437 Information that is prior to the 
transaction is based on the depth and the tightness of the open order book that 
contains information about the ability to trade the share.438 That means that in an 
open order book the relevant information is also available for all market 
participants before trading takes place.439 Pre-trade measures display the trading 
costs that can be observed before trading takes place.440 They can be defined as the 
“…availability of information about pending trading interest in the market.441” 
Pre-trade measures mainly include limited bid orders that are visible and publicly 
available in the order-book. Pre-trade measures, like the bid as spread, show how 
costly buying and immediate selling would be.442 In other words, these measures 
capture the tradability of shares in a current market situation.  
A few drawbacks accompany pre-trade measurement. The trading decision 
can be influenced by the available information and investors can manipulate the 
price-building process (“gaming”).443 Furthermore, time-related characteristics 
like the resilience of the market are unobservable before the trade.444  
 
 
                                            
436 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 27 f. 
437 Cf. Atkins, A. B., Dyl, E. A. (1997), p. 309 f.; Boehmer, E. et al. (2005), p. 784; 
Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
438 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 46. 
439 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
440 Cf. Boehmer, E. et al. (2005), p. 784; Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
441 Boehmer, E. et al. (2005), p. 784. 
442 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1989), p. 479 f.; Atkins, A. B., Dyl, E. A. 
(1997), p. 309 f.; Bacidore, J. M. (1997), p. 92 f.; Chordia, T. et al. (2011), p. 709 f.; 
Chordia, T. et al. (2001), p. 501 f.; Hasbrouck, J. (2004), p. 305 f.; Huang, G.-C. et al. 
(2012), p. 43 f.; Ranaldo, A. (2000), p. 26 f. 
443 Cf. Hasbrouck, J. Schwartz, R. A. (1988), p. 11. 
444 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
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In particular, potential traders who monitor the order-book cannot be detected, 
nor can special kinds of orders445, which are not shown in the order book.446 If 
traders who monitor the order book react to moving share prices by placing an 
order, they influence the market.447 Therefore, the observers’ willingness to trade 
can only be measured post-trade as it is visible only after the execution of the 
order.  
 
As a result, post-trade measures supply additional information to pre-trade 
proxies that are generated with the transaction.448 Market participants who are 
willing to trade but who do not place market orders, as well as special order 
forms, are visible after trading. Likewise, post-trade measures are free from 
“gaming” and few post-trade measures can discriminate between persistent and 
temporary price movements.449  
However, post-trade measures are stated not to quantify the transactions’ 
costs adequately, since the shareholders’ ability to trade immediately depends on 
the information that is available prior to the trade. That means that a post-trade 
measure overrates the trading opportunities systematically.450  
There are three general ways to obtain liquidity information after trading. 
They are based on the transaction time, the transaction quantity and/or the 
transaction price. The overview in Figure 7 subdivides the potential proxies based 
on these criteria.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
445 E.g. iceberg orders that show only a small part of the order volume. 
446 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 48. 
447 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 25 f. 
448 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 27 f. 
449 Cf. Hasbrouck, J. Schwartz, R. A. (1988), p. 11. 
450 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 32. 
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Figure 7: Categorization of liquidity measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 109; Wyss, R. (2004), p. 9. 
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On the one hand, the overview shows that there are various potential 
liquidity measures, because scientific investigations and the multidimensional 
character of liquidity permit the application of multiple measures.451 On the other 
hand, the high number of liquidity measures complicates the selection process.452 
On that account the suitability and data availability of the liquidity measures is 
evaluated with the following three criteria to reduce the selection possible. 453 
 
Firstly, the variables should lead every market participant to the same 
evaluation within the price-building process. That means that the variables 
should lead to identical prices from the seller’s and the buyer’s perspective. 
Therefore, appropriate liquidity measures need symmetrical properties to lead to 
the same results independent from buying or selling shares.454 The prerequisite 
can be tested by the accumulation of all rates of return. If the sum is different 
from zero, the condition is not fulfilled, because every appropriate liquidity 
measure demonstrates that trading is a “zero-sum game”.455 For the reason that 
discrete variables like the bid-ask spread do not fulfill the condition, the 
logarithm can convert discrete variables into continuous ones.456 Hereafter, 
variables that can be converted into continuous variables by conversion with the 
natural logarithm are labeled “if log”.457 
 
 
 
                                            
451 Multiple measures are also used in Kindermann, S. (2005) and Wyss, R. 
(2004). 
452 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 45.  
453 Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 112 defines three further criteria that are required 
to approximate stock market efficiency instead of volatility. Since that makes the 
separation of transitory and permanent price movements necessary, and almost 
all long-term available liquidity measures fail to do so, the additional criteria are 
not considered further.   
454 Cf. Cuny, C. J. (1993), p. 73. 
455 Cf. Berkowitz, S. A. et al. (1988), p. 97 f. 
456 Cf. Berkowitz, S. A. et al. (1988), p. 100. 
457 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 112. 
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Secondly, the investigation of dividend changes requires a long-term 
dataset. Thus, a further criterion is the availability of data, especially because the 
importance of stock market liquidity estimation has increased quite recently, and 
the necessary liquidity information cannot be traced back far into the past. 
Therefore, the lack of availability of data for a long-term investigation is a large 
restriction.  
 
Thirdly, comparability between different companies is stated to be the last 
relevant factor for measures to be appropriate.458 In summary the described 
conditions for an appropriate liquidity measure are given in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8: Criteria for the evaluation of liquidity measures 
Source: own figure based on Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 39 f. 
 
In assessing the suitability of the different measures the three liquidity 
criteria are summarized in Table 7. The column furthest to the right in the table 
shows the number of criteria that are met by the specific liquidity measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
458 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 13. 
Suitability criteria 
Symmetry Data availability Comparability 
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Table 7: Overview of the suitability of all introduced measures 
Source: own table based on Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 112. 
 
 
 
Liquidity Proxies Symmetry Availability Comparability  ∑ Suitability 
Pre-trade measures 
Order book span 
Absolute spreads if log fulfilled  not fulfilled  2 of 3 
*Relative spreads* if log fulfilled fulfilled *3 of 3* 
Effective spread if log not fulfilled fulfilled 2 of 3 
Average spread if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Round trip costs not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Order book volume 
Quantity depth not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Dollar depth not fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 1 of 3 
Order ratio not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Order book span/volume 
Quote slope not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Composite liquidity not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Post-trade measures 
Transaction time 
Trading frequency fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
Trading latency fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
Zeros fulfilled  fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Transaction quantity 
Trading volume  fulfilled fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Turnover fulfilled fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
*Turnover ratio* fulfilled fulfilled fulfilled *3 of 3* 
LR 1 if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
*ILLIQ* if log fulfilled fulfilled *3 of 3* 
*LR 2* if log fulfilled fulfilled *3 of 3* 
LR3 if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Flow ratio if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Transaction price 
Thompson Waller measure  if log not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
Bhattacharya measure if log not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
Market impact not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Price impact fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 2 of 3 
Depth of price impact fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 2 of 3 
* The liquidity measure meets all three criteria.   
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Since the literature creates many similar measures that are not suitable for 
calculating liquidity, the dissertation focuses on four liquidity proxies that meet 
the defined suitability criteria, namely, relative spread, turnover ratio, ILLIQ and 
LR 2. 
3.2.2 Pre-trade liquidity measures 
The relative spread is the only pre-trade measure that meets the defined 
criterion. It shows a ratio of the absolute spread and a reference value:459 
 
(2) Relative spread 
 
 
The relative spread, measured as the span between the lowest bid price and 
the highest ask price can be compared to the mid-price or the last trade.460 The 
lower the spread is, the more liquidly the asset can be traded.461 The spread in 
relation to the calculated mid price is one of the most frequently used measures in 
the literature.462 
(3) Relative spread (calculated with mid price) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
459 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 14. 
460 Cf. Stoll, H. R., Whaley, R. E. (1990), p. 70. 
461 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 13. 
462 Used in Acker, D. et al. (2002); Bertin, W. et al. (2005); Chordia, T. et al. 
(2001); Corwin, S. A. (1999); Elyasiani, E. et al. (2000); Greene, J., Smart, S. (1999); 
Kavajecz, K. A. (1999); Rojahn, J., Elschen, R. (2009); Kluger, B. D., Stephan, J. 
(1997); Levin, E. J., Wright, R. E. (1999); Lin, J.-C. et al. (1995); Menyah, K., 
Paudyal, K. (2000); Van Ness, B. F et al. (2000). 
       
  
    
 
  
  
     
    
  
  
    
  
 
       = spread; relative calculated with mid price 
  
  = best asked price 
  
   best bid price 
  
 = mid price calculated 
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An alternate relative spread measure is calculated with the last trade in the 
denominator.463 The ratio of the spread and the last trade considers that the 
market is moving in different directions: upward moving, where    = ask price 
and downward moving, where    = bid price.464 
 
(4) Relative spread (calculated with last trade) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the spread is scaled by a reference value it makes different companies’ 
liquidity comparable.465 Further, it is possible that the spread leads to the same 
price from the buyers’ and sellers’ perspective if logarithmic values are used.466   
3.2.3 Post-trade liquidity measures 
Because they are easily measured, many investigations use volume related 
liquidity variables like trading volume, turnover and turnover ratios for 
estimation.467 Like all post-trade measures, volume-related proxies over-evaluate 
the liquidity level systematically. Despite their common use, volume related 
liquidity variables are unsuitable for measuring liquidity, as they do not take the 
                                            
463 Used in Fleming, M. J., Remolona, E. M. (1999) and Amihud, Y., Mendelson, 
H. (1991). 
464 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 15. 
465 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 14. 
466 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 112. 
467 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007); Chordia, T. et al. (2011); Greene, J., Smart, S. 
(1999); Jayaraman, S., Milbourn, T. T. (2012); Joshipura, M. (2009); Mancini, L. et 
al. (2013). 
       
  
    
 
  
 
 
       = spread; relative calculated with last trade 
  
  = best asked price 
  
   best bid price 
   = last traded price before time t 
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share price into account.468 A given traded amount of money (turnover), leads to a 
different trading volume depending on the price level.  
Because trading volume and turnover are absolute figures, they fail to make 
different observations comparable. 
 
A modified turnover measure, the turnover ratio, which divides the 
calculated turnover by a company’s outstanding shares, is used to overcome the 
problem described above.469 Turnover, which shows trading activity, is negatively 
correlated to the bid-ask spread, which means that it is positively correlated to 
liquidity.470 
 
(5) Turnover ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite outstanding shares being exogenous market factors that are not 
taken into account by market participants regarding their trading decision,471 the 
turnover ratio is advantageous in respect of the turnover measure. It relates to the 
shares that can potentially be traded by taking outstanding shares into account. 
Furthermore, scaling the turnover by the reference value makes companies’ 
liquidity comparable.   
 
                                            
468 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 69. 
469 Used in Banerjee, S. et al. (2007); Griffin, C. H. (2010); Huang, G.-C. et al. 
(2012); Jayaraman, S., Milbourn, T. T. (2012). 
470 Cf. Huang, G.-C. et al. (2012), p. 45. 
471 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 69. 
     
       
  
  
   
 
 
    = turnover to shares outstanding per time 
   = price of trade i 
   = shares of trade i 
so = shares outstanding 
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In addition to the turnover ratio, the previous liquidity measure overview 
shows that Amihuds’ liquidity measure “ILLILQ” also meets the defined 
suitability criteria.  
ILLIQ is the daily ratio of absolute stock return compared to its trading 
volume, averaged over a period of time; and quantifies the effect of one traded 
monetary unit on the daily price response. In other words, Amihud’s liquidity 
measure estimates the stock’s ability to absorb trading volumes with no major 
share price variations.  
The ILLIQ proxy makes it possible to construct long time series of liquidity 
that are necessary to test the effects of illiquidity on ex ante and contemporaneous 
stock excess returns over time. This is much more complicated with finer 
illiquidity measures like the bid-ask spread.472  
 
(6) Amihud illiquid measure (ILLIQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fourth and last measure that meets the symmetry, data availability and 
comparability criteria is liquidity ratio 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
472 Cf. Amihud, Y. (2002), p. 32. 
                           
   
   
 
 
        = illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002) 
     = return on stock i on day d of year y 
        = respective daily volume in dollars 
   = number of days with available data for stock i in year y 
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For calculation, the volume of traded shares is reduced by the free float.473 
The reduction is based on the minor changes in the daily free float. 
 
(7) Liquidity ratio 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Selection of liquidity measures 
The preceding review of liquidity measures shows that only four measures 
meet the defined necessary criteria of symmetry, data availability and 
comparability. In order to choose between the selected measures, they are 
analyzed regarding their difficulty of their interpretation, their liquidity valuation 
and a consideration of potential traders and invisible orders, shown in Table 8. In 
order to select the most suitable proxies, each category values one scoring point. 
The sum of scoring points determines the most convenient liquidity measures for 
the present investigation. 
 
Table 8: Liquidity measure selection process  
Criterion 
(scoring systematology) 
Relative 
spread 
Turnover  
ratio 
ILLIQ Liquidity 
ratio 2 
Interpretation 
(easy 1, difficult 0) easy easy difficult difficult 
Liquidity valuation 
(appropriate 1, overvalue 0) 
appropriate overvalue overvalue overvalue 
Potential traders/   
invisible orders 
(considered 1, missed 0) 
missed considered considered considered 
∑ Score 2/3 2/3 1/3 1/3 
                                            
473 Used in Ranaldo, A. (2000). 
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     = liquidity ratio 2 
        = free float = total number of shares minus 
shares owned by the firm 
   = price of trade i 
   = shares of trade i 
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The comparison provided by this overview shows that the relative spread 
and the turnover ratio meet more of the defined criteria than do ILLIQ and 
liquidity ratio 2.474 Accordingly, ILLIQ and liquidity ratio 2 are not considered in 
the final investigation.  
While liquidity ratios consider potential traders and invisible orders, 
negative characteristics are predominant: interpretation is difficult and they 
overvalue liquidity systematically.475  
 
Contrarily, it is found that two liquidity proxies are particularly suitable for 
the investigation: the relative spread and the turnover ratio.  
One of the several advantages of the spread measurement for liquidity 
approximation is the accuracy of the spread in comparison to many other coarser 
measures and its acceptance in the literature.476 It is a fine measure for liquidity as 
small spread changes can lead to large variations in the price-building process 
and interpretation is easy.477 Furthermore, the relative spread does not over value 
liquidity, since it is measured before the trade takes place.478 The most noteworthy 
disadvantage of the relative spread is that pre-measurement misses out potential 
traders and invisible orders.479  
For estimation purposes the spread can be set into relation to the mid price 
or the last trade.480 Since the ratio of the spread and the last trade depends more 
on share price movements that are smoothed by using the mid price, the relative 
spread calculated with the mid price is taken to make observations less 
fluctuating.  
 
 
  
                                            
474 The liquidity measure selection process is given in Table 8. 
475 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 32. 
476 Also see sub chapter 3.2.2. 
477 Cf. Amihud, Y. (2002), p. 32. 
478 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 32. 
479 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
480 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 14 f. 
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Also, liquidity estimation with the turnover ratio is easy to interpret.481 
Differently from the relative spread, the liquidity valuation with the turnover 
ratio considers potential traders and invisible orders. Because the turnover ratio is 
a post-trade liquidity measure, it accounts for that interesting information.  
As with every post-trade measure, it is a negative in the sense that the 
overvaluation of liquidity is a systematic problem of the turnover ratio.482  
 
In conclusion, the selection of appropriate liquidity measures is challenging. 
On the one hand, the availability and lack of comparability of data limits the 
range of suitable liquidity measures. On the other hand, many of the potential 
liquidity measures presented do not correspond to the previous definition of 
liquidity.  
3.3 CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In a frictionless world, from a transaction costs point of view investors with 
a cash preference are indifferent between cash distributions and selling shares.483 
To generate liquid funds, shareholders can either sell shares (homemade 
dividends) or be supplied with cash distributions. Since tradability is a necessary 
requirement to convert assets into cash, liquidity and dividends can be 
considered to be substitutes from that point of view.  
Since capital markets are not frictionless and trading as well as dividend 
payment are accompanied by transaction costs, the influence of stock liquidity on 
dividend changes is more complex. The influence of stock liquidity on dividend 
changes is unclear in the current state of the literature.  
 
 
                                            
481 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007); Chordia, T. et al. (2011); Greene, J., Smart, S. 
(1999); Jayaraman, S., Milbourn, T. T. (2012); Joshipura, M. (2009); Mancini, L. et 
al. (2013). 
482 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 32. 
483 Cf. Miller, M. H., Modigliani, F. (1961), p. 411 f. 
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On the one hand, a substitutive relationship is investigated by Aggarwal et 
al. (2012), Banerjee et al. (2007) and Kale et al. (2012). Banerjee et al. (2007) argue 
that transaction costs are responsible for the negative influence of stock liquidity 
on dividends, because shareholders’ liquidity requirements can be met by 
creating home-made dividends in highly liquid capital markets. Kale et al. (2012), 
as well as Aggarwal et al. (2012), see the information value of liquidity and 
dividends to be more significant for the substitutive effect of liquidity and 
dividends. Both dividends and liquidity can be used to reduce investment risk to 
overcome agency problems.484 Since agency costs become larger with illiquidity, 
firms with illiquid shares are more likely to initiate dividends to reduce the risks 
of investment than are firms with satisfactory liquidity.485  
On the other hand, Fama and French’s (2002) and Jiang et al.’s (2017) 
findings support a complementary influence of liquidity on dividends. Fama and 
French (2002) argue that size matters for dividend payments, because larger firms 
have better access to capital markets that provides them with more liquid 
shares.486 Large companies are also more likely to distribute dividends due to 
their constant cash flows and low leverage.487 Company size is stated to be the 
main driver for the influence of stock liquidity on dividend changes. Both are 
enhanced with greater firm size; the liquidity level and the probability of 
dividend issuance increase. 
Also, Jiang et al. (2017) argue that liquidity positively influences the 
propensity to pay a dividend, and that dividend yields are increasing with rising 
liquidity. Since share prices are less affected by informed traders in liquid 
markets, they provide convenient surroundings for informed investors to hide 
private information.488 Further, gathering information becomes more important 
                                            
484 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 650 f.; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. (1988),       
p 149 f.; Jensen, M. C. (1986), p. 323 f.; Lang, L. H. P., Litzenberger, R. H. (1989),     
p. 181 f., among others. 
485 Cf. Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H. (1991), p. 57. 
486 The positive influence of company size on dividends is also investigated in 
Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012); De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015); Kale, J. R. et al. 
(2012), Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), among others.  
487 Cf. Fama, E. French, K. (2002), p. 1 f. 
488 Cf. Jiang, F. et al. (2017), p. 295. 
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for less informed shareholders in order to increase their information level and 
make investing more secure. If uninformed investors increase their information 
level with increasing liquidity, they are more likely to detect managers who 
opportunistically abuse the companies’ cash flows for private benefits. When 
managers are concerned about being exposed, they distribute liquid funds in the 
form of cash dividends rather than taking private benefits.  
 
The controversies presented here as to whether stock liquidity has a 
negative489 or positive490 effect on the probability of paying a dividend make 
further investigations necessary. Furthermore, additional insights by 
investigating dividend changes are needed to put further pieces of the dividend 
puzzle in place.  
 
Following the argument of the substitution theory, information 
asymmetries must be downsized to eliminate or reduce shareholders’ risks and as 
a result to keep the cost of financing as low as possible. One option to keep 
shareholders and other market participants informed is to pay out dividends. The 
distributed amount of money limits potential cash flow abuse and opportunistic 
behavior by management (moral hazard).491 While dividend payments reduce the 
risk of unpredictability, illiquidity causes higher information asymmetries and, as 
a consequence, financing costs rise.492 If management use their distribution 
policies in this way, dividend changes may depend on the degree of liquidity. 
Based on the studies of Aggarwal et al. (2012), Fama and French (2002), Banerjee 
et al. (2007), Kale et al. (2012) and Jiang et al. (2017) that liquidity influences 
dividends, the following hypothesis will be examined: 
 
H1: Stock market liquidity significantly affects the probability of dividend changes.     
 
                                            
489 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007), p. 369 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f. 
490 Cf. Fama, E. French, K. (2002), p. 1 f.; Jiang, F. et al. (2017), p. 295 f. 
491 Cf. Achleitner, A.-K., Pietzsch, L. (2005), p. 379 f.; He, W. et al. (2017), p. 281. 
492 Cf. Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 657 f.; Jensen, M. J. (1986), p. 328. 
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To test the importance of and general link between stock market liquidity 
for shifting dividends, stochastic models as well as data mining techniques seem 
particularly suitable.493  
Besides the general link between stock liquidity and shifting dividends, the 
direction of influence is investigated to increase understanding of how stock 
liquidity and dividend changes are connected. Therefore, further hypotheses are 
derived from research findings. Following Fama and French (2002) and Jiang et al. 
(2017), it is considered that dividend changes and stock market liquidity are 
complementary. This can be a size effect or a result of the enhanced information 
level of uninformed investors in the presence of stock liquidity. Since large 
companies have more liquid shares and better conditions for dividend payments 
such as constant cash flows, in comparison to smaller firms, company size 
supports the complementary effect of stock liquidity and dividend changes.494 
Moreover, liquid capital markets enable managers to hide private information in 
share prices, which makes it necessary for uninformed investors to gather more 
information to reduce agency costs. Due to the increased information level, 
dividends become less required for monitoring managers495, which also supports 
the assumption that stock liquidity and dividend changes are positively linked. 
Consequently, the second and third hypotheses are: 
 
H2: Stock market liquidity has a negative effect on the probability of dividend 
decreases.496 
H3: Stock market liquidity has a positive effect on the probability of dividend 
increases.497 
 
 
                                            
493  Also Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016) use stochastic models as well as data 
mining to test the importance different firm-specific variables have for dividend 
changes.  
494 Cf. Fama, E., Franch, K. (2002), p. 29. 
495 Dividends can serve as monitoring devices because less liquid funds are left 
under managements’ control.  
496 Derived from Fama, E. French, K. (2002) and Jiang, F. et al. (2017). 
497 Derived from Fama, E. French, K. (2002) and Jiang, F. et al. (2017). 
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In line with Fama and French (2002), the thesis subsequently tests whether 
the positive influence of firm size on dividend changes is to be attributed to large 
companies having easier access to capital markets. The research design to test the 
three hypotheses is described and results are analyzed and interpreted in chapter 
four. 
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4 EMPRIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1.1 Dividend change classification techniques  
The current state of research employs multiple approaches to dividend 
change measurement. Classification methods are the most prominent solutions.498 
Most simply, dividend changes can be measured binarily. That means that the 
nominal scaled dividend change variable can take two different values. As an 
illustrative definition a binary change variable takes the value one if the dividend 
increases, zero otherwise.499 Because dividend change events consist of numerical 
scores that exist on an ordinal scale, a dividend change event is an ordinal 
variable. Therefore, an ordered probit or ordered logit model seems appropriate 
for the investigation of a multiclass dividend change variable. The advantage of 
these methods over a simple OLS regression is that the gap between dividend 
increases/decreases and maintenance is not assessed in the same way as an OLS 
would do.500 In addition to binary estimation, multinomial classification divides 
the dividend change events into three or more classes, such as decreases, 
maintenance and increases. This considerably improves the accuracy of the whole 
measuring process, while multiple classes are narrower.  
 
 
 
                                            
498 Dividend changes are also investigated with classification methods in 
Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 20; De Cesari, A., 
Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 8 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; Goergen, M. et al. 
(2005), p. 387 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. (2006), p. 303 f.; 
Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f., among others.  
499 Cf. Simons, K. (1994), p. 579. 
500 Cf. Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379. 
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One of the most common models in the literature is:501 
 
Y = 0 if    ≤0 (decrease) 
Y = 1 if 0 <    ≤ µ (maintain) 
Y = 2 if 0 µ ≤    (increase) 
 
To distinguish between small and large dividend events, the change can be 
split into four or more groups.502 For example, Alangar et al. (1999) include only 
numerous dividend changes that are larger than 50 percent as well as dividend 
initiations and dividend omissions in the following pattern: 
 
1. Dividend initiations (first time or first after three years)  
2. Omissions (after at least three years of payment for at least one year)  
3. Large increases (>50%)  
4. Large decreases (<50%)  
 
The commonly used classification techniques are auspicious for dividend 
change research and can simply be expanded or modified; but some 
circumstances have to be considered.  
First, the number of classes is of special importance for an appropriate 
classification. It has to sustain the distinctive characteristics of dividend changes.  
Second, too many classes waters down the quality of information; but the 
original character of the variable is lost if too few classes are built and no scaling 
up is possible afterwards.503  
Third, it is difficult to find useful classes that handle the nature of the 
variable with little friction.504  
 
 
 
 
                                            
501 Cf. Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379. 
502 Cf. Alangar, S. et al. (1999), p. 429 f.  
503 Cf. Abdessemed, L., Escofier, B. (1994), p. 604.  
504 Cf. Tsoumakas, G., Katakis, I. (2007), p. 2 f.  
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Despite it being complicated to find suitable classes, in general the benefits 
of classification outweigh the disadvantages by far. For the present investigation 
it is particularly valuable that investigation of dividend changes makes it easy to 
find appropriate categories such as dividend omissions, decreases, maintenance, 
increases and first time initiations. It is also helpful that dividend research 
provides a non-linear relationship and harmonizes the nature of the data if it is 
heterogeneous.505 Due to these advantages, the present investigation uses 
classification techniques to measure dividend changes. A multinomial 
investigation appears to correspond particularly well to the character of dividend 
changes.506 If the dividend change observations are unequally distributed across 
the different groups, they can be adjusted by putting classes together. The 
adjustment helps to equalize the observations of each category and possibly 
increases information value and predictive power.507  
4.1.2 Comparison of stochastic and algorithmic modeling  
In general, data modeling is like a black box, where the input variable x 
enters the box on one side and the response variable y comes out on the other 
side.508  
 
Figure 9: Nature of data  
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Breiman, L. (2001), p. 199. 
 
 
                                            
505 For further information see Keune, H. et al. (1991), p. 249 f. 
506 Cf. Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 379. 
507 Cf. Domingos, P. (2012), p. 79 f.  
508 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 199. 
 
116 SEBASTIAN KUHLMANN 
Models are derived from scientific literature to figure out how the “real 
world” works. Although all models fail to reflect reality entirely, some of them 
are useful to make complex reality more comprehensible.509 
 
Today there are two general modeling-cultures: stochastic and machine 
learning.510 While classical stochastic statistics allows more detailed inference by 
deriving the process by which data was generated, machine learning focuses on 
the prediction of future data.511 
Classical statistics, like logit regression models and linear discriminant 
analysis, primarily aims to test hypotheses of causes and effects and the 
interpretability of models.512 Those models are generally chosen by the parameter 
significance and the goodness-of-fit, while the outcomes are easy to interpret. 
Breiman (2001) argues that classical models are interested only in minimizing 
loss, using anything that works.513 Forecasting is not their primary objective, 
because stochastic models are primarily based on well-known historical 
assumptions.514 This is a major disadvantage, because “It is quite true what 
philosophy says: that Life must be understood backwards. But that makes one 
forget the other saying: that it must be lived forwards.515” The request for 
forward-oriented approaches underlines the importance of machine learning 
models because they consider the nature of variables as unknown and do not 
bank upon historical patterns.516 
 
 
 
 
                                            
509 Cf. Hand, D. J. (2014), p. 99.  
510 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 199 f.  
511 Cf. Rodriquez, B. et al. (2008), p. 266. 
512 Cf. Foo, J., Merkel, M. (2010), p. 49.  
513 This is also stated by Hand, D. J. (2014), p. 3. 
514 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 202. 
515 Quotation from Søren Kierkegaard 1988 (Danish philosopher and 
theologian). 
516 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 1 f.  
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Accordingly, the analysis in this study extends the classical stochastic 
modeling techniques by further methods, aiming to illustrate reality even more 
suitably. To do so, machine learning techniques are used additionally, to get new 
insights and increase the reliability of the statistical outcomes.517 The primary 
focus of those models is on predictive accuracy, because the underlying data 
mechanism is more reliable when the predictive accuracy is high.518 Algorithmic 
modeling tends to achieve better performance accuracy than do traditional 
statistical methods, but is more complicated to interpret.519 Models are not chosen 
by their parameter significance or goodness-of-fit but on their cross-validated 
predictive accuracy, using training and test samples.520 One can say that the 
machine learning algorithms rely on making progress; machine learning is 
advantageous in handling large and sophisticated data sets in comparison to data 
modeling.  
“If our goal as a field is to use data to solve problems, then we need to move 
away from exclusive dependence on data models and adopt a more diverse set of 
tools.”521 For this reason the dissertation aims to answer the research question 
using these two different modeling techniques.  
Each technique can be divided into two sub-categories, depending on the 
arrangement of the endogenous dividend change variable, namely multinomial 
and binary classification. Multinomial measurement explains the nature of 
dividends by putting them into more than two classes, while binary measurement 
can help to equalize the dividend change categories to improve model accuracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
517 Cf. Huang, Z. et al. (2004), p. 543 f.  
518 Cf. Hastie, T. et al.(2017), p. 24 f.    
519 Cf. Huang, Z. et al. (2004), p. 543 f. 
520 Cf. Saravanan, P., Kalpana, P. (2017), p. 97.   
521 Breiman, L. (2001), p. 199. 
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The stochastic techniques used are panel logit models and linear 
discriminant analysis, while the machine learning analysis focuses on Breiman’s 
(2001) preferred method, random forests.522 As a preliminary step a single 
decision tree is grown to simplify the interpretability of the tree model. 
Additionally, a more complicated technique is used that can advance the accuracy 
of a relatively weak learning algorithm by using re-sampling on training data in a 
process known as gradient boosting.523  
Starting with the stochastic estimation, the different statistical models are 
explained in more detail in the following section. 
4.1.3 Stochastic modeling approaches 
4.1.3.1 Panel logit analysis 
The Hausman Test of Specification is used to differentiate between fixed 
and random effects in panel data.524 As random effect is preferred a random 
effects logit panel with a multinomial endogenous variable is calculated, using 
panel data controls for unobserved heterogeneity within the estimation of the 
coefficients. Accordingly, a logistic function is used to estimate the probabilities 
between the dependent categorical variable and the independent variables.525 
Using multinomial classification, the endogenous variable can take more than 
only binary characteristics.526 It can be said that the logit classification is 
generalized to multidimensional problems and it is assumed that a logistic 
relationship between the predictors and the log odds of group membership 
exists.527 
                                            
522 Cf. Breiman, L.(2001), p. 207. 
523 Cf. Friedman, J. et al. (2000), p. 337. 
524 Cf. Hausman, J. A. (1978), p. 1251 f. 
525 Cf. Hilbe, J. M. (2009), p. 15 f. 
526 For the multinomial panel logistic estimation the dividend change variable 
can take the value 0 for decreased, 1 for maintained and 2 for increased 
dividends. 
527 Cf. Finch, H., Schneider, M. K. (2007), p. 48; Gujarati, D. N. (2009), p. 597. 
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For panel data, every individual company i chooses its dividend policy with 
j choices at time t. The company’s choice depends on observed characteristics that 
change between single firms and over time (    . Also, time-constant unobserved 
individual effects are taken into account by    : 
 
(8) Panel logit estimation with individual effects 
 
 
As    effects choice probabilities, it has to be integrated over the distribution 
of unobserved heterogeneity. The random effects multinomial logit sample 
likelihood is as follows: 
 
(9) Random effects multinomial logit likelihood  
 
 
where         if the company i chooses the alternative j at time t, and zero 
otherwise.528  
 
In addition to the multiclass estimation, a further calculation with a binary 
endogenous variable is executed to check the robustness of the model. The binary 
response variable is estimated with one or more predictor variables at more than 
two points in time (panel structure of data).529 The panel structure has the 
advantage of controlling the unobserved heterogeneity within the estimation of 
the coefficients.  
 
(10) Random effect panel logit estimation 
 
 
 
                                            
528 Cf. Frees, E. W. (2004), p. 398.  
529 Cf. O’Connell, A. A. (2006), p. 29 f.  
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This model is different from the standard model of logistic regression in 
that the number of different values for α      equal the number of companies 
within the investigation.530 It is preferable to a fixed effects model in that it takes 
time-constant characteristics into account and it is a result of the previously 
implemented Hausman model specification test.531 Due to the binary variable, the 
conditional distribution is a Bernoulli and not a Gaussian distribution and the 
predicted values are limited to take the value null or one.532 
4.1.3.2 Linear discriminant analysis 
The second step linear discriminant analysis (hereafter LDA) is very similar 
to the logit model that has already been presented; both contain linear decision 
boundaries and explain one endogenous variable as a linear combination of 
further independent variables.533 This creates an equation that minimizes the 
possibility of misclassification of cases into their respective groups.534 The 
difference is that LDA uses the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution 
of X with a common covariance matrix ∑ within the classes.535 With   = E(X|K=j) 
and prior probabilities    allocation via 
 
(11) Estimation of linear discriminant 
 
 
The differences in the mean vector of each class weighted by the inverted 
covariance matrix provide information concerning the differences in the classes.536 
                                            
530 Cf. O’Connell, A. A. (2006), p. 29 f. 
531 Cf. Gisselmann, M., Winzio, M. (2012), p. 150. 
532 Cf. Austin, P. (2008), p. 1228 f.  
533 Cf. McLachlan, G. J. (2004), p. 7.  
534 Cf. Bhatnagar, V., Srinivasa, S. (2013), p. 185. 
535 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 108. 
536 Cf. Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f. 
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4.1.4 Algorithmic modeling techniques (machine learning) 
4.1.4.1 Decision tree modeling 
Decision trees are quite simple in nature; they describe a chain of choices 
that conclude with an outcome.537 They can be used for regression and 
classification purposes by recursive binary splitting.538 Based on a root, branches 
are built on the basis of a splitting criterion x (independent variables) to get a 
terminal node (leaf).539 The inner branching points are named internal nodes. The 
terminal node is the estimation of y. Because all observations can potentially lead 
to terminal nodes within a decision tree (overfitting), the tree is pruned by 
complexity parameters that are generated by cross-validation.540 Given data on 
the predictor variables and the categorical response variable “dividend change”, 
the decision tree algorithm builds a model for understanding the relationship 
between the variables.541 Therefore, the trees are grown with several nodes, where 
bottom nodes are terminal nodes.542 Using fixed splitting criteria at each node the 
data is split into two sub-nodes.543 The process of building a decision tree can be 
separated into four steps, given in Table 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
537 Cf. Inzalkar, S. M., Sharman, J. (2015), p. 488 f.; Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 8; 
Wilkinson, L. (1998), p. 43.  
538 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 305. 
539 Cf. Finch, H., Schneider, M. K. (2007), p. 48.   
540 Cf. Therneau, T. M., Atkinson, E. J. (2015), p. 13. 
541 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 305 f. 
542 Cf. Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 12.  
543 Cf. Barros, R. et al. (2015), p. 10.  
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Table 9: Decision tree algorithm 
1. Step Recursive binary splitting on training data to grow a large tree. 
Stopping when terminal node has fewer than the minimum of 
observations.   
2. Step Apply cost complexity pruning to the large tree => sequence of 
best subtrees of α. 
3. Step Use K-fold-cross-validation to choose α. That is, divide the 
training observation into K folds. For each k = 1,..., K: 
a) Repeat step 1 and 2 on all but the kth fold of the training data 
b) Evaluate the mean squared prediction error on the data in the 
left-out kth fold, as a function of α. 
Average the results for each value of α, and pick α to minimize 
the average error.  
4. Step Return the subtree from Step 2 that corresponds to the chosen 
value of α. 
Source: own figure based on James, G. et al. (2016), p. 309. 
 
The splitting principle for classification trees is the Gini criterion: 
 
(12) Gini splitting criterion 
 
 
 
 
 
As α can be defined as a tuning factor, it controls a trade-off between the 
complexity and the fit to the training data. That means that the subtree is equal to 
   if α is zero. An increase of the tuning factor may be disadvantageous, because 
it can lead to too many terminal nodes. Decision tree modeling can be very 
effective, because it handles the categorical predictors naturally and is simple to 
fit, even for large data sets.544 If the tree is small the results are easy to interpret, 
                                            
544 Cf. Srivastava, A. et al. (1999), p. 238.  
Gini =             +           (1-     
    = proportion of class k in left node 
    = proportion of class k in right node 
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but the complexity rises with the size of the tree.545 Furthermore, it can handle 
highly non-linear interactions and handles missing values by replacement 
through surrogate variables.546 Trees can furthermore give valuable insight by 
determining the importance of the different variables and terminal nodes cluster 
data naturally into homogeneous groups.547 
The advantages mentioned are countered by one certain disadvantage of 
binary or multinomial regression trees; small data changes can have major 
effects.548 Therefore, more accurate models are required to get more stable results. 
As a solution, the more constant random forest approach is used.549 The 
fundamental idea is that changing data may change individual trees but not the 
combination of many trees (forest).  
4.1.4.2 Random forest algorithm 
The bagging algorithm is used to grow a forest of multiple decision trees.550 
Bagging pursues the goal of creating several random decision trees by drawing 
random samples with replacement to give notable improvements in accuracy 
(reduced variance).551 The algorithm grows trees out of the bootstrap-samples, 
using one randomly selected splitting criterion x afterwards.552 The random forest 
analysis has two major differences from decision trees; missing values are not 
handled by surrogates but by proximities and the interpretation is vastly more 
complex. Within the randomly selected bootstrap sample some observations end 
up in the sample several times (overlapping), while other observations are “out of 
bag”, which means that they do not end up in the sample at all.553 Random forest 
models do not produce a picture of a single tree, but of many trees that may 
                                            
545 Cf. Han, J., Kamber, M. (2011), p. 321. 
546 Cf. Rokach, L., Maimon, O. (2005), p. 481. 
547 Cf. Freitas, A. A. (2002), p. 50. 
548 Cf. Rokach, L., Maimon, O. (2015), p. 82 f.  
549 Cf. Breiman, L.(2001), p. 207. 
550 Cf. Bauer, E., Kohavi, R. (1999), p. 106.  
551 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 587; James, G. et al. (2016), p. 317.  
552 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 207. 
553 Cf. Maindonald, J., Braun, W. J. (2010), p. 369. 
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overlap each other.554 Hence, the possibilities of interpretation sink and 
indistinctness rises on the one hand, but the model’s accuracy increases on the 
other hand. The five steps for calculating the random forest by bootstrap 
sampling are described in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Random forest algorithm 
1. Step Choosing the random sample from the data  
N1 = Learning sample (n1= 7/10) 
N2 = Out-of-bag data (n-n1) 
2. Step Learning sample is used to create a tree;  
only one random independent variable is used for splitting 
purposes  
3. Step Repeat step 1-2 for all B bootstrap samples 
4. Step Bagging (summarizing results) 
5. Step Calculation of the out-of-bag error rate  
Source: own figure based on Hastie, T. et al. (2013), p. 588; Varian, H. R. (2014),   
p. 17. 
 
For the investigation, each of the trees is grown on an independent 
bootstrap sample. After that, an observation of each node is necessary to 
randomly select m variables out of M possible variables and find the best split on 
the selected determinants.555 For bagging purposes, multiple predictors are 
generated to create one aggregated predictor.556 Therefore, bootstrap replicates of 
the learning set are created and used as new learning sets. As already stated, 
model accuracy is expected to increase by implementing various trees.557 The 
reason for this is visualized in Figure 10. 
 
 
                                            
554 Cf. Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 17. 
555 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 588; Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 17. 
556 Cf. Hothorn, T. et al. (2004), p. 80.  
557 Cf. Breiman, L. (1996), p. 123 f.; Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 600.  
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Figure 10: Added value of multiple tree estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Cutler, A. (2010), p. 69. 
 
On the left side there is a single regression tree and there are ten regression 
trees on the right side. As can be seen, the multiple tree estimation reduces the 
consequential variance.558  
 
The random forest approach contributes to the investigation in this thesis by 
its high prognostic potential and the measurement of the relative importance of 
different variables.559 Certainly, it is disadvantageous that the approach demands 
several parameters that have to be set (e.g. number of trees, number of variables 
for splitting) and the interpretation is more complex than is required for a single 
decision tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
558 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 207 f.  
559 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 282.   
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4.1.4.3 Gradient boosting calculation 
In addition to the tree-based methods, gradient boosting is a powerful 
machine learning algorithm that can optimize the prediction accuracy of many 
regression or classification models.560 Compared with the random forest 
approach, for gradient boosting the sample selection is made more 
systematically.561 After the first sample is randomly selected within gradient 
boosting, the following samples are not unsystematically selected but are based 
on observations that are hard to classify (gradients) in a forward stage-wise 
manner.562 That means that boosting aims to turn several classifiers that do not 
show high correlation to the true classification (weak learners) into one classifier 
that is highly correlated with the classification (strong learner).563  
 
Figure 11: Weak learner boosting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own figure based on Schapire, R. E., Freund, Y. (2012), p. 418. 
 
The first box in Figure 11 shows one vertical line that illustrates the first 
weak learner. On the right side of the box one can see three pluses that are 
misclassified. Gradient boosting puts more weight on those misclassified 
observations.564  
 
 
                                            
560 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 337; James, G. et al. (2016), p. 321. 
561 Cf. Strickland, J. S. (2014), p. 369. 
562 Cf. Warmuth, M. K. et al. (2006), p. 1002.   
563 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 337. 
564 Cf. ibid.  
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To categorize them correctly, the vertical line on the right side in the second box is 
used. In the following, the weak learners are combined in suitable weight after 
repeating this process.565 If the model finds appropriate weights for the learners it 
improves the classification accuracy as a result. The gradient boosting algorithm 
is given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Boosting algorithm 
1. Step Set ƒ      and    =    for all i in the training set. 
2. Step For b = 1,2,…,B, repeat: 
a) Fit a tree ƒ  with d splits (d+1 terminal nodes) to the 
training data ( , r). 
b) Update ƒ by adding in a shrunken version of the new tree: 
ƒ    <-  ƒ    + λƒ     . 
c) Update the residuals r <-    - λƒ
      . 
3. Step Output the boosted model, 
ƒ    <-   λƒ           
Source: own table based on James, G. et al. (2016), p. 321. 
After random sampling, further trees are based on the previous trees weight 
error function.566 The advanced trees show the variables that are most important 
for the classification of the output variable.567 That boosting solves possible 
problems of multicollinearity by lessening the selected estimates towards zero, is 
one appreciable advantage of the model. In addition, it can increase the predictive 
power of an estimator significantly and is suited to analyzing the classification 
problems of interest.568 
 
 
 
                                            
565 Cf. Schapire, R. E., Freund, Y. (2012), p. 418. 
566 Cf. James, G. et al. (2016), p. 321. 
567 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 367.  
568 Cf. Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 16. 
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4.1.4.4 Measuring the importance of variables 
The goal of the stochastic models and of the machine learning models is to 
quantify the importance of the liquidity variables for the classification of the 
response variable "dividend changes". To make that importance visible, the 
multinomial and binary panel logit model estimates the significance of influence 
with the mean absolute value of the t-test statistic (H0:                    . 
As the LDA can be linked to multivariate analysis of variance, a forward selection 
based on the P-Value of Wilks' lambda to determine the variable’s importance is 
employed.569  
 
For decision trees, the most important decision node, which corresponds to 
the best predictor, is called ‘root’.570 The variables that split on the top of the tree 
are more important in classifying the outcome variable than the ones that are 
closer to the terminal nodes.571 Furthermore, random forest, as well as gradient 
boosting, provides an overview of the comparison of the importance of variables. 
The improvement in the split-criterion at each split of the tree contributes to 
measuring the importance.572 The importance is calculated for each tree of the 
model and accumulated for the whole forest.573 While the random forest approach 
calculates the importance of each variable, the boosting algorithm ignores some of 
them completely.574 This is due to candidate split-variable selection that enhances 
the chance that the random forest approach will include every single measure in 
comparison to gradient boosting. Given that the candidate split-variable selection 
does not occur within the boosting algorithm, significantly fewer variables can be 
included.575 In order to use the same criterion and make the measurement process 
                                            
569 Cf. Mardia, K. V. et al. (1979), among others.   
570 Cf. Rokach, L., Maimon, O. (2005), p. 477. 
571 Cf. James, G. et al. (2016), p. 315. 
572 Cf. Liao, T. W. (2007), p. 376. 
573 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2013), p. 588; Varian, H. R. (2014), p. 17. 
574 Cf. Schapire, R. E., Freund, Y. (2012), p. 418.  
575 Cf. Grabczewski, K. (2014), p. 92 f.  
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comparable, the plots of importance for random forest and for gradient boosting 
that are used in the investigation are based on the Gini splitting index.576 
 
The respective variable importance measures are summarized in Table 12: 
 
Table 12: Overview of variable importance measures 
Method Variable importance measure 
 Panel logit  
 Mean absolute value of the        
t-test statistic 
 Linear discriminant  P-Value of Wilks' lambda 
 Decision tree  Position in the tree 
 Random forest  Gini splitting index 
 Gradient boosting   Gini splitting index 
4.1.5 Definition of variables 
4.1.5.1 Sample selection and endogenous variable 
The investigation of the influence of stock market liquidity on dividend 
changes in Europe covers the years 2006 to 2014, starting two years before the 
outbreak of the financial market crisis.577 The initial sample consists of all 
companies that are listed in the STOXX Europe 600 index as of January 2015. The 
index contains firms with high importance for the European area and represents 
large and mid-capitalization companies across 18 countries in Europe. To be part 
of the index the country classification, free float, and market capitalization are the 
most important criteria. Furthermore, it must be ensured that foreign investors 
are able to freely buy and sell the stock.578 Despite the danger of survivorship bias 
the index composition as of January 2015 is used to make sufficient valid 
statements, as it makes it possible to obtain a large number of liquidity 
                                            
576 In contrast to the Permutation Accuracy measure the Gini splitting index 
can be calculated for both random forest as well as gradient boosting.  
577 Cf. Bogle, J. C. (2016), p. 9 f.; Mancini, L. et al. (2013), p. 1821.   
578 Cf. STOXX (2017), p. 11.  
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observations from the database, because the recording of liquidity measures 
gained importance over time. Taking an index composed previously causes 
difficulties of insufficient availability of liquidity data.579 Since 600 companies are 
listed in the STOXX Europe 600 index, the investigation starts with 5,400 yearly 
observations over the entire sample period, with the following adjustments.  
 
First, 90 quarterly dividend payments are excluded from further 
investigation as they are underrepresented and less comparable to larger 
dividend intervals. The signaling value of quarterly dividend changes is valid for 
only three months while semi-annual and annual dividend-change signals last 
longer. For annual and semi-annual paying companies the annual figure “total 
dividends” is used for estimation. Using the annual figure makes companies 
comparable and keeps annual and semi-annual dividend paying companies in the 
dataset.580  
 
Secondly, according to previous dividend policy studies, 1,818 yearly 
observation financials, utilities and REITs are dropped due to their external 
regulations.581  
 
Thirdly, 1,102 observations of zero dividend policies582, dividend omissions 
and initiations are discarded from the final sample due to their special 
character.583 Zero dividend policies are eliminated from the final sample because 
they are not synonymous with unchanged dividend.  
 
 
                                            
579 The index composition of January 2015 contains 176 and the index 
composition of December 2005 contains 429 observations with insufficient 
liquidity data.   
580 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 408, among others.  
581 Cf. Deshmukh, S. (2003); Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002). 
582 They mean that companies have not paid dividends in the previous year 
and continue to retain earnings completely.  
583 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 9 f. 
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When companies maintain the distribution of dividends on a constant level, solid 
free cash flows are necessary, while zero dividend polices can be either an active 
management choice or a signal of low cash flows.  In detail, the investigation does 
not take 802 zero dividend policies, 124 dividend omissions and 176 initiations 
into account due to their special character.584 
 
Fourthly, 204 yearly observations are excluded due to missing data, 
particularly data concerning the previously mentioned liquidity variables.  
 
Finally, 14 yearly observations with negative book equity values are 
discarded because they make the calculation of a controlling variable that is 
scaled by the book value of equity impossible. The final sample has 2,172 yearly 
observations over the time period 2006-2014.  
 
Table 13: Sample selection 
Criterion Observations 
STOXX Europe 600 from 2006-2014 5,400 
Quarterly payments -90 
Financials, utilities, REITs -1,818 
Dividend omissions, initiations and zero-dividend 
policies 
-1,102 
Missing data  -204 
Negative book equity values -14 
Final Sample = 2,172 
 
Table 14 reports the annual summary statistics for the sample. Dividend 
changes (DC) are calculated as total annual dividend distributions compared to 
the previous year’s figure.  
 
 
 
                                            
584 The elimination of dividend omissions and initiations is also done in Best, R. 
J., Best, R. W. (2001). 
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Table 14: Sample descriptive statistics on dividend changes 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of 
obs. 
208 223 230 218 226 257 269 270 271 
Mean 
DC % 
22.79 22.91 18.87 -3.98 12.12 35.27 14.93 16.18 9.60 
Std. dev  
DC 
31.96 33.36 28.62 27.64 40.21 86.99 31.02 41.99 39.6 
Increases  
absolute 
176 197 200 112 140 214 211 200 186 
Increases  
% 
84.62 88.34 86.96 51.38 61.95 83.27 78.44 74.07 68.63 
Decreases  
absolute 
11 13 8 57 29 17 24 13 33 
Decreases  
% 
5.29 5.83 3.48 26.15 12.83 6.61 8.92 4.81 12.18 
Constant 
absolute 
21 13 22 49 57 26 34 57 52 
Constant 
% 
10.10 5.83 9.57 22.48 25,.22 10.12 12.64 21.11 19.19 
 
The sample firms increase their annual distributions 1,636 yearly 
observation, whereas unchanged dividends occur 331 times and dividend 
decreases occur 205 times.  
In an annual comparison, the proportion of dividend-increasing firms peaks 
in 2007 at 88.34 per cent, while the highest number of dividend decreases occurs 
in 2009, the year that follows the outbreak of the financial market crisis. In 2009, 
26.15 per cent of the annual observed firms decrease dividends, while in the 
previous year only 3.48 per cent did so. It is conspicuous that even in the crisis-
driven year 2009 more than half of the sample companies increase their 
dividends.  
From 2009 to 2011, the two years following the financial crisis, the yearly 
number of dividend-increasing firms grows more than 30 percentage points, 
while the number of constant dividends is halved and less than one quarter of the 
firms decrease their dividends. The post-crisis annual dividend increases peak in 
2011, two years after the lowest point, with 83.27 per cent of firms increasing their 
dividend payout. From 2011 to 2014 yearly dividend increases and unchanged 
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dividend paying firms double, while only 68.63 per cent of the sample firms 
increase their dividends in 2014.  
The fraction of firms that do not change their yearly dividend ranges from 
25.22 per cent in 2010 to 5.83 per cent in 2007, with a weighted average of 15.24 
per cent over the entire sample period. 
 
As supposed, the findings show that the sample firms avoid decreasing 
dividends, while increases far outweigh unchanged and decreased dividends 
almost threefold. For further examination, two different variables are created to 
measure dividend changes; a multinomial and a binary one.  
 
Multinomial dividend change classification (DCM): 
The research focuses on managements’ decision to decrease, maintain or 
increase dividends. Therefore, the dividend change variable is encoded as 
follows:585  
 
Y = 0 if    ≤0 (Decrease) 
Y = 1 if 0 <    ≤ µ (Maintain) 
Y = 2 if 0 µ ≤    (Increase) 
 
Binary dividend change classification (DCB): 
As dividend increases are predominant in the sample, the endogenous 
variable is also measured binarily: 
 
Y = 0 if    ≤0 (Decrease, Maintain) 
Y = 1 if 0 <    ≤ µ (Increase) 
 
Balancing the categories makes the dataset more appropriate for data 
mining analysis, as the accuracy of measurement will improve with classes that 
are more closely matched.586 
 
                                            
585 Based on Goergen, M. et al. (2005). 
586 Cf. Zhang, C., Soda, P. (2012), p. 256. 
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To make the different modeling techniques comparable to each other, their 
predictive ability is cross validated. This means the data are separated into 
training and test data. The “training set” is used to identify the best combination 
of parameters and contains 70 per cent of the observations. The results of the 
statistical investigation using the “training set” are generalized to a “test-set” of 
variables that is not used in estimation. It consists of the outstanding 30 per cent 
of the observations. The 70 to 30 division is frequently used to ensure that the 
training dataset includes as many possible patterns of the dataset as possible.587 In 
addition to making the results comparable, cross validation is also used to limit 
overfitting problems and obtain reliable error estimates.588  
4.1.5.2 Definition of the explanatory variables 
Among other things, the existence of many different stock exchanges as well 
as dark pools589 hampers the analysis. To overcome the problem, the present 
cross-national investigation provides data from the leading stock exchange in a 
specific country.  
In particular, the mean values of the selected liquidity measures are 
calculated 10 days before the announcement day of the dividend event.590 If the 
company pays dividends semi-annually, the respective 10 days before each 
dividend change announcement are calculated as a mean value for the specific 
liquidity variable. As the final sample includes trading days only, bank holidays 
and weekends are discarded. To quantify the level of stock market liquidity, the 
two previously selected measures are used for the investigation: 
 
                                            
587 Cf. Saravanan, P., Kalpana, P. (2017), p. 97. 
588 Cf. Rodriquez, B. et al. (2008), p. 266. 
589 Private exchanges or forums that are not accessible by the investing public 
for trading securities. They have the primary function of inhibiting the market 
impact of trading.  
590 The 10-day period from t-10 to t0 that surround dividend changes is 
frequently used in the literature (e.g. Ball, et al. (2016); Corwin S. A., Lipson, M. L. 
(2000) and Nguyen, N. H., Wang, D. Y. (2013)).  
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The relative spread (SPREAD) as defined in chapter 3 helps to make the 
ability to trade measureable. As liquidity is a multidimensional phenomenon that 
can also be estimated after the trading takes place, a further post-trade measure is 
implemented; the turnover ratio (TR), as also defined in chapter 3. 
Percentage liquidity variations compared to the previous year figure are 
also calculated for both the SPREAD (CHANGE_SPREAD) and the TR 
(CHANGE_TR) measure, and are adopted in the analysis.  
4.1.5.3 Definition of the controlling variables 
A broad set of firm-specific characteristics is employed to control for the 
presumed impact on dividend changes of, among other things, profitability, 
investment opportunities, size, leverage, growth and cash.591  
Operating net income is one of the most intuitive profitability measures for 
the present investigation because more successful companies more likely 
distribute parts of their profits in the form of cash dividends.592 It is calculated in 
relation to total assets (OI).593 Further, the firm’s ability to generate internal funds 
and payment surpluses is frequently measured by operating cash flow divided by 
the firms’ turnover (CFTO).594 In contrast to the net income figure, the cash flow 
does not take non-cash items that do not support cash generation, like 
depreciation and amortization, into account.595 For all the European companies, 
Bloomberg calculates the cash from operations as the sum of net income, 
depreciation and amortization, other noncash adjustments and changes in non-
cash working capital.  
 
                                            
591 Cf. Eije, H., Megginson, W. (2008); Ferris, S. et al. (2009). 
592 Also investigated in Al-Najjar (2011); Grullon et al. (2002); Mizraei (2012). 
593 Also used in Bulan, L. et al. (2007). 
594 The cash flow is also stated to be an appropriate measure for the 
investigation of profitability in La Porta, R. et al. (2000), p. 1 f.; Faccio, M. et al. 
(2001), p. 54 f. 
595 Cf. Auer, K. V. (2000), p. 573; Goergen, M. et. al. (2005), p. 385. 
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The occurrence of a loss (OL) is calculated binarily and equals one if the 
company suffers a loss, zero otherwise.596 
Firm size is measured to approximate the company-specific risk level, its 
maturity and its capital market access. To deal with the high correlation between 
total assets and market capitalization, a principal component analysis is 
employed, reducing the dimension to one latent variable (SIZE).  
As more indebted firms’ primary aim is to strengthen their equity base, 
leverage (DEBT) is included, with an assumed negative influence on dividends; 
and is calculated as total debt to total assets.597  
Investment opportunities can influence financial management decisions.598 
To quantify the firms’ investment opportunities net investments are calculated as 
capital expenditures minus depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets 
(NINV).599  
Additionally, the turnover growth rate (TGR) indicates yearly company 
growth that requires investments.600 The price to book ratio (PBR), defined as the 
market value of equity over the book value of common shareholder’s equity, is a 
further frequently used variable for growth opportunities.601 The higher the price 
to book ratio, the more the market valuation exceeds the accounting value.  
The firm’s cash reserves to total assets are captured with (CASH).602 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) indicates the market value of the firm to the replacement 
costs of its assets.603 The figure is based on the assumption that the market 
valuation of the firm corresponds approximately to the replacement costs of its 
assets over a longer period. In comparison to PBR the TQ measures the costs of 
                                            
596 Also used in DeAngelo, H. et al. (1992). 
597 Also investigated in Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 7; Jensen, M. C., 
Meckling, W. H. (1976), p. 308 f. 
598 Cf. Myers, S. C., Majluf, N. S. (1984), p. 190. 
599 Also used in Rojahn, J., Luebke, K. (2014).  
600 Also used in Maury, C. B., Pajuste, A. (2002), p. 15 f. 
601 Cf. Huang, R. D., Shiu, C-Y. (2009), among others. 
602 Also used in Li, W., Lie, E. (2006). 
603 Also used in Chang, K. et al. (2016).  
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replacing items at current prices and not at their original costs. The estimated 
influence on dividend increases is negative.604  
The previous year’s dividend policy includes the indicator variable 
“PREVIOUS”, that is set at one if dividends increase, are maintained or are 
initiated in the previous year, zero if the previous years’ dividends decrease.605 
Since companies pursue consistent dividend policies the effect is expected to be 
positive. Furthermore, dividend yields (YIELD) are measured as the previous 
year’s annual total dividends to the previous year’s total companies’ revenues.  
The issuance measure (ISSUANCE) captures the cash inflow from the 
issuance of new shares scaled by the company’s total equity if new shares are 
issued, zero otherwise. Companies that issue new shares require equity capital 
and are expected to decrease dividends rather than enhance their payouts.  
Besides dividend distributions, share buybacks also return assets to 
shareholders as an alternative capital allocation possibility.606 Buyback of shares 
(BBS) are measured binarily because the database provides only the individual 
share repurchases in the companies’ domestic currencies. “MA” captures the 
after-tax effect of the costs associated with conducting mergers and acquisitions 
scaled by the turnover. If no M&A transactions are realized in the relevant year, 
“MA” is valued at zero.607  
Because owners and the property rights that are allocated to these owners 
are essential elements of companies, the ownership structure is a key variable of 
corporate governance. As discussed in subchapter 2.2.2.3, the conflicts between 
owners and managers and also between owners and owners are part of the 
literature of early corporate governance research. In a later stage, among other 
things, the investigation of the influence of ownership on firms’ profitability and 
shareholders’ diversification strategies is further evidence for the link between 
corporate governance and ownership structure.608 Taking the agency costs of 
                                            
604 Cf.  Lee, C.-H., Alam, P. (2004), p. 329 f.  
605 Also used in Simons, K. (1994). 
606 Cf. Grullon, G., Michaely, R. (2002). 
607 The influence of Mergers on dividend policies is also investigated in 
Masulis, R. W., Trueman, B. (1988).  
608 Cf. Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B. (2001), p. 230; Banalieva, E. R., Eddleston, K. 
A. (2011), p. 1070. 
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equity into consideration, the firm’s specific Bloomberg-Corporate-Governance-
Score (CGS) is taken.609 It is based on the extent of corporate governance 
disclosure and ranges from a minimum 0.1 scoring points to a maximum of 100 
scoring points. The CGS score takes the ownership structure, the supervisory 
board structure, compensation programs and audit oversight quality into 
account. 
The agency costs of debt are approximated with the coverage of the firm’s 
total debt capital with secured debt capital (SECURED). The quota of secured 
debt capital is company-specific and extends from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. 
The number of analysts covering a security is (ANALYST).610 The 
information they provide makes dividends redundant for signaling purposes and 
dividends are expected to decrease with high analyst coverage.  
Country dummy variables are implemented to control for local difference in 
dividend policies. Since more than three-quarters of the 2198 dividend changes of 
the final sample are companies from Britain (789), Germany (317), Sweden (192) 
and France (189), five indicator variables are implemented. “BRITAIN” values 
one, if the dividend changing company is British, zero otherwise. In the same way 
the variables “GERMANY”, “SWEDEN” and “FRANCE” estimate whether the 
firm is from the specific country. Because less than one-fourth of the companies 
are from different countries “REST” is used as a reference category. Since the 
shareholder structure in Britain is less concentrated than in different European 
countries like Germany, Italy, France or Austria,611 “BRITAIN” also approximates 
the agency costs of equity (ownership concentration). It is assumed that the 
granular shareholder structure of British firms makes dividend-changes more 
likely, while anchor shareholders do not urge for payouts.  
Since the selected time interval covers some interesting events, such as the 
financial market crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, the yearly dummy variables 
are expected to influence dividend changes. For this reason, yearly dummy 
                                            
609 That the Corporate Governance influences dividend changes is stated by 
Goergen, M. et al. (2005), among others.  
610 Also used in Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012). 
611 Cf. Aguilera, R. V., Crespi-Cladera, R. (2016), p. 55; Gugler, K. (2003),            
p. 1298. 
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variables are used to control for time effects (Y2007, …Y2014).612 The first year of 
the time span from 2006 to 2014 is chosen to be the reference category.  
Moreover, operating net income, operating cash flow, debt, price to book 
ratio, Tobin’s Q, and abnormal returns are measured delta scaled as the difference 
between t-1 and t if data is available for both consecutive years (denoted by 
“DELTA”). Also included are relative changes in spread, turnover ratio, size, cash 
reserves and corporate governance score that are denoted by “CHANGE”. 
The variance inflation factor is used to test for multicollinearity in the 
dataset. The results show that the residuals and the covariates are not correlated 
and the required exogeneity assumption is met. 
No unequivocal measure of company age exists, because special events like 
corporate mergers can change the nature of the company entirely and the 
corporation appears to be “newborn”. Even so, the distance to the IPO, which is 
available for only 196 firms and is not controlled further due to too few 
observations, is requested from the Bloomberg database. All controlling variables 
are lagged by one year to account for their causality on changes in the dividend 
during period t+1. 
The performance of the company’s annual returns in comparison to the 
STOXX 600 portfolio is not considered. The calculation of abnormal returns 
includes the beta factor, which in regression is assumed to be constant and time 
invariant. The stability assumptions are not met in reality and therefore the 
abnormal returns are not investigated further.613 
The variable set that is included in the final investigation is summarized in 
Table 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
612 Also used in Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016). 
613 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (1992), p. 464. 
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Table 15: Overview of the selected variables and its expected influence on 
dividend increases 
Variable Measure Infl. 
Dividend changes  Dividend change multinomial (DCM) 
 Dividend change binary (DCB) 
 
Liquidity  Relative spread to mid price (SPREAD) 
 Turnover ratio (TR) 
- 
+ 
Profitability  Net income to assets (OI) 
 Cash flow to turnover (CFTO) 
 Occurrence of a loss (OL) 
+ 
+ 
- 
Size  Size (SIZE) + 
Debt level  Leverage (DEBT)  - 
Investment 
opportunities 
 Net investments (NETINV)  
 Turnover growth rate (TGR) 
 Price to book ratio (PBR) 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
Cash reserves  Cash and equivalents to total assets (CASH) +/- 
Valuation level  Tobin’s Q (TQ) +/- 
Dividend-Payout ratio  Previous year’s dividend change (PREVIOUS) 
 Previous year’s dividend yield (YIELD) 
+ 
- 
Issuance   Issuance of equity capital (ISSUANCE) + 
Capital allocation  Merger and Acquisition to turnover (MA) 
 Share repurchases/Buybacks (BBS) 
+/- 
- 
ency costs equity  Corporate Governance Score (CGS) +/- 
Agency costs debt  Secured debt capital (SECURED) +/- 
Analysts  Analyst coverage (ANALYST) +/- 
Country   Britain (BRITAIN), Germany (GERMANY), 
Sweden (SWEDEN), France (FRANCE),  
Reference REST 
+/- 
+/- 
Time   Year 2006-2014 (Y2007, …Y2014) ,  
Reference Y2006 
+/- 
Delta scaled variables 
and relative changes that 
measure the differences 
from period t-1                    
to period t 
 Change SPREAD (CHANGE_SPREAD) 
 Change TR (CHANGE_TR) 
 Change net income (DELTA_OI) 
 Change Cash flow (DELTA_CF) 
 Change size (CHANGE_SIZE) 
 Change debt (DELTA_DEBT) 
 Change price to book ratio (DELTA_PBR) 
 Change cash (CHANGE_CASH) 
 Change Tobin’s Q (DELTA_TQ) 
 Change CGS (CHANGE_CGS) 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
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4.2 ANALYSIS 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
The distribution of the independent variables is given in the subsequent 
Table 16:  
 
Table 16: Distribution of the independent variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SPREAD 0.0019 0.0025 0.0001 0.0384 
TR 1.7741 4.7116 0.0000 93.1216 
OI 0.1440 0.2785 -1.4255 2.9828 
CFTO 0.1530 0.1320 -0.5441 1.0087 
LNSIZE 8.7858 1.3038 4.7497 12.2481 
DEBT 0.2577 0.1449 0.0000 0.8043 
NETINV 0.0049 0.0331 -0.2179 0.2416 
TGR 0.0667 0.1605 -0.9463 2.5602 
PBR 3.5699 6.8939 0.0244 183.9444 
CASH 0.0889 0.0765 0.0000 0.5494 
TQ 1.8004 0.9692 0.0000 18.0689 
YIELD 0.0477 0.0561 0.0005 0.9657 
ISSUANCE 0.0144 0.0626 0.0000 0.8270 
MA 0.0004 0.0040 -0.0280 0.1655 
CGS 52.8183 12.5701 3.5714 85.7143 
ANALYST 21.3237 9.3529 1.0000 58.0000 
ABNRT 0.1312 -0.3398 -1.1574 4.4163 
CHANGE_SPREAD 0.0863 1.4513 -0.9601 40.0823 
CHANGE_TR 0.2085 0.9667 -1.0000 22.2517 
DELTA_OI 0.6835 7.8255 -37.3171 275.5 
DELTA_CF 0.3879 3.6421 -9.1664 98.9775 
CHANGE_SIZE 0.1099 0.2836 -0.8700 7.59 
DELTA_DEBT 0.2607 3.7581 -1.0000 142.2826 
DELTA_PBR 0.2143 3.3063 -0.9946 150.8835 
CHANGE_CASH 1.0738 32.2767 -0.9999 1500.0000 
DELTA_TQ 0.0317 0.2032 -1.0000 1.1247 
CHANGE_CGS 0.0423 0.3478 -0.6667 14.0001 
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The liquidity proxies show a considerable range; the relative spread to mid 
price has a minimum value of 0.0001, while the maximum value is 0.0384. That 
means that the highest observation is 322 times larger than the lowest and 
illustrates that the liquidity variables range widely. On average, the ratio of 
turnover to shares outstanding is 1.77, with a minimum value of 0 and a 
maximum value of 93.12. The spread measures forty-fold at the top level and 
diminishes by 96 per cent in the minimum value. Also the CHANGE_TR measure 
ranges widely from -1 to 2.  
Net income, which is expected to play a major role for dividend changes, is 
14.4 per cent of total assets on average. Also, for profitability measurement 
purposes the cash flow coverage of the firm’s revenues averages 15.30 per cent. 
While 0.5 per cent of the sample companies are exclusively equity-financed, the 
highest total debt to total assets ratio exceeds 80 per cent and the sample firms’ 
average revenue increases 6 per cent.  
The average market valuation of the company’s equity capital exceeds the 
book value of equity 3.5 times on average, while the price to book ratio peaks 
with a value of 183. The specific value can be attributed to a high demand of the 
Rightmove PLCs’ registered shares due to takeover speculation in 2010. Since 
these events are also accompanied by high stock market liquidity variations that 
are important for the present examination, the extreme values are kept in the final 
sample.  
Cash reserves vary strongly from below 0.00 per cent to 54.94 per cent. The 
Tobin’s Q is wide ranging around its mean value of 1.80, with a standard 
deviation of 0.97. 
The popularity of cash distributions in corporate Europe is underlined by 
the dividend yield of 4.77 per cent. That means that almost five per cent of the 
company’s revenue is distributed to the shareholders in form of cash dividends, 
while the largest dividend-payout ratio is above 96.57 per cent and the lowest 
level is 0.05 per cent.  
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The investigation shows considerable differences in corporate governance; 
the highest CG Score (85.71) is 24 times larger than the lowest (3.57).  
On average, slightly more than nine analysts cover a stock that is listed in 
the final sample of the STOXX Europe 600. Analyst coverage varies from 1 to 58. 
For the investigation of dividend changes the variations to the previous 
years’ value (DELTA and CHANGE) are also notable. DELTA_OI increases 
slightly more than two-thirds, while DELTA_CF increases 38.79 per cent on 
average. The overall increase in profitability underlines the assumptions that 
despite the financial market crisis of 2008 the period investigated included more 
economic good than bad years. Company size grows by slightly more than 10 per 
cent, with an increasing leverage ratio of one quarter. That might indicate that 
rising profitability is used for growth that is partly funded with debt rather than 
for repaying liabilities.  
In order to minimize the expected error of the linear discriminant analysis, 
it is a fundamental assumption that the variables are normally distributed. Since 
some of the described variables are right-skewed, they are transformed with the 
natural logarithm LN(X), where X is the specific independent variable. In detail, 
those variables are SPREAD, SIZE, PBR and YIELD. Because the rights screwed 
variables TR, CASH, ISSUANCE, MA, SECURED and all of the right-screwed 
delta-scaled variables can value zero or negative figures, those variables are 
transformed with LN(X+|min(X)|+0.0001). The addition of the minimum value of 
the variable with the small increment 0.0001 ensures that the logarithmic value is 
greater than zero.614  
Additionally, all independent variables are normalized except for the 
nominal scale variables, so that dimensions and magnitude of these variables are 
comparable to each other.615 This is commonly done for many machine-learning 
techniques as well as for logistic regression616 and ensures that the algorithms 
work properly.617  
 
 
                                            
614 For further information also see Svolba, G. (2015). 
615 Cf. Gujarati, D. N. (2009), p. 298. 
616 Cf. Jain, A. et al. (2005), p. 2274.  
617 Cf. Saravanan, P., Kalpana, P. (2017), p. 96.  
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4.2.2 Multinomial and binary analysis of dividend changes 
4.2.2.1 Panel-logit estimation 
The implementation of the analysis starts with the panel-logit estimation. In 
a first step, dividend changes are categorically measured for decreasing, 
maintaining or increasing distributions, where “maintain” is chosen to be the 
reference category. Since the number of dividend-maintaining firms is very low 
over the whole investigation period, the accuracy of the models is below 60 per 
cent. Because the sample sizes are very unequal in the groups, it is problematic 
not to use the largest group as the reference group.618 Consequently, “increase” is 
chosen as a reference category. This selection is neither based on the content nor 
on the simplicity of interpretation but on methodological considerations. 
In a second step, for a more equal distribution, the multinomial estimation 
is complemented with binary measurement of the dividend change variable that 
differentiates between a decrease/maintain group and increase group, whereas 
“maintain/decrease” is chosen to be the reference category. This might improve 
estimation accuracy, since the dependent variable is divided into fewer 
categories, because the predictive power strongly depends on how often each 
class occurs.619 Table 17 summarizes the statistical outcome: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
618 Cf. Osborne, J. W. (2017), p. 79 f. 
619 Cf. Baldi, P. et al. (2000), p. 413. 
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Table 17: Multinomial and binary panel logit  
Variable  
 
Categorical 
[Decrease] 
Categorical 
[Maintain] 
Binary 
[Increase] 
Coefficient Est. t-value Est. t-value Est. z-value 
(Intercept) -1.35 -3.25** -0.83 -2.61** 0.54 14.23*** 
LN(SPREAD) 0.05 0.40 -0.13 -1.28 0.01 0.40 
LN(TR) 0.05 0.40 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 0.29 
OI -0.05 -0.36 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.20 
CFTO -0.52 -4.06*** -0.32 -2.92** 0.03 3.36*** 
OL 1.82 4.97*** 1.28 3.61*** -0.30 -6.70*** 
LN(SIZE) -0.27 -1.86. -0.35 -2.82** 0.04 2.99** 
DEBT 0.14 1.35 0.03 0.29 -0.01 -0.80 
NETINV 0.11 1.32 -0.05 -0.63 -0.01 -0.82 
TGR -0.55 -5.57*** -0.39 -4.47*** 0.05 5.96*** 
LN(PBR) 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 -1.00 0.01 1.28 
LN(CASH) -0.07 -0.73 0.20 2.24* -0.01 -1.60 
TQ -0.45 -2.31* -0.41 -2.68** 0.03 2.63** 
PREVIOUS -0.58 -4.79*** -0.56 -5.62*** 0.12 8.80*** 
LN(YIELD) 0.69 5.84*** 0.28 2.90** -0.05 -4.60*** 
LN(ISSUANCE) 0.07 0.64 -0.13 -1.41 0.01 0.71 
LN(MA) 0.13 0.84 -0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.18 
BBS 0.01 0.05 -0.18 -0.92 0.02 0.94 
CGS -0.11 -1.03 -0.16 -1.96. 0.02 1.81. 
LN(SECURED) 0.03 0.32 -0.05 -0.59 0.00 -0.24 
ANALYST 0.28 2.00* 0.19 1.61 -0.03 -2.19* 
BRITAIN -1.27 -4.07*** -1.39 -5.10*** 0.15 5.23*** 
GERMANY -0.31 -1.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.32 
SWEDEN -0.57 -1.49 0.08 0.27 0.00 -0.12 
FRANCE -0.70 -1.82 0.48 2.12* -0.05 -1.46 
Y2007 0.28 0.61 -0.31 -0.78 0.00 0.01 
Y2008 -1.20 -2.25*** -0.46 -1.25 0.09 2.28* 
Y2009 0.68 1.49 0.40 1.05 -0.14 -3.08** 
Y2010 0.82 1.84. 0.81 2.39* -0.13 -3.06** 
Y2011 -0.09 -0.20 -0.42 -1.19 0.05 1.25 
Y2012 -0.02 -0.04 -0.31 -0.88 0.03 0.75 
Y2013 -0.08 -0.17 0.73 2.22* -0.07 -1.72. 
Y2014 0.90 2.08* 0.69 2.07* -0.11 -2.79** 
LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) 0.11 1.05 0.05 0.69 -0.01 -1.13 
LN(CHANGE_TR) -0.26 -2.58* -0.15 -1.80. 0.03 3.07** 
LN(DELTA_OI) 0.11 0.50 -0.11 -0.88 0.01 1.12 
LN(DELTA_CF) 0.02 0.15 -0.05 -1.11 0.01 0.65 
LN(CHANGE_SIZE) -0.29 -2.38* -0.28 -2.33* 0.02 1.72. 
LN(DELTA_DEBT) 0.07 0.60 0.06 0.62 0.00 0.03 
LN(DELTA_PBR) -0.02 -0.21 0.06 0.54 0.00 -0.43 
LN(CHANGE_CASH) -0.11 -1.35 -0.05 -0.55 0.01 1.61 
DELTA_TQ -0.43 -3.39*** -0.34 -3.33*** 0.05 4.38*** 
LN(CHANGE_CGS) 0.09 0.74 0.18 2.11* -0.02 -2.29* 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ' ' 1 
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Based on the multinomial panel regression, some variables decrease while 
other variables increase the probability of class affiliation. Within the overview 
presented, the t-values/z-values of the specific variable are given in parentheses. 
Taking a closer look at the liquidity dimension, neither LN(TR) nor LN(SPREAD) 
show statistical significance for the dividend change variable, in either the 
decrease or the maintain group.  
The delta-scaled variable LN(CHANGE_TR) shows a significant positive 
impact on the probability of dividend decreases and unchanged dividends, while 
LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) has no statistically significant influence. In line with 
these results, the LN(CHANGE_TR) has a high significant positive impact on the 
propensity of dividend increases within the binary regression model. That means 
that worsening liquidity levels promote dividend decreases while a continuing 
enhancement of the tradability of shares makes dividend increases more likely.  
 
First, the multinomial investigation provides information regarding the 
variables influencing dividend decreases. The most influential variables (values in 
parentheses denote t-values) of the multinomial estimation that make dividend 
decreases more likely are LN(YIELD) (5.84) and loss OL (4.97). When companies 
distributed large parts of their revenues in the previous year or when the 
company has suffered a loss, payouts are likely to decline in the following year. In 
the year Y2014 companies reduce their distributions; the t-value is 2.08. 
ANALYST (2.00) and Y2010 (1.84) complete the set of variables that enhance the 
probability of affiliation to the decrease group.  
Contrarily, eleven variables make dividend reductions less likely. In 
decreasing order of importance those variables are TGR, PREVIOUS, BRITAIN, 
CFTO, DELTA_TQ, LN(CHANGE-TR), LN(CHANGE_SIZE), TQ, Y2008, 
LN(SIZE) and FRANCE. Profitability and turnover growth play a major role in 
the decision not to reduce dividends. TGR (-5.57) and CFTO (-4.06) reduce the 
propensity of dividend reductions. Also, TQ (-2.31) and LN(DELTA_TQ) (-3.39), 
as well as LN(CHANGE_SIZE) (-2.38) and LN(SIZE) (-1.86), diminish the 
propensity of dividend decreases. Once again, time and local effects on dividend 
change decisions could be observed; companies did not reduce their dividends in 
Y2008 (-2.25); BRITAIN (-4.07) and FRANCE (-1.82) lowers the probability of 
dividend decreases.  
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Second, the multinomial investigation selects several variables that 
influence the probability that dividends remain unchanged with statistical 
significance. The most important variable that influence the maintain group 
affiliation negatively is PREVIOUS, with a t-value of –5.62; managers do not stick 
exactly to their previous year’s dividends payout. BRITAIN, TGR, DELTA_TQ, 
CFTO, LN(SIZE), TQ, LN(CHANGE_SIZE), CGS and LN(CHANGE_TR) 
complete the set of variables that cause companies not to maintain their 
dividends. TGR (-4.47) and CFTO (-2.92), which also influence dividend decreases 
negatively, are also high in significance for the selection of the maintain group. 
Comparable to the decrease group, company size and the change in company size 
calculated with LN(SIZE) (-2.82) and LN(CHANGE_SIZE) (-2.33) and the 
valuation level TQ (-2.68), matter for group affiliation. Not keeping dividends 
constant also seems to be a country-specific phenomenon, while BRITAIN (-5.10) 
shows significant estimates. That shows that British firms change their dividends 
regularly and are not interested in holding them on a constant level. 
In total there are eight determinants that influence dividend continuity 
positively, most of which are time specific: OL (3.61), LN(YIELD) (2.90), Y2010 
(2.39), Y2013 (2.22),  FRANCE (2.12), LN(CHANGE_CGS) (2.11) and Y2014 (1.91) 
have significant positive t-values. Also, profitability is a key condition when 
companies maintain their dividends when a loss occurs. Finally, LN(CASH) 
(2.24), completes the bundle of driving determinants that can be derived from the 
multinomial panel logit estimation.  
 
Third, the binary panel logit model (values in parentheses denote z-values) 
shows that dividend increases are mostly determined by PREVIOUS (8.80) and 
BRITAIN (5.23), while TGR (5.96) and CFTO (3.36) are also high in significance. 
The high statistically significant influence of PREVIOUS shows that managers do 
not hold their dividends on a constant level but aim to pay more cash in the form 
of dividends in comparison to the previous year. It can be summarized, that 
dividends are not likely to fall below the previous year’s dividend payout and 
dividends are sticky in terms of minimum distributions.  
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In decreasing order of importance, DELTA_TQ (4.38), LN(CHANGE_TR) 
(3.07), LN(SIZE) (2.99), TQ (2.63), Y2008 (2.28), CGS (1.81) and 
LN(CHANGE_SIZE) (1.72) complete the variable set with statistically significant 
positive influence on dividend increases.  
Overall, eight variables influence the binary endogenous variable in the 
opposite direction. OL (-6.70), LN(YIELD) (-4.60), LN(CHANGE_CGS) (2.29) and 
ANALYST (-2.19) make dividend increases less likely, while companies also 
forego enhancement of cash distributions in the years Y2009 (-3.08), Y2010 (-3.06), 
Y2014 (-2.79) and Y2013 (-1.72). The significant intercept might show that having 
more determinants can help to increase the prediction accuracy of the 
endogenous variable or, inversely, that the variable set has to be cleaned up.  
 
The classification quality is given in the cross-validated confusion matrix 
that shows the out-of-sample prediction.  
 
Table 18: Confusion matrix for multinomial panel logit  
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Decrease    
in % 
Maintain    
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Decrease in % 2.30 2.45 1.84 6.59  
Maintain in % 1.84 1.38 1.38 4.60  
Increase in % 4.29 11.97 72.55 88.81  
Total in % 8.43 15.80 75.77 100.00  
 
The diagonal line shows the percentage of all correctly predicted 
classifications and the other lines all misspecifications.620 The table shows that in 
total 76.23 per cent of the observations are correctly classified with a 
misclassification rate of 23.77 per cent. It is conspicuous that the low rate of 
correct classification of decrease (2.30%) and maintain (1.38%) only contribute 
little to the overall accuracy while increases account for 72.55 per cent.  
                                            
620 Cf. Hastie, T. et al. (2017), p. 301. 
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The binary panel logit increases the model’s accuracy to 80.83 per cent with 
less than one fifth misclassifications. That means that the model quality improves 
by more than 4.5 per cent compared to the multinomial panel logit estimation.  
 
Table 19: Confusion matrix for the binary panel logit estimation 
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Maintain/Decrease 
in % 
Increase       
in % 
Total  
in % 
 
Maintain/Decrease in % 7.82 2.76 10.58  
Increase in % 16.41 73.01 89.42  
Total in % 24.23 75.77 100.00  
4.2.2.2 Linear discriminant analysis 
The discrimination of the firm’s distribution policy between decreases, 
maintenance and increases by the selected variables is displayed in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Estimated class means in the LDA 
 Multinomial Binary 
Variable Decrease Maintain Increase Dec./Main. Increase 
SPREAD 0.0023 0.0020 0.0018 0.0022 0.0018 
TR 1.3284 0.9317 2.0004 1.0834 2.0005 
OI 0.1039 0.1285 0.1521 0.1191 0.1521 
CFTO 0.1458 0.1303 0.1585 0.1362 0.1585 
OL 0.1366 0.0846 0.0165 0.1045 0.0165 
SIZE 8.9070 8.8691 8.7537 8.8836 8.7537 
DEBT 0.2952 0.2618 0.2521 0.2746 0.2521 
NETINV 0.0058 0.0010 0.0056 0.0029 0.0056 
TGR -0.0038 0.0176 0.0855 0.0094 0.0855 
PBR 3.2069 2.5901 3.8136 2.8260 3.8136 
CASH 0.0819 0.0899 0.0895 0.0869 0.0895 
TQ 1.4678 1.5040 1.9020 1.4901 1.9020 
PREVIOUS 1.4341 1.4048 1.7573 1.4160 1.7573 
YIELD 0.0669 0.0391 0.0471 0.0497 0.0471 
ISSUANCE 0.0112 0.0081 0.0161 0.0093 0.0161 
MA 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
BBS 0.1707 0.1390 0.1510 0.1511 0.1510 
CGS 52.4739 50.9491 53.2396 51.5323 53.2396 
SECURED 0.0263 0.0207 0.0239 0.0229 0.0239 
ANALYST 23.0488 22.8610 20.7965 22.9328 20.7965 
BRITAIN 0.2634 0.1329 0.4224 0.1828 0.4224 
GERMANY 0.1463 0.2024 0.1241 0.1810 0.1241 
SWEDEN 0.0780 0.1239 0.0825 0.1063 0.0825 
FRANCE 0.0488 0.1782 0.0733 0.1287 0.0733 
Y2007 0.0634 0.0393 0.1204 0.0485 0.1204 
Y2008 0.0390 0.0665 0.1222 0.0560 0.1222 
Y2009 0.2780 0.1480 0.0685 0.1978 0.0685 
Y2010 0.1415 0.1722 0.0856 0.1604 0.0856 
Y2011 0.0829 0.0785 0.1308 0.0802 0.1308 
Y2012 0.1171 0.1027 0.1290 0.1082 0.1290 
Y2013 0.0634 0.1722 0.1222 0.1306 0.1222 
Y2014 0.1610 0.1571 0.1137 0.1586 0.1137 
CHANGE_SPREAD 0.5057 0.1599 0.0188 0.2921 0.0188 
CHANGE_TR -0.0232 0.0691 0.2658 0.0338 0.2658 
DELTA_OI 0.7373 0.2092 0.7727 0.4112 0.7727 
DELTA_CF 0.5547 0.1762 0.4099 0.3210 0.4099 
CHANGE_SIZE 0.0314 0.0517 0.1315 0.0439 0.1315 
DELTA_DEBT 0.2929 0.2532 0.2581 0.2684 0.2581 
DELTA_PBR 0.7427 0.0613 0.1790 0.3219 0.1790 
CHANGE_CASH 0.3594 0.2807 1.3238 0.3108 1.3238 
DELTA_TQ -0.0535 -0.0009 0.0489 -0.0210 0.0489 
CHANGE_CGS 0.0418 0.0743 0.0358 0.0619 0.0358 
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The variable means differ between the three groups: the TR and 
CHANGE_TR variables have their highest mean value and analogues SPREAD 
and CHANGE_SPREAD their lowest mean value in the “Increase” group.  
To measure a variable’s importance, the results of all discriminate functions 
have to be taken into account. Therefore, a stepwise variable selection using the 
Wilks' lambda criterion is done to explore the independent variables that have 
explanatory power at the one per cent level.621  
 
Table 21: Results of the stepwise selection with Wilks’ lambda  
Categorical Binary 
Rank Variable Lamb. Rank Variable Lamb. 
1 PREVIOUS 0.9481 1 PREVIOUS 0.9482 
2 Y2009 0.8958 2 Y2009 0.9061 
3 BRITAIN 0.8591 3 BRITAIN 0.8723 
4 TGR 0.8239 4 TGR 0.8373 
5 OL 0.8008 5 OL 0.8169 
6 DELTA_TQ 0.7903 6 DELTA_TQ 0.8068 
7 FRANCE 0.7817 7 Y2010 0.8012 
8 LN(YIELD) 0.7740 8 Y2014 0.7940 
9 Y2010 0.7681 9 Y2013 0.7873 
10 Y2013 0.7613 10 LN(CHANGE_TR) 0.7832 
11 Y2014 0.7524    
12 CFTO 0.7469    
13 TQ 0.7426    
14 LN(CHANGE_TR) 0.7390    
 
In decreasing order of importance the selection starts with the variable that 
discriminates best between categories while the gain in explanatory power 
decreases. PREVIOUS, Y2009 and BRITAIN are the three most important 
variables, but also the liquidity change variable LN(CHANGE_TR) meets the 
predetermined one per cent significance level, unaffected by binary or 
multinomial measurement. The three other liquidity and liquidity change 
                                            
621 Cf. Collignon, O., Monnez, J.-M. (2016), p. 1641 f. 
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indicator variables do not reach the required significance level; similar to the logit 
estimation, the cross validated accuracy is above 75 per cent. The outcome is 
unaffected by the use of normalized or not normalized data.  
 
The maintain group has the weakest accuracy measure while, contrarily, the 
most variables are classified correctly in the increase group.  
 
Table 22: Confusion matrix for multinomial LDA  
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Decrease   
in % 
Maintain   
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Decrease in % 1.84 2.15 4.45 8.44  
Maintain in % 2.45 1.69 11.66 15.80  
Increase in % 1.83 2.15 71.78 75.76  
Total in % 6.12 5.99 87.89 100.00  
 
The binary linear discriminant analysis estimates more than three–fourths 
of the test-data properly, with an overall accuracy of 79.75 per cent.  
 
That result means that binary measurement improves the model’s quality 
considerably, with more than 4.4 per cent.  
 
Table 23: Confusion matrix for binary LDA 
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Maintain/Decrease 
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Maintain/Decrease in % 8.89 15.34 24.23  
Increase in % 4.91 70.86 75.77  
Total in % 13.80 86.20 100.00  
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4.2.2.3 Decision tree analysis 
Both the liquidity and liquidity change variables split the tree using binary 
measurement. LN(DELTA_OI) is the most important variable in determining 
dividend decreases and splits the binary tree on the treetop. If the operating net 
income increases more than -0.033 per cent, British companies enlarge their 
dividends. If the company is not from Great Britain, and LN(TR) is above -0.22, 
that also leads companies to increase their distributions in comparison to the 
previous year. Also LN(CHANGE_TR) splits the tree at the bottom of the tree, 
where it has a positive influence on the probability of dividend increases.  
The multinomial tree also displays the influence of LN(DELTA_OI) and 
BRITAIN; a high operating income and British companies with operating incomes 
below -0.003 increase their dividends.  
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Figure 12: Multinomial decision tree 
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Figure 13: Binary decision tree 
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The calculated accuracy of the categorical classification tree is 75.77 per cent. 
The table shows that there are no “decrease” and “maintain” observations within 
the random selected dataset. Therefore, the model misclassifies the outcomes at a 
relatively high rate. 
 
Table 24: Confusion matrix for categorical classification tree 
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Decrease   
in % 
Maintain    
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Decrease in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Maintain in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Increase in % 8.44 15.79 75.77 100.00  
Total in % 8.44 15.79 75.77 100.00 
 
 
Binary measurement advances the model quality to 77.76 per cent. That 
shows an improvement of almost two per cent in comparison to the categorical 
classification tree.  
 
Table 25: Confusion matrix for binary classification tree 
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Maintain/Decrease  
in % 
Increase      
in % 
Total     
in % 
 
Maintain/Decrease in % 6.44 4.45 10.89  
Increase in % 17.79 71.32 89.11  
Total in % 24.23 75.77 100.00 
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4.2.2.4 Random forest analysis  
The liquidity variables show high significance for shifting distributions 
within the multinomial random forest analysis (values in parentheses denote the 
mean decrease in Gini impurity); the liquidity measure LN(TR) (38.43) ranked 
sixth out of 42 variables. The second liquidity variable, LN(SPREAD) (22.47), also 
shows comparatively high influence on dividend changes and ends in the 
midfield of the ranking. Both liquidity change variables - LN(CHANGE_TR) 
(35.05) and LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) (27.05) - are in the upper third. LN(TR) and 
LN(CHANGE_TR) are in the top eight of the variable selection.  
 
Compared to the multiclass estimation, the binary random forest analysis 
underlines the importance of the liquidity proxies. LN(TR) (37.34) and 
LN(CHANGE_TR) (32.26) remain essential influencing factors for dividend 
changes, while LN(DELTA_OI) (74.93) is the most important variable by far. 
These results do not correspond to the presumption that managers are focused 
primarily on keeping dividends constant. LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) (24.29) is in 
the top 15, whereas LN(SPREAD) (19.11) remains in the midfield position.  
In both the multinomial and the binary investigation, only LN(DELTA_OI), 
TGR, LN(DELTA_PBR), OIA and DELTA_TQ are better positioned than the 
liquidity measure LN(TR).   
 
To concentrate on the most important variables in particular, the following 
table presents all of the variables that have a mean decrease Gini that is larger 
than 10.  
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Table 26: Variable importance of the multinomial and binary random forest  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
mean decrease Gini 
[Multinomial RF] 
mean decrease Gini 
[Binary RF] 
LN(DELTA_OI) 68.18 74.93 
TGR 43.01 42.76 
LN(DELTA_PBR) 40.89 41.02 
OI 39.55 40.08 
TQ 38.12 39.10 
LN(TR) 38.43 37.34 
DELTA_TQ 38.85 34.44 
LN(CHANGE_TR) 35.05 32.26 
PREVIOUS 30.81 31.30 
LN(CHANGE_SIZE) 32.16 30.29 
LN(DELTA_CF) 31.85 28.27 
LN(PBR) 29.97 27.27 
CFTO 29.00 24.68 
LN(DELTA_DEBT) 26.00 24.51 
LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) 27.05 24.29 
LN(YIELD) 28.93 23.95 
LN(CHANGE_CASH) 25.92 22.58 
LN(SIZE) 24.10 21.62 
LN(CASH) 26.12 21.00 
NET_INV 24.98 20.75 
DEBT 23.94 20.41 
CGS 23.31 20.10 
LN(SPREAD) 22.47 19.11 
ANALYST 21.66 17.93 
LN(CHANGE_CGS) 16.56 13.46 
BRITAIN 12.67 13.27 
LN(ISSUANCE) 12.70 11.91 
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It can be demonstrated from Table 26 that the profitability level of the firm, 
which is represented by the LN(DELTA_OI) variable is by far the most important 
factor for correct classification of the dividend change variable.  
On the next level TGR represents investment opportunities. 
LN(DELTA_PBR) is ranked in third place and tends to be of special importance 
for dividend change categorization. The variables OI, DELTA_TQ and LN(TR) 
complete the set of the most important variables.  
 
The calculated accuracy for the random forest analysis is 76.23 per cent. The 
resulting confusion matrix supports previous findings that the “decrease” and 
“maintain” observations are largely underrepresented in the dataset. In 
comparison to the decision tree estimation, the goodness of fit increases slightly 
(by 0.15 per cent) by implementing further trees.  
 
Table 27: Confusion matrix for categorical random forest  
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Decrease 
in % 
Maintain 
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Decrease in % 0.16 0.30 0.00 0.46  
Maintain in % 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.60  
Increase in % 7.98 15.19 75.77 98.94  
Total in % 8.44 15.79 75.77 100.00  
 
The confusion matrix for the binary random forest shows that in 
comparison to the multinomial random forest more observations are classified in 
the “maintain/decrease” group. The more balanced distribution leads to 2.3 per 
cent more correctly classified predictions, in comparison to the categorical 
investigation. Accuracy is greater than three-quarters and is 78.53 per cent. 
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Table 28: Confusion matrix for binary random forest  
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Maintain/Decrease 
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Maintain/Decrease in % 2.76 0.00 2.76  
Increase in % 21.47 75.77 97.24  
Total in % 24.23 75.77 100.00  
4.2.2.5 Gradient boosting analysis 
The boosting algorithm trains samples that are difficult to categorize, to 
obtain models that are good at learning parts of the training data. Consequently, 
the quantitative outcome of variables with important influence is reduced with a 
simultaneous increase in the quality of variables used for classification.  
The relative influence of the multinomial and binary estimation is 
visualized in the following figure. The liquidity change variable 
LN(CHANGE_TR) and LN(TR) are selected by the gradient boosting algorithm as 
the third and seventh most influencing variable for dividend changes, with a 
relative influence of 2.07 per cent and 0.62 per cent. Neither of the liquidity 
variables LN(SPREAD) and LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) has any influence when 
performing multinomial gradient boosting.  
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Figure 14: Relative influence of the multinomial and binary gradient boosting 
analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seven further variables have weight in the gradient boosting selection. The 
change of operating net income is the most important factor by far, with 78.87 per 
cent relative influence. The combination of the variables LN(DELTA_OI) and 
PREVIOUS explains more than 95 per cent of the dividend changes. In summary, 
32 variables do not show any importance in gradient boosting, which highlights 
the relevance of the stock market liquidity change measure LN(CHANGE_TR) on 
the response variable in particular.  
The binary gradient boosting model shows that only four measures remain 
significant for the classification of dividend changes: LN(DELTA_OI), 
PREVIOUS, OI and TQ. Liquidity variables have no explanatory power within the 
binary gradient boosting model. In comparison to the categorical estimation of 
dividend changes the influence of LN(DELTA_OI) increases significantly in 
binary gradient boosting. The results support previous assumptions that the 
earning situation is most important for the binarily measured dividend change 
classification.  
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LN(DELTA_OI) has a very high influence on dividend changes, with 91.26 
per cent. Consequently, the additional three variables combined impact is lower 
than 9 per cent. 
The gradient boosting algorithm misclassifies almost one fourth of 
observations, giving 75.77 per cent accuracy.   
 
Table 29: Confusion matrix for categorical gradient boosting 
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Decrease 
in % 
Maintain 
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Decrease in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Maintain in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Increase in % 8.43 15.80 75.77 100.00  
Total in % 8.43 15.80 75.77 100.00  
 
Compared to the multinomial measurement techniques presented, gradient 
boosting accuracy remains constant at the 75.77 per cent level.  
 
Table 30: Confusion matrix for binary gradient boosting  
                       Reference 
 
Predicted 
Maintain/Decrease 
in % 
Increase 
in % 
Total 
in % 
 
Maintain/Decrease in % 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Increase in % 24.23 75.77 100.00  
Total in % 24.23 75.77 100.00  
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4.2.2.6 Exploration of the link between company size and liquidity 
The results presented so far show that stock market liquidity is one of most 
important determinants of dividend changes in the multinomial and binary 
random forest analyses as well as the multinomial gradient boosting and binary 
decision tree estimation. Moreover, liquidity variations rank among the ten most 
important variables for dividend changes in seven of the ten estimation 
techniques used. 
 Since larger companies tend to have easy access to capital markets on the 
one hand and stable cash flows and low debt ratios on the other hand, it remains 
to be investigated if company size promotes both stock liquidity as well as 
dividend changes. Accordingly, a binary logistic moderation analysis explores 
whether liquidity has a statistically significant weight on the influence of 
company size on the propensity for dividend changes.622 Company size (SIZE) is 
the independent variable, liquidity the moderation variable and the four most 
important variables of dividend increases of the previous investigations TGR, 
LN(DELTA_OI), PREVIOUS and LN_YIELD are used as controlling variables. All 
covariates are z score transformed, so that the company size and liquidity proxies 
have the same weight in the interaction term. The interaction term of “TR” and 
“SIZE” (INTER_SIZE_TR) influences the dividend increase variable DCB 
significantly negatively. 
 
Table 31: Results of the binary logit moderation analysis with the independent 
variable company size 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 1.2496 0.0563 22.2050*** 0.0000 
SIZE -0.0481 0.0549 -0.8760 0.3813 
TR 0.4954 0.1154 4.2930*** 0.0000 
INTER_SIZE_TR -0.3280 0.1025 -3.2010** 0.0014 
TGR 0.5173 0.0640 8.0830*** 0.0000 
LN(DELTA_OI) 0.3925 0.1943 2.0200* 0.0434 
PREVIOUS 0.4015 0.0481 8.3520*** 0.0000 
LN_YIELD -0.0695 0.0525 -1.3240 0.1855 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
                                            
622 Cf. Ai, C., Norton, E. C. (2003), p. 123 f. 
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The main effect of TR on the probability of affiliation in the dividend 
increase group is statistically significant and positive with a z-value of 4.293, 
whereas the interaction term’s influence is statistically significant and negative  
(z-value -3.201).  
The interaction term in logistic regression cannot simply be evaluated by 
the sign, magnitude or statistical significance of the variable.623 Therefore, to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, the corrected effect of stock liquidity on 
dividend changes and the moderation effect of company size are visualized in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Moderation effect of liquidity on the influence of company size on 
dividend changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above shows that the propensity to increase cash distributions 
varies only infinitesimally with company size, while it is substantially different in 
stock markets with low and high liquidity. When companies’ stock liquidity is 
high, firms increase their dividends rather than in low liquidity surroundings, 
regardless of their company size. 
                                            
623 Cf. Ai, C., Norton, E. C. (2003), p. 129.  
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Accordingly, the statistical outcome supports the suggestion that liquidity is 
the major reason for the influence of company size on dividend changes. The 
results strengthen the position that access to capital markets improves with 
increasing firm size and dividends are more likely to be increased.624 
Besides the moderating effect of stock liquidity on the impact of company 
size on dividend changes, stock liquidity could also be a mediator that affects 
dividend increases indirectly. 
Thus, a binary logistic mediation analysis following Hayes (2013) is used to 
determine whether the effect of company size on dividend changes is transmitted 
through stock liquidity. Despite there being a statistically significant positive 
main effect between liquidity and dividend changes, no mediating effect could be 
observed.  
Figure 16 gives the standardized regression coefficients for the relationship 
between stock liquidity (measured with TR) and dividend increases as mediated 
by company size. It also includes the four previously presented controlling 
variables. The indirect effect is given in parentheses. 
 
Figure 16: Path diagram of stock liquidity, company size and dividend increases  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
624 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 8. 
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The path diagram visualizes the absence of a statistically significant effect of 
company size on stock liquidity. Furthermore, the indirect effect is statistically 
insignificant. Accordingly, stock liquidity is not a mediator of the influence of 
company size on dividend increases. 
4.2.2.7 Investigation of the relationship between analysts and liquidity 
In addition to company size, the numbers of analysts that cover a stock are 
frequently stated to influence a firm’s dividend policy and liquidity level.625 The 
previously impact of analysts on dividend changes is negative when analyst 
coverage indicates a high-information environment that makes dividend 
increases redundant.626 The influence of analysts can also be positive, if their 
reporting is followed by institutional investors, who make dividend increases 
more likely.627 
 
To test whether stock liquidity impacts the relationship between analyst 
coverage and dividend changes, a moderation analysis is performed as a first 
step: 
 
Table 32: Results of the binary logit moderation analysis with the independent 
variable analyst coverage 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 1.2447 0.0561 22.2000*** 0.0000 
ANALYST -0.1989 0.0574 -3.4680*** 0.0005 
TR 0.3623 0.1069 3.3900*** 0.0007 
INTER_ANALYST_TR -0.0968 0.1248 -0.7760 0.4379 
TGR 0.5045 0.0639 7.8970*** 0.0000 
LN(DELTA_OI) 0.3610 0.1911 1.8900. 0.0588 
PREVIOUS 0.4054 0.0482 8.4110*** 0.0000 
LN_YIELD -0.0560 0.0525 -1.0670 0.2860 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
                                            
625 Cf. Brennan, M. J., Tamarowski, C. (2000), p. 26 f.; Francis, J. et al. (1997),     
p. 363 f.  
626 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 403 f. 
627 Cf. Reeding, L. (1997), p. 246. 
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Table 32 shows that the interaction term has no statistically significant 
influence on dividend changes. Accordingly, stock liquidity does not moderate 
the main effect of analyst coverage and dividend increases.   
In addition to the moderation analysis, a subsequent binary logistic 
mediation analysis explores, as a second step, whether stock liquidity mediates 
the influence of analyst coverage on the propensity for dividend increases.628  
The following path diagram illustrates the relationship between analyst 
coverage and dividend increases as mediated by stock liquidity. The indirect 
effect is stated in parentheses. 
 
Figure 17: Path diagram of stock liquidity, analyst coverage and dividend 
increases  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 illustrates that the direct effect of analyst coverage on dividend 
increases is statistically significant. Furthermore, it can be found from the above 
figure with high statistical significance that analyst coverage influences stock 
liquidity, and stock liquidity influences dividend increases.  
 
 
                                            
628 Cf. Ai, C., Norton, E. C. (2003), p. 123 f. 
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Both bootstrapping for standard errors629 and the Sobel test  (z-value -2.4782) 
show that the indirect effect is also significant, with low error probabilities; the 
influence of analyst coverage on dividend increases is mediated by stock 
liquidity.  
4.3 SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS  
4.3.1 Overview of the results  
4.3.1.1 Comparison of the models’ accuracy 
To show how well the models classify the dividend change observations, 
the cross validated accuracy is measured for the different models. For the logistic 
regression, LDA, and for the machine learning techniques used, the criterion laid 
down is that accuracy has to exceed the 70 per cent level.630  
 
Table 33 illustrates that all models satisfy the quality criterion and vary 
between 75.31 per cent and 80.83 per cent. 
 
Table 33: Comparison of accuracy values 
Model Accuracy 
multinomial 
Accuracy 
binary 
Panel logistic regression 76.23 80.83 
Linear discriminant analysis 75.31 79.75 
Decision tree 75.77 77.76 
Random forest 76.23 78.53 
Gradient boosting 75.77 75.77 
 
 
                                            
629 BootLLCI x BootULCI ≠ 0 
630 Cf. Baldi, P. et al. (2000), p. 413. 
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Despite the minimum accuracy level being reached, the multinomial 
machine learning techniques in particular base their accuracy valuation on 
positively estimated dividend increases only. Since dividend reductions and 
maintained dividends are not predicted, the accuracy of the model is a large 
limitation of those analyses.  
 
Within all ten of the estimations presented the cross validated accuracy 
changed by more than 5.5 per cent from the lowest to the highest value. Within 
the categorical and binary investigation random forest outperformed the other 
machine learning techniques. Surprisingly, both the panel logit and linear 
discriminant analysis provide better model accuracy than the machine learning 
algorithms using a binary outcome variable. Because the machine learning 
algorithms focus on increasing the model accuracy, these results deviate from the 
initial expectations. 
Due to the binary measurement of the dividend change variable and the 
reduction of the categories, the accuracy of the LDA increases by more than four 
per cent and the random forest prediction model improves from 76.23 per cent to 
78.53 per cent. The logistic regression improves most, from 76.23 per cent to 80.83 
per cent. 
In summary, all models except gradient boosting improve with the binary 
classification technique. Unexpectedly, the accuracy table displays the highest 
value for binary logistic regression; unaffected whether using normalized or not 
normalized estimates. The results show that multiple tree estimation, such as 
random forest and gradient boosting, does not per se outperform classical 
stochastic models.631  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
631 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 214. 
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4.3.1.2 Ranking multinomial variables by importance  
The ranking of variables by importance is interesting mainly for the 
evaluation of the first hypothesis, that stock market liquidity influences dividend 
changes. The ten most important variables of the multinomial investigation are 
summarized in Table 34. The liquidity measure LN(TR) ranks in sixth place in 
random forest and seventh place in gradient boosting, while LN(CHANGE_TR) is 
in tenth place in the panel logit model, eighth place in random forest and third 
place in the gradient boosting model. Despite LN(SPREAD) and 
LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) not showing statistically significant influence in either 
of the models, the results show support for the assumed importance of stock 
market liquidity on dividend changes for stochastic techniques as well as for data 
mining. LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) outperforms 27 further variables using random 
forest and ends in fifteenth place.  
 
Table 34: Multinomial variable importance ranking  
Rank Logit LDA Tree RF GBM 
1 LN(YIELD) PREVIOUS LN(DELTA_OI) LN(DELTA_OI) LN(DELTA_OI) 
2 PREVIOUS Y2009 BRITAIN TGR PREVIOUS 
3 TGR BRITAIN DELTA_TQ LN(DELTA_PBR) LN(CHANGE_TR) 
4 BRITAIN TGR PREVIOUS OI TQ 
5 OL OL DELTA_PBR DELTA_TQ LN(DELTA_PBR) 
6 CFTO DELTA_TQ DELTA_CF LN(TR) LN(CHANGE_SIZE) 
7 DELTA_TQ FRANCE  TQ LN(TR) 
8 LN(SIZE) LN(YIELD)  LN(CHANGE_TR) LN(PBR) 
9 TQ Y2010  LN(CHANGE_SIZE) LN(DELTA_CF) 
10 LN(CHANGE_TR) Y2013  LN(DELTA_CF)  
 
As can be seen from Table 34, LN(DELTA_OI) is the most important 
determinant for dividend change classification using machine learning. Also, 
PREVIOUS is collectively ranked high by the panel logit model, LDA, decision 
tree and gradient boosting.  
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LN(YIELD) is in first place for the panel logit, eighth in LDA and second 
using decision trees, but does not make the top ten using random forest and 
gradient boosting. That dividend changes vary in a country-specific manner is 
also underlined by the FRANCE measure, which is in seventh place using LDA.  
The stepwise forward selection selects Y2009, the year subsequent to the 
financial market crisis, in second place. The years Y2010 are Y2013 also in the top 
ten. 
TGR is in the top ten for every estimation technique, except the decision tree 
and the boosting algorithm. Companies that suffer a loss influence management’s 
propensity to reduce dividends (fifth in Panel Logit and LDA). 
LN(CHANGE_SIZE) contributes to the estimation of dividend changes in the 
random forest and the gradient boosting models.  
4.3.1.3 Ranking binomial variables by importance  
The ranking of variables using the binary measurement is highlighted in 
Table 35. 
 
Table 35: Ranking binomial variables by importance 
Rank Logit LDA Tree RF GBM 
1 PREVIOUS PREVIOUS LN(DELTA_OI) LN(DELTA_OI) 
 
LN(DELTA_OI) 
2 OL Y2009 BRITAIN 
 
TGR 
 
PREVIOUS 
3 TGR BRITAIN PREVIOUS LN(DELTA_PBR) OI 
4 BRITAIN TGR LN(DELTA_PBR) OI TQ 
5 LN(YIELD) OL LN(TR) TQ  
6 DELTA_TQ DELTA_TQ TGR LN(TR)  
7 CFTO Y2010 TQ DELTA_TQ  
8 Y2009 Y2014 LN(DELTA_DEBT) LN(CHANGE_TR)  
9 LN(CHANGE_TR) Y2013 DELTA_TQ PREVIOUS  
10 Y2010 LN(CHANGE_TR) LN(CHANGE_TR) LN(DELTA_CF)  
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Y2014 and LN(DELTA_DEBT) are the only new variables within the binary 
measurement, compared to categorical estimation. Despite changes in the 
position of some variables, the influencing variables remain the same overall.  
In summary, binary measurement of the dependent variable for dividend 
change also shows the importance of stock market liquidity on dividend changes.  
4.3.2 Interpretation of the empirical findings  
Despite the random forest selection ranking the liquidity variable 
LN(SPREAD) and the liquidity change variable LN(CHANGE_SPREAD) in a 
midfield position, they have no statistical impact on the classification of the 
endogenous variable in the panel logit model, the linear discriminant analysis, the 
decision tree algorithm and the gradient boosting investigation.  
Support for the presumed influence of stock market liquidity on dividend 
changes could be found for the liquidity variable LN(TR) within the binary and 
multinomial random forest, binary decision tree and the multinomial gradient 
boosting analysis. 
Additionally, the liquidity change variable LN(CHANGE_TR) contributes 
significantly to the propensity for dividend changes, regardless of binary or 
categorical measurement. LN(CHANGE_TR) has significant influence on 
dividend changes in all applied binary analyses except gradient boosting. The 
variable ranks highly in the multinomial random forest and gradient boosting 
selection and also has significant influence in the multinomial panel logit model 
and linear discriminant analysis.  
Correspondingly, the analysis fails to reject the hypothesis H1, Stock market 
liquidity significantly affects the probability of dividend changes, regardless of whether 
stochastic or logarithmic modeling is used.  
 
Although the outcome highlights the general importance of stock liquidity 
for dividend changes, the direction of influence is also important. Recalling the 
current state of research, two contradictory views on the impact of liquidity on 
dividends exist: Kale et al. (2012), Aggarwal et al. (2012) and Banerjee et al. (2007) 
claim that the relationship is substitutive and companies with highly liquid shares 
have no need for cash distributions. If investors require cash, they create 
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homemade dividends by selling shares, since liquidity goes hand in hand with 
low transaction costs of trading. 
Contrarily, Jiang, F. et al. (2017) state that the effect is complementary, and 
also Fama and French (2002) assume that companies pay more dividends with 
increasing liquidity as a function of their access to capital markets, which differs 
with firm size. To review the second hypothesis H2, Stock market liquidity has a 
negative effect on the probability of dividend decreases and the third hypothesis H3, 
Stock market liquidity has a positive effect on the probability of dividend increases,632 a 
closer look at the results of the panel logit, linear discriminant and the decision 
tree model is taken.   
Because increasing turnover ratios approximate increasing liquidity, a 
positive impact of LN(TR) and LN(CHANGE_TR) on dividend increases would 
show that the null hypotheses could be rejected. Within the binary and 
multinomial panel logit model rising liquidity also increases the propensity for 
dividend increases. The positive effect of LN(CHANGE_TR) on the group 
affiliation of dividend increases in the panel logit model supports the previous 
results that the relationship of stock liquidity on dividend changes is 
complementary.  
This is also supported by the LDA, where the variable reaches the defined 
0.01 level using Wilks’ lambda. The class means are lower in the increase group 
than in the decrease (decrease/maintain) group, which also suggests that high 
liquidity tends to encourage distributions to increase. The null hypothesis of H2 
and H3 is rejected with respect to the presented results. 
Moreover, LN(TR) and LN(CHANGE_TR) split the binary decision tree and 
influence the probability of dividend increases positively and make dividend 
decreases less likely.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
632 Derived from Fama, E. French, K. (2002). 
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In order to find an explanation for the complementary influence of liquidity 
on dividend changes, the impact of company size is investigated in more detail in 
line with Fama and French (2002). Due to existing fixed costs of issuance, good 
access to capital markets is a privilege of large companies and the firms’ stock 
liquidity level might vary depending on size.633 In view of that, stock market 
liquidity might be the reason company size matters for dividend changes. Using a 
binary logistic moderation analysis, it is found that the influence of firm size on 
dividend changes depends greatly on the liquidity level. That supports the 
previous assumption that larger companies face better surroundings for capital 
market access and dividend distributions than do smaller companies.  
 
Also the influence of analyst coverage on dividend changes, as argued by 
Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), turns out to be influenced by stock market 
liquidity. The statistically significant positive indirect effect of analyst coverage 
shows the stock liquidity level mediates the influence of analyst coverage on 
dividend changes.  
 
Summarized, the analysis supports the complementary theory of liquidity 
and dividend changes in large part, while company size appears to be a driver for 
this direction of influence. The impact is significant for the present liquidity level 
and when liquidity changes in comparison to the previous year. Changes of 
liquidity level in the sample companies are size-dependent, so that it is assumed 
that the size of the enterprise facilitates a superior entry to the capital market. 
Moreover, large companies face optimal conditions to distribute parts of their 
profits in the form of dividends due to their constant cash flow and their low 
leverage.  
Additionally, stock liquidity reduces the negative effect of analyst coverage 
on dividend increases. Since there is a positive relationship between buy side and 
sell side analysts and institutional investors, the investor’s desire for current 
income might be the reason for management’s increasing propensity to dividend 
increases.634 
 
                                            
633 Cf. Fama, E. French, K. (2002), p. 8. 
634 Cf. Reeding, L. (1997), p. 246. 
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4.3.3 Peculiarities and limitation of the research  
Since models help to reduce the complexity of reality, they contain only the 
features selected for the model maker’s purpose. That means that any model fails 
to reflect reality entirely and is accompanied by restrictions. The most meaningful 
limitations of the present research are presented here. 
 
Firstly, the sample companies are not randomly selected, as the STOXX 
Europe 600 reflects only significant European firms. Important information that is 
carried by smaller companies is not taken into account. In this connection, banks 
and other financial entities have a significant influence on the European economy, 
but are discarded from the final sample. Even though, on the one hand, the index 
composition as of January 2015 increases the availability of data, on the other 
hand it increases the probability of survivorship bias.635  
 
Secondly, the liquidity measures fail to distinguish between transitory and 
permanent price movements. Therefore, they do not measure liquidity as an 
equivalent of efficiency and the results might be biased by the volatility 
component.  
 
Thirdly, the multinomial observations of dividend changes show that 
decreases, maintenance and increases are unequally distributed. The final dataset 
contains many more dividend increases than unchanged and reduced dividends. 
This unequal distribution could lead to decreasing estimation accuracy within the 
categorization, as the information on dividend-decreasing companies as well as 
dividend-maintaining firms is underrepresented.  
 
Fourthly, some potential independent variables are missed out because they 
cannot be obtained from the database. In particular, those variables are ownership 
structure and shareholder identity. Apart from the fact that they are frequently 
used to measure the agency costs of equity, institutional investors might also be 
the reason for the mediation effect of stock liquidity on the influence of stock 
analysts on dividend changes. As a substitute, the rather gross CGS score is used. 
                                            
635 For further information see Brown, S. J., Goetzmann, W. (1992). 
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Although the scoring system for CGS takes the ownership structure into account, 
it respects numerous further criteria such as the supervisory board structure, 
compensation programs and audit oversight quality. Accordingly, CGS fails to 
measure the precise influence of the ownership structure. Moreover, abnormal 
returns and company age are not included in the investigation due to 
measurement problems.   
 
Fifthly, the different approaches that are implemented in the present 
investigation do not provide a uniform measure of variable importance. In 
particular, a comparison of the statistic methods with data mining is not possible 
without friction. As a consequence, the comparison of the different variable 
rankings might be biased by the chosen methodology.  
 
Sixthly, the models’ accuracy is a factor that could be improved to allow 
more reliable assumptions regarding the influence of stock market liquidity on 
dividend changes to be made. When investigating dividend changes 
multinomially, a misclassification rate of almost 25 per cent leaves room for 
optimization. Because fewer dividend decreases and unchanged dividends than 
increased dividends are given in the sample period, the cross validated accuracy 
frequently includes only a small number of decreases and maintain observations. 
The overall goodness of fit increases achieved using the binary measurement 
remains lower than 81 per cent. 
 
Seventhly, besides stock liquidity influencing dividend changes, there 
might also be reverse causality; dividend changes can impact the liquidity of 
securities. When firms change their dividends, it can cause shareholders to invest 
or disinvest, which in turn increases the trading volume. The potential reverse 
causations can produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Among 
other things, the described problem can be solved with a “Two Stage Least Square 
Estimation”. In the present study lagged explanatory variables are used in 
response to endogeneity concerns. 
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Eighthly, size is used as a proxy for access to capital markets in the present 
investigation but it can also be used to measure companies’ specific operating 
risk. Larger companies have more self-funding capabilities and are less likely to 
face the risk of insolvency. Accordingly, the influence of company size on 
dividend changes calls for additional research that is beyond the scope of this 
work.  
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 SUMMARY 
The dissertation aims to answer the specific question as to whether the 
tradability of shares determined shifting dividend payouts in Europe within the 
time period from 2006 to 2014. It is copiously documented in the literature that 
investors rely on dividend signals, which frequently lead to stock price 
reactions.636 Following the dividend discount model, the fair firm valuation is the 
sum of the firm’s present values of future cash flows such as dividend 
payments.637 Since not every dividend change event makes investors review the 
valuation of the company, the information content of dividend changes appears 
to be multifaceted.638 To create a deeper understanding, the signaling hypothesis 
of dividends is assessed to find whether or not the relevant conditions are 
satisfied.639 There is evidence to support the view that investors take dividends 
into account when they make investment decisions; and also that dividend 
changes commonly follow increases in firm’s earnings.640  
Because managers hesitate to cut dividends, dividend initiations have a 
special signaling role.641 First time cash distributions lead to high expectations that 
the cash distribution will be followed by many further payouts.642 Dividend 
initiations have a positive effect on the share valuation as investors desire 
                                            
636 Cf. Benesh, G. A. et al. (1984), p. 131 f.; Best, R. J., Best, R. W. (2001), p. 361 f.; 
Denis, D. J. et al. (1994), p. 567 f.; Yoon, P. S., Starks, L. T. (1995), p. 995 f.; 
Woolridge, J. R. (1982), p. 245. 
637 Cf. Gordon, M. J., Shapiro, E. (1956), p. 102 f. 
638 Cf. Bajaj, M., Vijh, A. M. (1990), p. 193 f.; Dhillon, U. S., Johnson, H. (1994),   
p. 281 f., among others.  
639 Cf. Liu, C., Chen, A.-S. (2015), p. 205.   
640 Cf. Chen, T.-Y., Kao, L.-J. (2014), p. 508; Iqbal, Z., Rahmann, M. H. (2002),    
p. 23; Nissim, D., Ziv, A. (2001), p. 2131. 
641 Cf. Ross, S. A. et al. (2005), among others. 
642 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 393.   
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dividends, but they can also indicate that investment opportunities have 
declined.643 On another note, dividend omissions are frequently the result of weak 
current and historical profitability.644 Nonetheless, they can also display enhanced 
investments and growth opportunities.645 
To find the driving factors of dividend changes, possible determinants of 
dividend probabilities and dividend yields are derived from different theories 
such as trade-off theory and agency implications, because dividend change 
literature is somewhat limited. Generally, managers decide to pay or not to pay 
dividends as a sum of the disbursement costs and benefits, individual tax rates, 
investors’ demand for dividends and the influence on the company’s agency 
costs.646 The evaluation of the existing dividend change literature expands the 
variables available for selection by analyst coverage, abnormal returns, historical 
dividend yields and index membership.647  
In addition to dividend changes, the company’s stock liquidity level also 
plays a noteworthy role within the refinancing process.648  
 
Stock liquidity can lessen financing costs and make additional funding 
easier to source because agency costs decrease if shareholders can reverse their 
investment decision easily.649 This in turn can increase the firm’s valuation.650 The 
management decision to change the distribution policy can also vary with 
                                            
643 Cf. Wansley, J. W., Lane, W. R. (1987), p. 434. 
644 Cf. Ghosh, C., Woolridge, J. R. (1991), p. 328; Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G. 
(1988), p. 173, Liu et al. (2008), p. 1015.  
645 Cf. Christie, W. G. (1994), p. 473.  
646 Cf. Rozeff, M. S. (1982), p. 255 f.  
647 Cf. Aggarwal, R. et al. (2012), p. 420 f.; Bulan, L. et al. (2007), p. 20;               
De Cesari, A., Huang-Meier, W. (2015), p. 8 f.; Deshmukh, S. (2003), p. 364 f.; 
Goergen, M. et al. (2005), p. 387 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f.; Li, W., Lie, E. 
(2006), p. 303 f.; Luebke, K., Rojahn, J. (2016), p. 335 f. 
648 Cf. Gopalan, R. et al. (2012), p. 333 f.; Hoshi, T. et al. (1991), p. 57; Kale, J. R. 
et al. (2012), p. 365 f. 
649 Cf. Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H. (2004), p. 382.   
650 Cf. Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H. (2004), p. 392; Husman, C. (2003), p. 81. 
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feedback from stock prices.651 Liquidity generates positive feedback prices, while 
illiquidity is penalized by adverse price movements that make ensuring stock 
trading with low friction an overarching management goal.652 
Although stock liquidity is an important driver of value for shareholders, 
the definition and measurement of liquidity are difficult due to its multi-
dimensional character.653 In the present investigation liquidity is synonymous 
with efficiency, which means that the highest form of liquidity is immediate 
trading.654 
Due to the complexity of the measurement of liquidity, the literature 
approximates liquidity with transaction costs.655 The higher the transaction costs 
of trading are, the more the definition of liquidity moves away from being 
synonymous with efficiency.656 The overview of the different transaction costs 
that trading implies concentrates particularly on the market makers’ order 
processing, inventory holding and adverse information costs.657 
Based on the liquidity dimensions of tightness, depth, resilience and time, 
possible liquidity measures are selected for the present investigation. They are 
further categorized into pre-trade and post-trade measures.658 Although pre-trade 
measures can be influenced by “gaming” and do not take potential traders that 
monitor the order book into consideration, they provide valuable insights because 
they do not overrate trading opportunities as post-trade measures do.659 When 
liquidity is approximated after the trade takes place, those measures are free from 
gaming and take potential traders into account.660 Both measures provide 
                                            
651 Cf. Fang, V. et al. (2009), p. 150 f.; Subrahmanyam, A., Titman, S. (2001),      
p. 2389 f. 
652 Cf. Loukil, N. (2015), p. 415. 
653 Cf. Brunner (1996), p. 3; Chai, D. et al. (2010), p. 181 f.; Grullon, G. et al. 
(2004), p. 457; Makower, H., Marschak, J. (1986), p. 284.  Ranaldo, A. (2001), p. 312. 
654 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 8.   
655 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 9 f. 
656 Cf. Aitken, M., Comerton-Forde, C. (2003), p. 46. 
657 Cf. Madhavan, A. (2000), p. 208 f.  
658 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 27 f. 
659 Cf. Collins, B. M., Fabozzi, F. J. (1991), p. 32. 
660 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 47. 
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important information, so that one pre-trade and one post-trade measure that 
meet the defined criteria of symmetry, data availability and comparability are 
selected for the final investigation.  
The relative spread to mid price (pre-trade) as well as the turnover ratio 
(post-trade) meets those requirements661 and are selected to be the most suitable 
proxies for the present investigation due to their difficulty of interpretation, 
liquidity valuation and consideration of potential traders and invisible orders.662 
While the spread primarily measures the tightness of the limited order book, the 
turnover ratio covers the depth and the time dimension.663 To control for liquidity 
changes, the two proxies are also estimated, scaled by the previous year’s 
figure.664  
Reviewing current studies, the theoretical influence of stock liquidity on 
dividend changes is ambiguous: The relationship can either be substitutive665 or 
complementary.666 Transaction costs are stated to be one of the key drivers for the 
negative influence of stock liquidity on dividends, when investors satisfy their 
liquidity needs by cheap home-made dividends in highly liquid capital 
markets.667 Furthermore, both stock market liquidity and dividend changes are 
informative regarding the current situation of a firm, which makes them look 
interchangeable.668 Dividends, as well as liquidity, can reduce investment risk and 
help to minimize agency problems.669  
 
 
 
                                            
661 Cf. Kindermann, S. (2005), p. 112. 
662 See sub-chapter 3.2.4 for further information.   
663 Cf. Elyasiani, E. et al. (2000), p. 2; Wyss, R. (2004), p. 9. 
664 Cf. Wyss, R. (2004), p. 14. 
665 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007), p. 369 f.; Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f. 
666 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 1 f.; Jiang, F. et al. (2017), p. 295 f. 
667 Cf. Banerjee, S. et al. (2007), p. 369 f. 
668 Cf. Kale, J. R. et al. (2012), p. 365 f. 
669 Cf. Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), p. 753; Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H. 
(1976), p. 342 f. 
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A reason for the positive influence of liquidity on dividend changes is the 
decreasing sensitivity of stock prices to new information in liquid markets. If 
share prices do not respond to new information, it becomes easier for informed 
traders to hide information.670 Consequently, acquiring information rises in 
significance for uninformed traders to assimilate information asymmetries. If they 
do so, the increased information level will also help them to detect management’s 
opportunistic behavior and managers will react with cash distributions.  
The complementary effect of stock market liquidity and dividend changes is 
further supported by the better access to capital markets of large companies that 
provides them with shares that are more liquid.671 Despite increasing liquidity, 
those companies are more likely to distribute dividends due to their constant cash 
flows and low leverage. Accordingly, liquidity is a possible explanation of why 
company size matters for dividend probabilities, dividend yields and also 
dividend changes.  
To test which effect dominates, classical stochastic techniques (panel logit 
regression, LDA) are complemented by machine learning techniques (decision 
tree, random forest, gradient boosting) that are comparatively innovative in this 
research field.672  
The machine learning models, using different algorithms, show that stock 
liquidity and stock liquidity changes contribute to the classification of dividend 
changes. The LN(TR) variable is one of the seven most important variables in the 
multinomial random forest and gradient boosting selection as well as in the 
binary decision tree and random forest analysis. The binary decision tree shows 
that the direction of influence is positive; stock liquidity makes dividend increases 
more likely.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
670 Cf. Jiang, F. et al. (2017), p. 295 f. 
671 Cf. Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (2002), p. 1 f. 
672 Cf. Breiman, L. (2001), p. 214. 
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The importance of the change in turnover ratio for shifting dividends is also 
underlined by all of the binary estimation techniques except gradient boosting 
and the multinomial panel logit, random forest and gradient boosting algorithm. 
The positive t-values of the logistic regression, the mean values of the linear 
discriminant analysis and the structure of the decision tree show that the 
influence of changing stock market liquidity on dividend changes is positive. The 
results presented support the complementary assumption that dividends increase 
when stock market liquidity rises.  
To investigate whether stock liquidity influences the effect of company size 
and stock analysts on dividend changes, binary logistic moderation and binary 
logistic mediation analyses are conducted, with the result that stock liquidity 
moderates the effect of company size and mediates the effect of analyst coverage 
on dividend changes. These findings provide a potential explanation as to why 
company size and stock analysts are frequently analyzed as having influence on 
dividend changes.  
5.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The investigation of the STOXX Europe 600 index during a nine-year time 
period shows that stock market liquidity and liquidity variations can influence 
dividend changes in Europe. The results are found regardless of whether 
traditional stochastic models or machine learning techniques are used.  
Table 36 illustrates the key findings of the dissertation:  
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Table 36: Answers to the initial research questions  
"Does stock liquidity influence dividend changes in Europe?" 
Multinomial and binary panel logit 
Yes  
(section 4.2.2.1) 
Multinomial and binary LDA 
Yes  
(section 4.2.2.2) 
Binary decision tree 
Yes 
(section 4.2.2.3) 
Multinomial and binary random forest 
Yes  
(section 4.2.2.4) 
Multinomial gradient boosting 
Yes  
(section 4.2.2.5) 
"What is the direction of influence?" 
Multinomial and binary panel logit 
Positive  
(section 4.2.2.1) 
Multinomial and binary LDA 
Positive 
(section 4.2.2.2) 
Binary decision tree 
Positive 
(section 4.2.2.3)  
 
The analysis shows that stock market liquidity is a statistically significant 
positive driver for dividend changes in Europe. When the liquidity level is high 
or increases in comparison to the previous year, companies more likely increase 
and less likely decrease their dividends. One possible explanation for the 
complementary effect is company size. Larger firms have superior access to 
capital markets than small firms have, which improves the liquidity of the stocks 
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of larger companies. Besides more liquidly traded shares, large companies are 
usually not greatly indebted and have constant earnings and cash flows so that 
the propensity for dividend increases rises.  
The finding that stock market liquidity increases makes dividend increases 
(decreases) more likely (more unlikely) puts a further piece of the puzzle in place 
and amplifies business understanding. Stock liquidity helps to anticipate 
dividend changes and shareholders can benefit from the resulting stock price 
reactions, whereas managers can prevent negative feedback from share prices.  
5.3 OUTLOOK 
Investigating the liquidity phenomenon and its influence on dividend 
changes provides additional fruitful avenues for further research.  
Previous investigations state that US firms do not lessen dividend payments 
due to management's reluctance for dividend decreases.673 That shows that the 
dividend change decision depends in large part on management's subjective 
attitude and can be seen as an active management choice. Consequently, 
managements' risk attitude is one important factor for shifting dividends. Since 
risk is especially driven by what is unknown by management, lacking 
information is a further driver for distribution assumptions. This additional 
analysis can contribute to the agency-oriented view on dividend changes by 
focusing on managers’ attitudes towards cash payouts.  
In addition, future analysis can investigate whether the influence of the 
shareholder structure on dividend changes is influenced by stock liquidity. The 
impact on dividend changes of different shareholder concentrations and 
shareholder identities might be moderated or mediated by stock market liquidity. 
This possible connection is not well studied in the current state of research.    
Finally, several further possible proxies for liquidity exist that are 
frequently not available for long-term research. The resilience dimension, 
especially, has not been adequately measured. As modern databases put more 
importance on the electronic archiving of stock market liquidity data, they pay 
more attention to collecting information relevant to liquidity. Further 
                                            
673 Cf. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. (1990), p. 1415 f. 
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investigation of the liquidity dimension can add value to this multidimensional 
phenomenon in future investigations. 
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